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El. knyga: Negotiation Games

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Steven J. Brams is one of the leading game theorists of his generation. This new edition includes brand new material on topics such as fallback bargaining and principles of rational negotiation.

The concept of negotiation is critical to coping with all manner of strategic problems that arise in the everyday dealings that people have with each other and organizations. Game theory illustrates this to the full and shows how these problems can be solved.
This is a revised edition of a classic book and uses some wonderfully adroit case studies that remain relevant today. Negotiation Games covers such themes as:

· trade offs and the game of chicken
· the effects of power in the cease-fire game
· the use of threat power in sequential games
· fallback bargaining and rational negotiation.

Written by one of the leading game theorists of the generation, this book will be greatly appreciated not only by academics and students involved in game theory, economics, business and international relations, but also by those involved in diplomacy and international business.

Recenzijos

'If you are looking for a wide ranging application of game theory, with many applications to political science, then you will find that this book is well worth the read.' - Managerial and Decision Economics

List of Figures ix
List of Tables xi
Preface to the second Edition xiii
Preface xxi
Modeling Negotiations
xxi
Overview and Level
xxiii
Acknowledgments
xxvi
1. Negotiations in the Bible
1(28)
1.1. Introduction
1(2)
1.2. Cain and Abel: Bargaining with God
3(6)
1.3. Rahab and the Spies: Making a Just Agreement
9(8)
1.4. Solomon's Arbitration: Discovering the Truth
17(8)
1.5. Conclusions
25(1)
Notes
26(3)
2. Bargaining Procedures and the Problem of Honesty
29(35)
2.1. Introduction
29(5)
2.2. The Honesty Problem
34(5)
2.3. The Bonus Procedure
39(6)
2.4. The Bonus Appraisal Procedure
45(3)
2.5. The Penalty Procedure
48(3)
2.6. The Penalty Appraisal Procedure
51(2)
2.7. The Expansive Appraisal Procedure
53(4)
2.8. Camp David: The Logic of the Procedures Applied
57(3)
2.9. Conclusions
60(2)
Notes
62(2)
3. Arbitration Procedures and the Problem of Convergence
64(37)
3.1. Introduction
64(2)
3.2. Different Arbitration Procedures
66(2)
3.3. Trade-Offs and Implicit Arbitration
68(3)
3.4. Final-Offer Arbitration (FOA)
71(4)
3.5. FOA in Practice: The Importance of Winning
75(4)
3.6. Bonus FOA
79(2)
3.7. Combined Arbitration
81(5)
3.8. Two-Stage and Multistage FOA
86(5)
3.9. Is Convergence in Stages Desirable?
91(2)
3.10. Kissinger's Shuttle Diplomacy: A Case of Multistage Negotiations
93(3)
3.11. Conclusions
96(3)
Notes
99(2)
4. Superpower Crisis Bargaining and the Theory of Moves
101(37)
4.1. Introduction
101(1)
4.2. Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken
102(2)
4.3. The Cuban Missile Crisis as a Game of Chicken
104(6)
4.4. Deception and Power in the Cuban Missile Crisis
110(3)
4.5. A Sequential View of the Cuban Missile Crisis
113(3)
4.6. The 1973 Alert Decision
116(4)
4.7. Nonmyopic Equilibria and the Theory of Moves: A Digression
120(7)
4.8. Stability in the Cease-Fire Game
127(3)
4.9. Was There an Alternative to the Alert?
130(2)
4.10. The Possible Effects of Power in the Cease-Fire Game
132(2)
4.11. Conclusions
134(2)
Notes
136(2)
5. Threats and Reputation in Bargaining
138(30)
5.1. Introduction
138(3)
5.2. Repeated Play of a Sequential Game
141(7)
5.3. Threat Outcomes in Repeated Play of a Game
148(6)
5.4. The Sequential-Primary Game
154(9)
5.5. Conclusions
163(2)
Notes
165(3)
6. Threats in Two Domestic Crises
168(21)
6.1. Introduction
168(1)
6.2. The Use of Threat Power in Poland, 1980-81
169(6)
6.3. The White House Tapes Case: The Players and Their Preferences
175(6)
6.4. The White House Tapes Case: The Trap
181(5)
6.5. Conclusions
186(1)
Notes
187(2)
7. Bargaining in Legislatures
189(38)
7.1. Introduction
189(2)
7.2. Judgments about Vote Trading
191(1)
7.3. Definitions and Assumptions about Vote Trading
192(3)
7.4. Sincere and Insincere Voting
195(4)
7.5. Initial Trades and the Paradox of Vote Trading
199(3)
7.6. Subsequent Trades and the Instability of Vote Trading
202(2)
7.7. The Consequences of Refusing to Trade
204(2)
7.8. The Consequences of Forming Coalitions
206(3)
7.9. Empirical Examples of the Paradox of Vote Trading
209(2)
7.10. Choosing a Governing Coalition in a Multiparty System: Coalition Voting
211(4)
7.11. Majority, Minimal Majority, and Governing Coalitions
215(2)
7.12. Measuring Bargaining strength under Coalition Voting
217(4)
7.13. Possible Uses of Coalition Voting
221(2)
7.14. Conclusions
223(2)
Notes
225(2)
8. Bargaining Power
227(36)
8.1. Introduction
227(1)
8.2. Power in the U.S. Federal System
228(3)
8.3. What Should a Power Index Measure?
231(5)
8.4. The Power of Approval and Disapproval
236(6)
8.5. Empirical Evidence of Presidential Power
242(2)
8.6. The Paradox of the Chair's Position
244(5)
8.7. The Chair's Counterstrategy of Deception
249(3)
8.8. The Geneva Conference Game
252(6)
8.9. Conclusions
258(3)
Notes
261(2)
9. Epilogue
263(3)
Glossary 266(7)
Bibliography 273(14)
Index 287


Steven Brams, Ronald J. Quarles, David H. McElreath, Michelle E. Waldron, David Ethan Milstein
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