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Management Perspectives Pertaining to Root Cause Analyses of Nunn-Mccurdy Breaches: Program Manager Tenure, Oversight of Acquisition Category II Programs, and Framing Assumptions [Minkštas viršelis]

  • Formatas: Paperback / softback, 134 pages, aukštis x plotis: 254x178 mm
  • Išleidimo metai: 31-Oct-2014
  • Leidėjas: RAND
  • ISBN-10: 0833087398
  • ISBN-13: 9780833087393
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
  • Formatas: Paperback / softback, 134 pages, aukštis x plotis: 254x178 mm
  • Išleidimo metai: 31-Oct-2014
  • Leidėjas: RAND
  • ISBN-10: 0833087398
  • ISBN-13: 9780833087393
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
The authors analyze what motivates defense contractors to determine if better incentives exist to the ones now used, and analyze major defense acquisition programs to see if it is possible to identify programs that might incur a Nunn-McCurdy breach.
Preface iii
Figures
vii
Tables
ix
Summary xi
Acknowledgments xix
Abbreviations xxi
Chapter One Introduction
1(2)
Background and Purpose
1(1)
How This Report Is Organized
1(2)
Chapter Two Contractor Incentives
3(42)
Introduction
3(2)
Background
5(1)
Regulations, Policy, and Guidance
6(13)
Regulations
6(1)
Historical Trends in Contract Policy
7(4)
Guidance
11(1)
Service Contracts
12(3)
Effectiveness and Recent Implementation of Contract Strategies
15(1)
Acquisition Documentation History
16(2)
Industry Incentives
18(1)
Multiyear Contracting
19(5)
Multiyear, Multiple Year, and Block Buy Contracting
20(1)
Regulations Governing Multiyear Contracts
21(2)
Benefits of Using Multiyear Contracts
23(1)
Summary of the COG Discussions
24(17)
Setting the Stage: COG Meetings
25(1)
Major Points of the COG Discussions
26(1)
Contractor/Firm Motivations and Incentives
26(4)
Government Influence Mechanisms: Levers That Government Can Pull
30(3)
When Are Certain Contract Types and Lengths Effective, and How?
33(1)
DoD Behaviors and Processes as Enablers or Barriers to Contractor Incentives
34(2)
Improving the Acquisitions Process
36(1)
Aligning Government Incentives to Industry Motivations
37(1)
Characterizing Incentive Structures for Large, Complex Systems
37(1)
Characterizing Incentive Structures for Information Technology and Communications Programs
38(2)
Characterizing Incentive Structures for Service Contracts
40(1)
Summary and Observations
41(1)
Conclusions and Recommendations
41(4)
Chapter Three A Methodology for Anticipating Nunn-McCurdy Breaches
45(28)
Background and Objectives
46(1)
Analytical Framework and Methodology
46(6)
Step 1
48(1)
Step 2
49(2)
Step 3
51(1)
An Initial Demonstration of the Framework
52(13)
Observations and Extensions
65(6)
Concluding Remarks and Recommendation
71(2)
Chapter Four Concluding Observations
73(2)
Appendixes
A Membership of the COG
75(2)
B Truth-Revealing Incentive Mechanisms Manages Asymmetric Information Example
77(4)
C Executive Compensation
81(6)
D Exploration of Multiyear Use
87(10)
E Evolution of Nunn-McCurdy Legislation
97(6)
Bibliography 103