Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers present original contributions to our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing approaches to normative ethics (including moral realism, constructivism, and expressivism) to questions of how we should act and live well. OSNE will be an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.
| Acknowledgments |
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vii | |
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ix | |
| Introduction |
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1 | (11) |
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1 Taking Account of Character and Being an Accountable Person |
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12 | (25) |
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2 Taking Pride in Being Bad |
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37 | (19) |
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3 Character as a Mode of Evaluation |
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56 | (21) |
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4 The Normative Force of Promising |
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77 | (25) |
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5 Promissory Obligation: Against a Unified Account |
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102 | (21) |
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6 Two Concepts of Rule Utilitarianism |
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123 | (22) |
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145 | (21) |
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8 Extrinsic Value and the Separability of Reasons |
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166 | (23) |
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9 The Relativity of Ethical Explanation |
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189 | (26) |
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10 Two Senses of Moral Verdict and Moral Overridingness |
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215 | (26) |
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241 | (22) |
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263 | (14) |
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| Index |
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277 | |
Mark Timmons is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. He is the author of Morality Without Foundations (OUP, 1998) and co-editor of Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays (OUP, 2013) and Reason, Value, and Respect: Kantian Themes from the Philsophy of Thomas E. Hill, Jr. (OUP, 2015).
