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Necessary Existence [Kietas viršelis]

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(Professor of Philosophy, Baylor University), (Research Professor of Philosophy, Azusa State University)
  • Formatas: Hardback, 232 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 223x147x21 mm, weight: 418 g
  • Išleidimo metai: 08-Mar-2018
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 019874689X
  • ISBN-13: 9780198746898
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Necessary ExistenceDidesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: Hardback, 232 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 223x147x21 mm, weight: 418 g
  • Išleidimo metai: 08-Mar-2018
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 019874689X
  • ISBN-13: 9780198746898
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Pastovi nuoroda: https://www.kriso.lt/db/9780198746898.html
Raktažodžiai:
Necessary Existence breaks ground on one of the deepest questions anyone ever asks: why is there anything? The classic answer is in terms of a necessary foundation. Yet, why think that is the correct answer? Pruss and Rasmussen present an original defense of the hypothesis that there is a concrete necessary being capable of providing a foundation for the existence of things. They offer six main arguments, divided into six chapters. The first argument is an up-to-date presentation and assessment of a traditional causal-based argument from contingency. The next five arguments are new "possibility-based" arguments that make use of twentieth-century advances in modal logic. The arguments present possible pathways to an intriguing and far-reaching conclusion. The final chapter answers the most challenging objection to the existence of necessary things.
1 Introduction
1(10)
1.1 The Question of Necessary Existence
1(1)
1.2 Why Necessary Existence Matters
2(4)
1.3 The "Necessary Being" Survey Results
6(5)
2 Metaphysical Possibility and Necessity
11(22)
2.1 Introduction
11(1)
2.2 What is Metaphysical Modality?
11(3)
2.3 Modal Logic
14(15)
2.4 The S5 Ontological Argument and Two-dimensional Semantics
29(4)
3 An Argument from Contingency
33(36)
3.1 Introduction
33(1)
3.2 The Argument from Contingency
33(2)
3.3 On Behalf of the Premises
35(12)
3.4 Objections
47(19)
3.5 Concluding Assessment
66(3)
4 An Argument from Possible Causes
69(24)
4.1 Introduction
69(1)
4.2 The Modal Argument from Beginnings
69(3)
4.3 On Behalf of the Premises
72(7)
4.4 Objections
79(13)
4.5 Concluding Assessment
92(1)
5 From Possible Causes II
93(17)
5.1 Introduction
93(1)
5.2 Restricted Causal Principles
93(6)
5.3 The Restricted Modal Argument
99(1)
5.4 On Behalf of the Premises
100(3)
5.5 Objections
103(5)
5.6 Concluding Assessment
108(2)
6 From Modal Uniformity
110(16)
6.1 Introduction
110(2)
6.2 Uniformity as a Guide to Possibility
112(3)
6.3 Restricted Modal Uniformity
115(4)
6.4 Applications to Arguments from Contingency
119(4)
6.5 Objection
123(1)
6.6 Concluding Assessment
124(2)
7 From Necessary Abstracta to Necessary Concreta
126(24)
7.1 Introduction
126(1)
7.2 The Main Argument
126(1)
7.3 Necessarily There Are Abstracta
127(12)
7.4 If There Are Abstracta, There Are Concreta
139(3)
7.5 It's Possible for There to Be No Contingent Concrete Entities
142(4)
7.6 Weakening the Possibility of No Concreta
146(2)
7.7 Concluding Assessment
148(2)
8 The Argument from Perfections
150(23)
8.1 History and Introduction
150(1)
8.2 The Main Argument
150(2)
8.3 Positivity and the Formal Axioms
152(10)
8.4 Necessary Existence is Positive
162(2)
8.5 Being Capable of Causing is Positive
164(1)
8.6 Doing Without Properties
165(1)
8.7 Theism and the Problem of Evil
166(3)
8.8 Oppy's Parody
169(2)
8.9 Concluding Assessment
171(2)
9 Arguments against a Necessary Being
173(22)
9.1 Introduction
173(1)
9.2 The Argument from Conceivability
173(6)
9.3 The Semantic Problem
179(3)
9.4 The Logic Argument
182(2)
9.5 The Subtraction Argument
184(5)
9.6 Problems with Causation
189(2)
9.7 The Costly Addition
191(3)
9.8 Concluding Assessment
194(1)
Appendix: A Slew of Arguments 195(14)
Bibliography 209(8)
Index 217
Alexander R. Pruss is Professor of Philosophy at Baylor University, working in metaphysics, philosophy of religion, formal epistemology, philosophy of mathematics, and applied ethics. His previous books include One Body (Notre Dame 2012), Actuality, Possibility and Worlds (Continuum 2011), and The Principle of Sufficient Reason (Cambridge 2006). He holds Ph.D.s in both philosophy and mathematics.



Joshua L. Rasmussen is a research professor of philosophy at Azusa Pacific University. He specializes in analytic metaphysics, with interests in mind and philosophy of religion. He is the author of Defending the Correspondence Theory of Truth (Cambridge 2014) and the founder of Worldview Design, which helps people use reason to address the big question of life.