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El. knyga: No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War

3.81/5 (58 ratings by Goodreads)
(Academy Professor of History, US Military Academy, West Point, West Point, New York)
  • Formatas: PDF+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 01-Jun-2011
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press Inc
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780199830718
  • Formatas: PDF+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 01-Jun-2011
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press Inc
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780199830718

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It is commonly thought that the U.S. Army in Vietnam, thrust into a war in which territory occupied was meaningless, depended on body counts as its sole measure of military progress. In No Sure Victory, Army officer and historian Gregory A. Daddis uncovers the truth behind this gross simplification of the historical record. Daddis shows that, confronted by an unfamiliar enemy and an even more unfamiliar form of warfare, the U.S. Army adopted a massive, and eventually unmanageable, system of measurements and formulas to track the progress of military operations that ranged from pacification efforts to search-and-destroy missions. Concentrating more on data collection and less on data analysis, these indiscriminate attempts to gauge success may actually have hindered the armys ability to evaluate the true outcome of the fight at hand--a roadblock that Daddis believes significantly contributed to the multitude of failures that American forces in Vietnam faced. Filled with incisive analysis and rich historical detail, No Sure Victory is a valuable case study in unconventional warfare, a cautionary tale that offers important perspectives on how to measure performance in current and future armed conflict.

Recenzijos

This timely and important book is a major addition to the military history of the Vietnam War. It should be required reading for those grappling with the issues posed by counterinsurgency wars today. * George C. Herring, Alumni Professor Emeritus of History, University of Kentucky, and author of From Colony to Superpower *

Acknowledgments ix
List of Abbreviations
xiii
Maps
xv
Introduction 3(16)
1 Of Questions Not Asked: Measuring Effectiveness in the Counterinsurgency Era
19(20)
2 Measurements Without Objectives: America Goes to War in Southeast Asia
39(24)
3 An "Unprecedented Victory": The Problem of Defining Success
63(24)
4 Metrics in the Year of American Firepower
87(22)
5 "We Are Winning Slowly but Steadily"
109(24)
6 The Year of Tet: Victory, Defeat, or Stalemate?
133(24)
7 "A Time for Testing"
157(24)
8 Soldiers' Interlude: The Symptoms of Withdrawal
181(20)
9 Staggering to the Finish
201(36)
Conclusion
223(14)
Notes 237(66)
Bibliography 303(24)
Illustration Credits 327(2)
Index 329
Gregory A. Daddis is Academy Professor of History at the United States Military Academy, West Point, and a Colonel in the U.S. Army.