Preface |
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ix | |
About the Method of the Project |
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ix | |
A Comment on the Content and Form of this Book |
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xi | |
Acknowledgements |
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xiii | |
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1 | (7) |
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Origins and Initial Reception |
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2 | (1) |
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The Development of the Debate |
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3 | (2) |
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Is the Argument Worth All the Attention? |
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5 | (2) |
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The Overlooked Pre-History |
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7 | (1) |
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8 | (22) |
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McTaggart's Approach to Metaphysics |
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10 | (1) |
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The Importance of Appearance |
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11 | (1) |
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The Structure of The Nature of Existence |
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12 | (3) |
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The General Nature of the Existent in Absolute Reality |
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15 | (2) |
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McTaggart's Metaphysics in Axiomatic Form |
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17 | (3) |
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20 | (2) |
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Time as an Existing Whole: A Block Universe |
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22 | (2) |
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Substances, Things, and Events as Compound Entities |
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24 | (3) |
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The Relation between Absolute Reality and Our Beliefs about It |
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27 | (2) |
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The Universe Is a Compound Substance, but Can It Be Temporal? |
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29 | (1) |
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30 | (24) |
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30 | (1) |
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30 | (3) |
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Elaboration I The Ontological Status of Series and Positions |
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33 | (2) |
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No B Series without an A Series |
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35 | (3) |
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"Events Don't Change, Things Do" |
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38 | (2) |
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Elaboration II Change and Truth |
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40 | (2) |
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A Return to "No B Series without an A Series" |
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42 | (1) |
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The Contradictory Nature of the A Series |
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43 | (6) |
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Reprise: The Contradiction |
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49 | (1) |
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McTaggart's Criticism of Broad's Theory of Time |
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50 | (2) |
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Does Experience Support the Reality of Time with Immediate Certainty? |
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52 | (1) |
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Even If Experience of Time Is Illusory, Not Everything in It Is Illusory |
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52 | (1) |
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McTaggart Is Closer to Hegel than Kant, and not Unlike Russell |
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53 | (1) |
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54 | (6) |
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55 | (2) |
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57 | (1) |
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The Nature of the C Series |
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58 | (2) |
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60 | (18) |
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60 | (1) |
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The Defense of the Contradiction |
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61 | (2) |
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McTaggart and the Token-Reflexivity of Propositions |
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63 | (3) |
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The Defenders on the Ontological Status of Future and Past |
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66 | (1) |
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67 | (1) |
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Must There Be a Complete Description? |
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68 | (3) |
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Complete Description from No-When or Every-When? |
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71 | (2) |
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A Circular Rather than Infinite Regress? |
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73 | (3) |
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76 | (2) |
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78 | (14) |
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No Contradiction because Tense is Subjective |
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79 | (2) |
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There Is No Appearance of Contradiction |
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81 | (6) |
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McTaggart Misunderstands the Semantics of Tensed Language |
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87 | (3) |
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"Events Don't Change, Things Do" |
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90 | (2) |
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7 The B View and the Problem of Change |
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92 | (20) |
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The Link between Change, Persistence, and Time |
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94 | (2) |
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The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics |
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96 | (3) |
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The Spatial Analogue Argument |
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99 | (1) |
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`Wholly Present', `Singly Located', vs. `Multiply Located' |
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100 | (3) |
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103 | (5) |
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Simons's Theory of Invariants |
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108 | (2) |
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Properties as Relations to Times |
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110 | (1) |
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111 | (1) |
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8 The A View and the Problem of Tense |
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112 | (28) |
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Realism about the Future, Present, and Past I: A-B Hybrids |
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113 | (4) |
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Interlude: Cameron's Moving Spotlight Theory |
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117 | (3) |
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Realism about the Future, Present, and Past II: Fragmentalism |
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120 | (2) |
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The Branching View of Tense |
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122 | (1) |
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Rejecting the Future: The Growing Block |
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123 | (5) |
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128 | (6) |
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134 | (1) |
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Problem of Cross-Time Relations |
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135 | (1) |
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New Directions for Presentism? |
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136 | (3) |
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139 | (1) |
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140 | (3) |
Bibliography |
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143 | (8) |
Index |
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151 | |