Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers present original contributions to our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing approaches to normative ethics (including moral realism, constructivism, and expressivism) to questions of how we should act and live well. OSNE will be an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.
Acknowledgments |
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vii | |
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ix | |
Introduction |
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1 | (11) |
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1 Forms of Instrumental Reasoning |
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12 | (19) |
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2 Rethinking `One Thought Too Many' |
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31 | (20) |
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3 The Moral Concept of Right as Adjudication |
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51 | (22) |
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4 Lying as Infidelity: A Quasi-Rossian Account |
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73 | (25) |
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5 How Moral Uncertaintism Can Be Both True and Interesting |
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98 | (19) |
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6 Do the Right Thing: An Account of Subjective Obligation |
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117 | (21) |
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7 For Better or Worse: Commendatory Reasons and Latitude |
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138 | (23) |
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8 Asymmetrism about Desire Satisfactionism and Time |
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161 | (23) |
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9 Contractualism and the Counter-Culture Challenge |
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184 | (23) |
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10 Creditworthiness and Matching Principles |
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207 | (22) |
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11 The Centrality of One's Own Life |
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229 | (22) |
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12 Acts, Agents, and the Definition of Virtue |
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251 | (24) |
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275 | (24) |
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Index |
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299 | |
Mark Timmons is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. He is the author of Morality Without Foundations (OUP, 1998) and co-editor of Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays (OUP, 2013) and Reason, Value, and Respect: Kantian Themes from the Philsophy of Thomas E. Hill, Jr. (OUP, 2015).