Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers present original contributions to our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing approaches to normative ethics (including moral realism, constructivism, and expressivism) to questions of how we should act and live well. OSNE will be an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.
Acknowledgements |
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vii | |
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ix | |
Introduction |
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1 | (8) |
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1 Parfit on the Irrelevance of Deontological Distinctions |
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9 | (23) |
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2 After Aristotle's Justice |
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32 | (24) |
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3 Willful Ignorance and Moral Responsibility |
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56 | (25) |
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4 Moral Obligation and Epistemic Risk |
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81 | (25) |
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106 | (25) |
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6 The Rule Worship and Idealization Objections Revisited and Resisted |
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131 | (25) |
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7 Moral Worth, Credit, and Non-Accidentality |
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156 | (26) |
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8 Equal Respect for Rational Agency |
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182 | (22) |
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9 A Kantian Solution to the Trolley Problem |
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204 | (25) |
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10 Manifestations of Virtue |
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229 | (26) |
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11 The Limits of Virtue Ethics |
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255 | (28) |
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Index |
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283 | |
Mark Timmons is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. He is the author of Morality Without Foundations (OUP, 1998) and co-editor of Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays (OUP, 2013) and Reason, Value, and Respect: Kantian Themes from the Philosophy of Thomas E. Hill, Jr. (OUP, 2015).