Atnaujinkite slapukų nuostatas

El. knyga: Logical Structure of Kinds [Oxford Scholarship Online E-books]

(University of Arkansas)
  • Formatas: 194 pages
  • Išleidimo metai: 17-Jul-2014
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-13: 9780198713302
  • Oxford Scholarship Online E-books
  • Kaina nežinoma
  • Formatas: 194 pages
  • Išleidimo metai: 17-Jul-2014
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-13: 9780198713302
Eric Funkhouser uncovers a logical structure that is common to many, if not all, classificatory systems or taxonomies. Every conceptual scheme--including the sciences, mathematics, and ethics--classifies things into kinds. Given their ubiquity across theoretical contexts, we would benefit from understanding the nature of such kinds. Significantly, most conceptual schemes posit kinds that vary in their degree of specificity. Species-genus taxonomies provide us with familiar examples, with the species classification being more specific than the genus classification. This book instead focuses on adjectival kinds--classifications picked out by kind-terms like "mass," "shape," or "belief," to give but a few examples.

Some adjectival kinds specify others--for example, scarlet is a specific kind of red. This is an instance of the determinate-determinable relation. One of the fundamental claims of this book is that studying the determination relation provides deep insight into the essences of adjectival kinds and their instances (properties). The determination relation is found to contain two components, which are employed to structure kinds at the same level of abstraction into property spaces. In turn, these property space models lead to a theory for individuating properties, which has profound consequences when it comes to reduction, autonomy, and causation.

Determination relations are contrasted with realization relations, the latter being the favored way of understanding how the mental and the physical are related. Particular attention is given to the distinction between multiple realizability and multiple determination, and it is argued that determination and realization are mutually exclusive relations. This has been overlooked in many discussions of multiple realizability, but it is central to maintaining the connection between multiple realizability and autonomy. The claim that multiple realizability entails various senses of autonomy is defended from various reductionist challenges. These theories of determination and realization ultimately provide general standards for establishing the autonomy of the special sciences or, conversely, their reduction.
1 Introduction
1(15)
1.1 Scope
6(3)
1.2 Terminology and Assumptions
9(3)
1.3 Relevance and Importance
12(1)
1.4 Methodology
13(3)
2 Determination and Kinds
16(39)
2.1 Kind Necessitation
16(4)
2.2 Specification and Realization
20(5)
2.3 Determination Dimensions and Property Spaces
25(7)
2.4 Determinates and Determinables
32(5)
2.5 A Model and Analysis
37(6)
2.6 Confirming the Analysis
43(5)
2.7 Individuating Properties
48(4)
2.8 Determinates of a Determinable and Species of a Genus
52(3)
3 Objections and Responses
55(21)
3.1 Objections and Concerns about Determination Dimensions
55(11)
3.1.1 Can Determinables Have a Dual Nature?
55(7)
3.1.2 What is the Epistemology for Discovering Determination Dimensions?
62(1)
3.1.3 Are Simple Property Spaces Informative?
63(2)
3.1.4 Do Tropes Have Determination Dimensions?
65(1)
3.2 Are Properties or Kinds More Fundamental?
66(4)
3.3 How Many Kinds?
70(2)
3.4 Eliminativism about Determinables
72(4)
4 Multiple Realizability I: Its Role and Importance
76(39)
4.1 Sameness through Difference
76(2)
4.2 Realization
78(15)
4.3 Multiple Realizability and Autonomy
93(8)
4.3.1 Ontological Autonomy
94(3)
4.3.2 Explanatory Autonomy
97(2)
4.3.3 Methodological Autonomy
99(2)
4.4 Objections to Alternative Accounts
101(10)
4.4.1 Confusing Realization with Determination
101(2)
4.4-2 Different Ways of Performing a Function
103(3)
4.4.3 Disjunctions, Heterogeneity, and Kim's Challenge
106(5)
4.5 The Mutual Exclusivity of Determination and Realization (Again)
111(4)
5 Multiple Realizability II: An Analysis
115(60)
5.1 An Analysis
115(3)
5.2 Objections and Replies
118(13)
5.3 Memory: A Case Study of Fragmentation
131(10)
5.4 Explanatory Benefits of the Present Analysis
141(21)
5.4.1 Weak Ontological Autonomy
141(9)
5.4.2 Weak Explanatory Autonomy
150(10)
5.4.3 Weak Methodological Autonomy
160(2)
5.5 Concepts, Kinds, and Inter-Theoretic Reduction
162(10)
5.5.1 Concepts and Kinds
162(2)
5.5.2 Examples: Chemical Reductions
164(4)
5.5.3 Singular Realizability
168(4)
5.6 Concluding Thoughts
172(3)
Bibliography 175(6)
Index 181
Eric Funkhouser is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arkansas. He has published in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of action.