"Since the early 1960s, there have only been twelve years in which American troops have not been in combat, either in a formally declared conflict or otherwise. The vast majority of these have ended in failure, or something close to it. Why has the US been so ineffective, given the fact that the American armed forces are universally recognized as the best in the world? This is the key question James Warren answers here in Outmaneuvered. Most scholars and analysts believe that the primary cause of our abysmal war record since Vietnam has been the US military's overwhelmingly conventional approach-which favors kinetic operations, highly mobile precision firepower, and sophisticated systems of command and control. Here, Warren argues that the more formidable obstacle to success has been pervasive strategic ineptitude at the highest levels of Washington, including the executive branch, congress, and the national security council responsible for shaping US foreign policy. Time and time again, American presidents have committed military forces to operations in foreign countries whose politics and cultures they did not fully understand. Presidents of both political parties, including Kennedy, Reagan, Bush, Clinton, and Obama have overestimated the capacity of US forces to alter the social and political landscape of foreign nations, and underestimated the ability of insurgents and terrorists to develop strategies that draw out conflict and wage effective propaganda campaigns to curtail Washington's will to carryon the fight. Warren concludes the book by advocating for a less hubristic foreign policy and a broader conception of warfare as a political and military enterprise. For readers of political, military, and US history-as well as anyone interested in international relations and geopolitical strategy-this book offers unparalleled insights into America's prior-and potentially future-military conflicts"--
The author argues that a formidable obstacle to U.S. military success since the 1960s has been pervasive strategic ineptitude at the highest levels of decision-making, including the presidency, the national security council, and the foreign policy community in D.C. Illustrations. Maps.
From a celebrated military historian, a highly engaging and thought-provoking exploration of why the United States has failed again and again in irregular wars and military campaigns from Vietnam to Afghanistan.
Since the early 1960s, the United States has fought in four major wars and a cluster of complicated and bloody irregular warfare campaigns. The majority have ended in failure, or something close to it. Why has the US been so ineffective, despite the American armed forces being universally recognized as the best in the world?
Most scholars and analysts believe that the primary cause of our abysmal war record since Vietnam has been the US militarys overwhelmingly conventional approach to conflict, which favors kinetic operations, highly mobile precision firepower, and sophisticated systems of command and control. Here, James Warren argues that a much more formidable obstacle to success has been pervasive strategic ineptitude at the highest levels of decision-making, including the presidency, the national security council, and the foreign policy community in DC.
Time and time again, American presidents have committed military forces to operations in foreign countries whose politics and cultures they did not fully understand. Presidents of both political parties, including Johnson, Reagan, Bush, Clinton, and Obama have overestimated the capacity of US forces to alter the social and political landscape of foreign nations, and underestimated the ability of insurgents and terrorists to develop effective protracted war strategies that, in time, sap Washingtons will to carry on the fight.
In the War on Terror, Warren asserts that senior military officers have been complicit in extending bankrupt strategies by refusing to speak truthfully about them to their civilian bosses. So have the American people, who lost interest in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and refused to press their president and congress to bring an end to two futile conflicts. Warren advocates for a less hubristic foreign policy and a broader conception of warfare as a political and military enterprise.
For readers of political, military, and US historyas well as anyone interested in international relations and geopolitical strategythis book offers unparalleled insights into Americas priorand potentially futuremilitary conflicts.
