| Preface |
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iii | |
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ix | |
| Summary |
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xi | |
| Acknowledgments |
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xvii | |
| Abbreviations |
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xix | |
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1 | (12) |
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3 | (6) |
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Use of the Term Model in This Report |
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3 | (1) |
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Use of the Term Simulation in This Report |
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4 | (1) |
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Defining and Differentiating Between "Analysis" and "Assessment" |
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5 | (3) |
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Differences Between Campaign Assessment and Intelligence Analysis |
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8 | (1) |
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8 | (1) |
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Why Are COIN and IW So Difficult to Analyze and Assess? |
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9 | (1) |
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Research Objectives and Limits |
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10 | (1) |
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Focus on Operations for the Army and Marine Corps |
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11 | (1) |
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11 | (1) |
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12 | (1) |
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Chapter Two Decision Issues and Analysis in COIN and IW Literature |
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13 | (30) |
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Two Highly Relevant Publications |
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13 | (6) |
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TRAC Irregular Warfare Working Group Report |
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14 | (2) |
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CAA Deployed Analyst History for OIF |
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16 | (3) |
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Decision Issues Identified in Literature |
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19 | (2) |
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M&S and Analytical Methods Identified in Literature |
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21 | (1) |
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Demonstrated IW Decision Support Identified in Literature |
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21 | (18) |
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Courses of Action Associated with Families of Analysis |
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22 | (1) |
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Kinetic Activity Decisions Supported by Physics-Based Analysis |
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23 | (2) |
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Kinetic Activity Decisions Supported by Social Science Analysis |
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25 | (2) |
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Nonkinetic Activity Decisions Supported by Physics-Based Analysis |
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27 | (1) |
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Nonkinetic Activity Decisions Supported by Social Science Analysis |
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28 | (2) |
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Pattern and Trend Analysis and Assessment |
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30 | (3) |
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Literature Identifies Factors That Hindered Analytic Support to Commanders |
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33 | (2) |
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Operations Researchers Have Their Say About IW Assessment: MORS Workshops |
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35 | (4) |
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Summary of Decision and Analytic Issues in the Literature |
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39 | (4) |
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Analysts should be vested in the problem |
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40 | (1) |
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Know how and where to find data, and compare data |
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40 | (1) |
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Analysts must answer the question asked |
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40 | (1) |
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Help commanders understand complexity |
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41 | (1) |
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Build credibility as an analyst |
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41 | (1) |
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Know the players, use all available tools---both art and science |
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41 | (1) |
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Partner analysts to improve effectiveness and efficiency |
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41 | (2) |
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Chapter Three Support to Force Protection Decisions |
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43 | (16) |
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Commanders' Decisions in Force Protection |
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43 | (3) |
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45 | (1) |
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The Basic Analytic Problem |
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46 | (3) |
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Analytic Support to C-IED Operations in Iraq |
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47 | (1) |
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A Brief Introduction to Attack the Network |
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47 | (2) |
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Vignette: Tracking an IDF Shooter Using Overhead Sensors |
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49 | (1) |
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Vignette: COAG Analytic Efforts (2005--2008) |
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49 | (8) |
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MOEs for the Counter-IED Fight |
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50 | (1) |
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Sustaining Intelligence Directed Action |
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50 | (1) |
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Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Options for the IED Fight |
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51 | (1) |
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The Actionable Hot Spot Resource Planning Tool |
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52 | (1) |
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53 | (1) |
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Computation and Simulation Test Bed |
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54 | (1) |
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Gaming Blue-Red Interactions |
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54 | (1) |
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Development of a Platoon-Level Simulation Environment |
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55 | (2) |
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57 | (2) |
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Chapter Four Support to Logistics Decisions |
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59 | (12) |
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Commanders' Key Decisions and Challenges in Joint Logistics |
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59 | (3) |
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60 | (1) |
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61 | (1) |
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Vignette: Theater Airlift |
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62 | (3) |
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62 | (2) |
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64 | (1) |
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65 | (1) |
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Vignette: Surgery Team Placement in Afghanistan |
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65 | (1) |
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66 | (1) |
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66 | (1) |
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Vignette: Logistics Improvement to Reduce IED Exposure |
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66 | (1) |
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66 | (1) |
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66 | (1) |
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Vignette: Using Blue Force Tracker Data to Support Convoy Security |
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67 | (1) |
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67 | (1) |
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68 | (1) |
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68 | (3) |
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Chapter Five Support to Campaign Assessment Decisions |
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71 | (20) |
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Commanders' Decisions in Campaign Assessment |
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72 | (2) |
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73 | (1) |
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74 | (1) |
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Vignette: Determining the Impact of the Sons of Iraq on the Campaign |
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74 | (3) |
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75 | (1) |
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75 | (1) |
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75 | (1) |
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76 | (1) |
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Vignette: Automating Campaign Assessment |
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77 | (3) |
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77 | (1) |
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78 | (1) |
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78 | (1) |
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79 | (1) |
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Vignette: A View of Campaign Assessment from the Top |
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80 | (2) |
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80 | (1) |
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81 | (1) |
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81 | (1) |
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81 | (1) |
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Vignette: ISAF Joint Command District Assessments |
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82 | (4) |
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82 | (2) |
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84 | (1) |
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85 | (1) |
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85 | (1) |
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Vignette: ISAF Campaign Assessment |
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86 | (3) |
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86 | (2) |
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88 | (1) |
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88 | (1) |
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89 | (1) |
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89 | (2) |
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Chapter Six Support to Force Structuring |
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91 | (20) |
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Commanders' Decisions in Force Structuring |
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92 | (10) |
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93 | (2) |
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95 | (2) |
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97 | (1) |
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98 | (1) |
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99 | (3) |
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Vignette: Optimizing Force Size for IW |
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102 | (2) |
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102 | (1) |
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103 | (1) |
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103 | (1) |
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103 | (1) |
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Vignette: Determine Campaign-Level Force Requirements |
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104 | (3) |
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104 | (1) |
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104 | (1) |
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105 | (1) |
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106 | (1) |
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Vignette: Estimating Force Transition Requirements |
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107 | (1) |
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107 | (1) |
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107 | (1) |
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108 | (1) |
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108 | (1) |
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108 | (3) |
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Chapter Seven Conclusions, Findings, and Recommendations |
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111 | (10) |
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Was the Support Effective? |
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111 | (1) |
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Continuing Analytic Challenges |
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112 | (2) |
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114 | (3) |
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117 | (4) |
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For the Department of Defense |
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117 | (1) |
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For Modelers, Simulations Experts, and Operations Analysts |
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118 | (1) |
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118 | (3) |
| Appendix: Review of Selected Models and Simulations |
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121 | (16) |
| Bibliography |
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137 | |
