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Mechanisms in Science: Method or Metaphysics? [Kietas viršelis]

3.50/5 (4 ratings by Goodreads)
(University of Athens, Greece), (University of Athens, Greece)
  • Formatas: Hardback, 250 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 235x157x22 mm, weight: 564 g, Worked examples or Exercises
  • Išleidimo metai: 23-Jun-2022
  • Leidėjas: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1316519902
  • ISBN-13: 9781316519905
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Mechanisms in Science: Method or Metaphysics?Didesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: Hardback, 250 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 235x157x22 mm, weight: 564 g, Worked examples or Exercises
  • Išleidimo metai: 23-Jun-2022
  • Leidėjas: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1316519902
  • ISBN-13: 9781316519905
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Pastovi nuoroda: https://www.kriso.lt/db/9781316519905.html
Raktažodžiai:
In recent years what has come to be called the 'New Mechanism' has emerged as a framework for thinking about the philosophical assumptions underlying many areas of science, especially in sciences such as biology, neuroscience, and psychology. This book offers a fresh look at the role of mechanisms, by situating novel analyses of central philosophical issues related to mechanisms within a rich historical perspective of the concept of mechanism as well as detailed case studies of biological mechanisms (such as apoptosis). It develops a new position, Methodological Mechanism, according to which mechanisms are to be viewed as causal pathways that are theoretically described and are underpinned by networks of difference-making relations. In contrast to metaphysically inflated accounts, this study characterises mechanism as a concept-in-use in science that is deflationary and metaphysically neutral, but still methodologically useful and central to scientific practice.

The current philosophical consensus is that science searches for mechanisms. This book re-evaluates central features of this consensus arguing that 'mechanism' as used in scientific practice is a methodological concept, which implies no deep metaphysical commitments.

Recenzijos

'As the 'New mechanical philosophy' grows bigger by the day, it is very difficult to make a significant contribution to the field. But this book is an extremely well researched, timely, and interesting piece of work. It offers compelling (philosophical and historical) arguments for the idea that mechanisms in science are to be understood as a methodological stance, which no doubt will spark debate in philosophy of science.' Federica Russo, University of Amsterdam 'Ioannidis and Psillos provide comprehensive arguments for taking a deflationary or metaphysically neutral approach to understanding mechanism, especially in biology Highly recommended.' J. A. Hewlett, Choice 'Mechanisms in Science is a must-read for those interested in mechanisms, and I think it promises to shake up several discussions about mechanisms that have grown stale.' Kareem Khalifa, Metascience

Daugiau informacijos

Questions central tenets of the current philosophical consensus about mechanisms and develops the novel alternative of Methodological Mechanism.
List of Figures
x
Preface xi
Introduction 1(12)
PART I IDEAS OF MECHANISM
13(46)
1 Mechanisms, Then and Now
15(25)
1.1 Preliminaries
15(1)
1.2 Old versus New Mechanism
15(2)
1.3 Old Mechanism: From Metaphysics to Practice
17(12)
1.4 New Mechanism: From Practice to Metaphysics
29(8)
1.5 Newton Revisited
37(3)
2 Extending Mechanism beyond the Two `Most Catholic Principles of Bodies'
40(19)
2.1 Preliminaries
40(1)
2.2 Mechanical versus Quasi-Mechanical Mechanism
41(5)
2.3 Poincare's Problem
46(4)
2.4 Quasi-Mechanical Mechanisms
50(3)
2.5 Hegel's Problem
53(3)
2.6 Bringing Together the Two Problems
56(3)
PART II CAUSATION AND MECHANISM
59(132)
3 Mechanisms in Scientific Practice: The Case of Apoptosis
61(29)
3.1 Preliminaries
61(1)
3.2 The Case of Apoptosis
61(18)
3.3 Mechanisms of Cell Death
79(5)
3.4 Is Mechanism More than the Causal Pathway?
84(2)
3.5 What Does the Case of Apoptosis Show?
86(4)
4 Mechanisms as Causal Pathways
90(28)
4.1 Preliminaries
90(1)
4.2 Causal Mechanism: Three Theses
90(4)
4.3 The Case of Scurvy
94(8)
4.4 Inflationary Accounts of Mechanism
102(4)
4.5 Causal Mechanism as a Deflationary Account
106(12)
5 Mechanisms, Causation and Laws
118(20)
5.1 Preliminaries
118(1)
5.2 Mechanisms and Difference-Making
118(2)
5.3 Early Mechanistic Views
120(6)
5.4 Mechanisms-for versus Mechanisms-of
126(5)
5.5 Mechanisms-for and Mechanisms-of
131(2)
5.6 Mechanisms-for
133(5)
6 Against Activities
138(26)
6.1 Preliminaries
138(1)
6.2 Mechanisms and Counterfactuals
138(5)
6.3 Activities and Singular Causation
143(2)
6.4 Against Activities I: The MDC Account
145(4)
6.5 Against Activities II: Glennan's Approach
149(5)
6.6 Against Activities III: Illari and Williamson's Approach
154(3)
6.7 Against Glennan on Causation as Production
157(3)
6.8 Activities and the Language of Science
160(4)
7 Whither Counterfactuals?
164(27)
7.1 Preliminaries
164(1)
7.2 Counterfactuals: A Primer
165(10)
7.3 Counterfactual Manipulation and Causation
175(8)
7.4 Causal Inference and Counterfactuals
183(4)
7.5 Using a Black Box versus Looking into It
187(4)
PART III BEYOND NEW MECHANISM
191(56)
8 Constitution versus Causation
193(16)
8.1 Preliminaries
193(1)
8.2 Craver on Constitutive Relevance
194(2)
8.3 Are There Constitutive Mechanisms?
196(5)
8.4 Against Constitutive Mechanisms
201(4)
8.5 Causal Mechanism and Constitutive Relevance
205(4)
9 Multilevel Mechanistic Explanation
209(16)
9.1 Preliminaries
209(1)
9.2 Levels of Composition in Biology
210(2)
9.3 Craver on Levels of Mechanisms
212(2)
9.4 Levels of Composition and Multilevel Mechanistic Explanation
214(2)
9.5 Examples of Multilevel Mechanisms
216(5)
9.6 Mechanisms and Interlevel Causation
221(4)
10 Methodological Mechanism
225(22)
10.1 Preliminaries
225(1)
10.2 Methodological Mechanism: Historical Predecessors
225(5)
10.3 General Characterisations of Mechanism
230(2)
10.4 Inflationary New Mechanism
232(7)
10.5 Causal Mechanism as a Way Out of the Dilemma
239(3)
10.6 The Triviality Problem
242(5)
Finale 247(8)
References 255(12)
Index 267
Stavros Ioannidis is Assistant Professor at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. He is principal investigator of the project MECHANISM, funded by the Hellenic Foundation for Research and Innovation. Stathis Psillos is Professor of Philosophy of Science and Metaphysics at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. He is the author of Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth (1999) and Causation and Explanation (2002), and editor (with Henrik Lagerlund and Ben Hill) of Reconsidering Causal Powers (2021).