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McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time, first published in 1908, set the agenda for 20th-century philosophy of time. Yet there is very little agreement on what it actually says—nobody agrees with the conclusion, but still everybody finds something important in it. This book presents the first critical overview of the last century of debate on what is popularly called "McTaggart’s Paradox". Scholars have long assumed that McTaggart’s argument stands alone and does not rely on any contentious ontological principles. The author demonstrates that these assumptions are incorrect—McTaggart himself explicitly claimed his argument to be dependent on the ontological principles that form the basis of his idealist metaphysics. The result is that scholars have proceeded to understand the argument on the basis of their own metaphysical assumptions, duly arriving at very different interpretations. This book offers an alternative reading of McTaggart’s argument, and at the same time explains why other commentators arrive at their mutually incompatible interpretations. It will be of interest to students and scholars with an interest in the philosophy of time and other areas of contemporary metaphysics.

Recenzijos

"The book . . . is truly an excellent piece of both philosophy and scholarship: argumentative and rigorous, informative and thought provoking. It is also superbly written, exhibiting exceptional clarity, concision, and flow. It is in all respects a first rate contribution. Anybody interested in McTaggart, the philosophy of time, or metaphysics will reap tremendous rewards from engaging with Ingthorsson's ideas; do give them a go."Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

"Ingthorssons valuable book is a focused study of the paradox, which offers an insight into McTaggarts overall metaphysical system and discusses a range of responses to the paradox . . . [ This] is a valuable and well-researched addition to the literature on McTaggarts infamous argument, and scholars interested in the paradox will benefit from careful study of it."David Ingram in Review of Metaphysics

"For anyone who wants to get to grips with the major threads of thought that developed in response to McTaggart, this is an invaluable resource . . . The book is a rich source of argumentation and discussion of a number of core issues in the philosophy of time, and for that reason is well worth a read."Kristie Miller in Phenomenological Reviews

"This book is, to date, clearly the most comprehensive and critical overview of the debate on McTaggarts paradox."Michelle Beer, Florida International University, USA

Preface ix
About the Method of the Project ix
A Comment on the Content and Form of this Book xi
Acknowledgements xiii
1 The Introduction
1(7)
Origins and Initial Reception
2(1)
The Development of the Debate
3(2)
Is the Argument Worth All the Attention?
5(2)
The Overlooked Pre-History
7(1)
2 The Metaphysics
8(22)
McTaggart's Approach to Metaphysics
10(1)
The Importance of Appearance
11(1)
The Structure of The Nature of Existence
12(3)
The General Nature of the Existent in Absolute Reality
15(2)
McTaggart's Metaphysics in Axiomatic Form
17(3)
McTaggart on Persistence
20(2)
Time as an Existing Whole: A Block Universe
22(2)
Substances, Things, and Events as Compound Entities
24(3)
The Relation between Absolute Reality and Our Beliefs about It
27(2)
The Universe Is a Compound Substance, but Can It Be Temporal?
29(1)
3 The Argument
30(24)
The Preamble
30(1)
The Appearance of Time
30(3)
Elaboration I The Ontological Status of Series and Positions
33(2)
No B Series without an A Series
35(3)
"Events Don't Change, Things Do"
38(2)
Elaboration II Change and Truth
40(2)
A Return to "No B Series without an A Series"
42(1)
The Contradictory Nature of the A Series
43(6)
Reprise: The Contradiction
49(1)
McTaggart's Criticism of Broad's Theory of Time
50(2)
Does Experience Support the Reality of Time with Immediate Certainty?
52(1)
Even If Experience of Time Is Illusory, Not Everything in It Is Illusory
52(1)
McTaggart Is Closer to Hegel than Kant, and not Unlike Russell
53(1)
4 The C Series
54(6)
Error
55(2)
Time and Error
57(1)
The Nature of the C Series
58(2)
5 The Defenses
60(18)
The General Attitude
60(1)
The Defense of the Contradiction
61(2)
McTaggart and the Token-Reflexivity of Propositions
63(3)
The Defenders on the Ontological Status of Future and Past
66(1)
The Core of the Dispute
67(1)
Must There Be a Complete Description?
68(3)
Complete Description from No-When or Every-When?
71(2)
A Circular Rather than Infinite Regress?
73(3)
Conclusion
76(2)
6 The Objections
78(14)
No Contradiction because Tense is Subjective
79(2)
There Is No Appearance of Contradiction
81(6)
McTaggart Misunderstands the Semantics of Tensed Language
87(3)
"Events Don't Change, Things Do"
90(2)
7 The B View and the Problem of Change
92(20)
The Link between Change, Persistence, and Time
94(2)
The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics
96(3)
The Spatial Analogue Argument
99(1)
`Wholly Present', `Singly Located', vs. `Multiply Located'
100(3)
Mellor's Solution
103(5)
Simons's Theory of Invariants
108(2)
Properties as Relations to Times
110(1)
Conclusion
111(1)
8 The A View and the Problem of Tense
112(28)
Realism about the Future, Present, and Past I: A-B Hybrids
113(4)
Interlude: Cameron's Moving Spotlight Theory
117(3)
Realism about the Future, Present, and Past II: Fragmentalism
120(2)
The Branching View of Tense
122(1)
Rejecting the Future: The Growing Block
123(5)
Presentism
128(6)
Ersatz Presentism
134(1)
Problem of Cross-Time Relations
135(1)
New Directions for Presentism?
136(3)
The Problem of Tense
139(1)
9 The Conclusion
140(3)
Bibliography 143(8)
Index 151
R. D. Ingthorsson is a Lecturer at Lund University, Sweden. He has published in The European Journal of Philosophy, Dialectica, Metaphysica, and Axiomathes, and co-edited the celebrated Mental Causation and Ontology. His next project is "Scientific Essentialism: Modernising the Aristotelian View", funded by The Bank of Sweden Tercentenial Foundation.