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El. knyga: Logical Empiricism and Naturalism: Neurath and Carnap's Metatheory of Science

  • Formatas: EPUB+DRM
  • Serija: Vienna Circle Institute Library
  • Išleidimo metai: 01-Jun-2023
  • Leidėjas: Springer International Publishing AG
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9783031293283
  • Formatas: EPUB+DRM
  • Serija: Vienna Circle Institute Library
  • Išleidimo metai: 01-Jun-2023
  • Leidėjas: Springer International Publishing AG
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9783031293283

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This text provides an extensive exploration of the relationship between the thought of Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap, providing a new argument for the complementarity of their mature philosophies as part of a collaborative meta-theory of science. In arguing that both Neurath and Carnap must be interpreted as proponents of epistemological naturalism, and that their naturalisms rest on shared philosophical ground, it is also demonstrated that the boundaries and possibilities for epistemological naturalism are not as restrictive as Quinean orthodoxy has previously suggested. Both building on and challenging the scholarship of the past four decades, this naturalist reading of Carnap also provides a new interpretation of Carnap’s conception of analyticity, allowing for a refutation of the Quinean argument for the incompatibility of naturalism and the analytic/synthetic distinction. In doing so, the relevance and potential importance of their scientific meta-theory for contemporary questions in the philosophy of science is demonstrated.

This text appeals to students and researchers working on Logical Empiricism, Quine, the history of analytic philosophy and the history of philosophy of science, as well as proponents of naturalized epistemology.

Recenzijos

"Logical Empiricism and Naturalism could be used by anyone who wants to quickly get up to date on where the literature stands now on Carnap and Neurath ... . The book is an engaging contribution to the best tradition within integrated history of analytic philosophy. I wish the book was cheaper on Springers site and contained a detailed Index of terms and names." (Adam Tamas Tuboly, Metascience, Vol. 33 (3), 2024)

Introduction.- 1. Naturalism and the Vienna Circle.- 2. Neuraths
Epistemology of Science.- 3. Neuraths Conception of Protocol Statements.-
4. Carnapian Explication.- 5. Quine, Carnap, and Analyticity.- 6. Challenges
to the Bipartite Metatheory Interpretation.- 7. Bipartite Metatheory in
Application.
Dr. Bentley's primary interests are in the history of analytic philosophy and the history of philosophy of science, and in applying the insights gained from these historical studies to contemporary issues, primarily in philosophy of science and epistemology. His recent research focuses particularly on the work of Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap, and explores their respective projects providing a meta-theory for science. He is attempting to demonstrate the compatibility of their two projects as a form of naturalized epistemology which retains a conventional analytic/synthetic distinction, and is therefore distinct from more familiar Quinean approaches to epistemological naturalism.