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1 A Formal Model for a System's Attack Surface |
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1 | (28) |
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1 | (4) |
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5 | (2) |
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7 | (8) |
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1.4 Damage Potential and Effort |
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15 | (5) |
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1.5 A Quantitative Metric |
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20 | (3) |
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23 | (2) |
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25 | (2) |
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1.8 Summary and Future Work |
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27 | (2) |
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27 | (2) |
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2 Effectiveness of Moving Target Defenses |
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29 | (20) |
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29 | (1) |
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30 | (2) |
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32 | (2) |
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34 | (5) |
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39 | (5) |
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44 | (2) |
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46 | (3) |
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47 | (2) |
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3 Global ISR: Toward a Comprehensive Defense Against Unauthorized Code Execution |
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49 | (28) |
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49 | (2) |
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3.2 Instruction-Set Randomization |
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51 | (4) |
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55 | (3) |
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58 | (5) |
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63 | (1) |
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64 | (5) |
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3.7 Security Considerations |
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69 | (2) |
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71 | (2) |
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73 | (4) |
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74 | (3) |
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4 Compiler-Generated Software Diversity |
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77 | (22) |
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4.1 Introduction and Motivation |
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77 | (3) |
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4.2 Multi-Variant Execution |
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80 | (6) |
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4.3 Massive-Scale Software Diversity |
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86 | (3) |
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4.4 Diversification Techniques |
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89 | (7) |
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96 | (3) |
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97 | (2) |
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5 Symbiotes and defensive Mutualism: Moving Target Defense |
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99 | (10) |
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99 | (1) |
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100 | (2) |
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5.3 The Symbiote/Host Relationship |
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102 | (7) |
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107 | (2) |
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6 Manipulating Program Functionality to Eliminate Security Vulnerabilities |
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109 | (8) |
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109 | (1) |
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110 | (1) |
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6.3 Functionality Excision |
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111 | (1) |
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6.4 Functionality Replacement |
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111 | (1) |
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112 | (1) |
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6.6 Dynamic Reconfiguration via Dynamic Knobs |
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112 | (1) |
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6.7 Observed Invariant Enforcement |
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112 | (1) |
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6.8 Cyclic Memory Allocation |
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113 | (1) |
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6.9 Failure-Oblivious Computing |
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113 | (1) |
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113 | (4) |
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114 | (3) |
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7 End-to-End Software Diversification of Internet Services |
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117 | (14) |
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118 | (1) |
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119 | (4) |
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7.3 End-to-End Diversification of a Software Stack |
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123 | (3) |
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7.4 First Technical Challenge: Impact on Security |
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126 | (1) |
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7.5 Second Technical Challenge: Impact on Software Development |
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127 | (1) |
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7.6 Third Technical Challenge: Impact on Runtime Performance |
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128 | (1) |
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7.7 Fourth Technical Challenge: Impact on Deployment |
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129 | (1) |
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7.8 Conclusion and Open Problems |
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129 | (2) |
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130 | (1) |
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8 Introducing Diversity and Uncertainty to Create Moving Attack Surfaces for Web Services |
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131 | (22) |
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132 | (5) |
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8.2 Web Programming Practices with MAS |
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137 | (1) |
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8.3 Opportunities for Diversification |
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138 | (7) |
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8.4 Management Complexity |
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145 | (1) |
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8.5 The Need for New Metrics |
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146 | (1) |
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147 | (2) |
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149 | (4) |
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149 | (4) |
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9 Toward Network Configuration Randomization for Moving Target Defense |
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153 | (8) |
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153 | (2) |
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155 | (3) |
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9.3 MUTE Research Challenges |
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158 | (3) |
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159 | (2) |
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10 Configuration Management Security in Data Center Environments |
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161 | |
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161 | (1) |
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10.2 Configuration Management Basics |
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162 | (5) |
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10.3 Security of Configuration Management Data |
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167 | (5) |
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10.4 Securing Configuration Management Data |
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172 | (3) |
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10.5 Challenges in Securing Configuration Management |
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175 | (5) |
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180 | |
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180 | |