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El. knyga: Moral Epistemology

3.69/5 (52 ratings by Goodreads)
(University of California, Santa Barbara, USA)
  • Formatas: EPUB+DRM
  • Serija: New Problems of Philosophy
  • Išleidimo metai: 01-Jun-2010
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780203850862
  • Formatas: EPUB+DRM
  • Serija: New Problems of Philosophy
  • Išleidimo metai: 01-Jun-2010
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780203850862

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How do we know right from wrong? Do we even have moral knowledge? Moral epistemology studies these and related questions about our understanding of virtue and vice. It is one of philosophys perennial problems, reaching back to Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Hume and Kant, and has recently been the subject of intense debate as a result of findings in developmental and social psychology.

In this outstanding introduction to the subject Aaron Zimmerman covers the following key topics:





What is moral epistemology? What are its methods? Including a discussion of Socrates, Gettier and contemporary theories of knowledge





skepticism about moral knowledge based on the anthropological record of deep and persistent moral disagreement, including contextualism





moral nihilism, including debates concerning God and morality and the relation between moral knowledge and our motives and reasons to act morally





epistemic moral scepticism, intuitionism and the possibility of inferring ought from is, discussing the views of Locke, Hume, Kant, Ross, Audi, Thomson, Harman, Sturgeon and many others





how children acquire moral concepts and become more reliable judges





criticisms of those who would reduce moral knowledge to value-neutral knowledge or attempt to replace moral belief with emotion.

Throughout the book Zimmerman argues that our belief in moral knowledge can survive sceptical challenges. He also draws on a rich range of examples from Platos Meno and Dickens David Copperfield to Bernard Madoff and Saddam Hussein.

Including chapter summaries and annotated further reading at the end of each chapter, Moral Epistemology is essential reading for all students of ethics, epistemology and moral psychology.

Recenzijos

'This volume is appropriate for a wide range of readers concerned with moral theory and moral epistemology. Summing Up: Recommended. Upper-level undergraduates through researchers/faculty.' - CHOICE

'Zimmerman provides a lively and lucid yet precise and profound introduction to moral epistemology. Structured around responses to moral skepticism, Zimmerman deftly incorporates Dickens and Madoff, developmental and moral psychology, philosophy of language and theory of knowledge. This entertaining romp is highly recommended not only for students but also for experts and anyone who wants to learn more about moral epistemology.' - Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Duke University, USA

Written with verve and peppered with stimulating examples, Moral Epistemology provides an excellent introduction for the novice and plenty to engage experts. Zimmerman's critical assessment is accessible, balanced, rigorous, and richly informed by developmental and moral psychology, philosophy of language, and general epistemology. Anyone interested in moral skepticism and intuitionism, inferring 'ought' from 'is,' or the reliability of our moral judgments will find this book provocative and insightful. - Pekka Väyrynen, University of Leeds, UK

Acknowledgments ix
Chapter 1 Moral epistemology: content and method
1(24)
1.1 What is moral epistemology?
1(2)
1.2 Socrates, Gettier, and the definition of "knowledge"
3(6)
1.3 The standard method: levels of inquiry
9(5)
1.4 Theories of moral knowledge: an overview
14(8)
1.5
Chapter summary
22(1)
1.6 Further reading
23(2)
Chapter 2 Moral disagreement
25(17)
2.1 Disagreement and skepticism
25(8)
2.2 Moral contextualism
33(7)
2.3
Chapter summary
40(1)
2.4 Further reading
41(1)
Chapter 3 Moral nihilism
42(31)
3.1 Moral skepticism characterized
42(1)
3.2 The death of god
43(4)
3.3 Mackie's queerness
47(7)
3.4 Motives internalism
54(7)
3.5 Reasons internalism
61(8)
3.6
Chapter summary
69(2)
3.7 Further reading
71(2)
Chapter 4 The skeptic and the intuitionist
73(34)
4.1 The Pyrrhonian problematic
73(3)
4.2 Non-inferential moral knowledge
76(27)
4.3
Chapter summary
103(2)
4.4 Further reading
105(2)
Chapter 5 Deductive moral knowledge
107(34)
5.1 On deducing "ought" from "is"
107(6)
5.2 In search of an epistemologically valuable moral deduction
113(11)
5.3 Assessing the epistemological value of our deduction
124(14)
5.4
Chapter summary
138(1)
5.5 Further reading
139(2)
Chapter 6 Abductive moral knowledge
141(10)
6.1 Moral inference to the best explanation
141(8)
6.2
Chapter summary
149(1)
6.3 Further reading
150(1)
Chapter 7 The reliability of our moral judgments
151(20)
7.1 Acquiring moral concepts and exercising objectivity
151(17)
7.2
Chapter summary
168(1)
7.3 Further reading
169(2)
Chapter 8 Epilogue: challenges to moral epistemology
171(24)
8.1 Frege, Moore, and the definition of "immorality"
171(9)
8.2 Common-sense objections to non-cognitivism
180(2)
8.3 The Frege-Geach problems: semantics v. pragmatics
182(4)
8.4 Non-cognitivist forms of validity
186(7)
8.5
Chapter summary
193(1)
8.6 Further reading
193(2)
Glossary of philosophical terms 195(9)
Notes 204(15)
Works cited 219(22)
Index 241
Aaron Zimmerman is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University California, Santa Barbara. His research is focused on the intersection between thought, language and reason and he writes and teaches on David Hume's philosophical work.