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El. knyga: Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9

Edited by (Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona)
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Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers present original contributions to our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing approaches to normative ethics (including moral realism, constructivism, and expressivism) to questions of how we should act and live well. OSNE will be an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.
Acknowledgments vii
List of Contributors
ix
Introduction 1(8)
Mark Timmons
1 Being Prepared: From Duties to Motives
9(20)
Barbara Herman
2 The Normative Structure of Request
29(21)
Micha Glaser
3 Discretionary Moral Duties
50(23)
R. Jay Wallace
4 Taking it Personally: Third-Party Forgiveness, Close Relationships, and the Standing to Forgive
73(43)
Rosalind Chaplin
5 Persons as Things
116(1)
Mark Schroeder
6 Fitting Love and Reasons for Loving
116(22)
Christopher Howard
7 "But I Voted for Him for Other Reasons!": Moral Permissibility and the Doctrine of Double Endorsement
138(23)
Alida Liberman
8 On the Virtue of Taking Oneself Lightly
161(22)
Macalester Bell
9 From Duty for the Right Reasons
183(21)
Teemu Toppinen
10 Deontological Decision Theory and the Grounds of Subjective Permissibility
204(19)
Seth Lazar
11 Agent-Relative Prerogatives and Suboptimal Beneficence
223(28)
Ralf M. Bader
12 Well-Being, the Self, and Radical Change
251(20)
Jennifer Hawkins
13 From Teleosemantics to Normative Ethics
271(24)
Jacob Ross
Index 295
Mark Timmons is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. He is the author of Morality Without Foundations (OUP, 1998) and co-editor of Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays (OUP, 2013) and Reason, Value, and Respect: Kantian Themes from the Philosophy of Thomas E. Hill, Jr. (OUP, 2015).