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El. knyga: Patent-Competition Interface in Developing Countries

(Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong)
  • Formatas: 520 pages
  • Išleidimo metai: 16-Dec-2021
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780192671752
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
  • Formatas: 520 pages
  • Išleidimo metai: 16-Dec-2021
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780192671752
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This book proposes an approach to the patent-competition interface for developing countries. It puts forward a theoretical framework after canvassing relevant policy considerations and examines the many reasons why patent protection is not essential for generating innovation incentives in
developing countries. These include the tendency of the patent system to overcompensate innovators, the availability of other appropriation mechanisms for innovators to monetize their innovations, and the lack of appropriate technological capacity in many developing countries to take advantage of
the incentives generated by the patent system. It also argues that developing countries with a small population need not pay heed to the impact of their patent system on the incentives of foreign innovators. It then proposes a classification of developing countries into production countries,
technology adaptation countries, and proto-innovation countries and argues that dynamic efficiency considerations take on different meanings for developing countries depending on their technological capacities.

For the vast majority of developing countries bereft of meaningful innovation capacity, foreign technology transfer is the main vehicle for technological progress. The chief dynamic policy consideration for these countries is hence incentives for technology transfer instead of innovation incentives.
There are three main means of voluntary technology transfer: importation of technological goods, foreign direct investment, and technology licensing. Competition law regulation of patent exploitation practices interacts with these three means of technology transfer in different ways and an
appropriate approach to the patent-competition interface for these countries needs to take these into account.

Distilling all these considerations, the book proposes a development stage-specific approach to the patent-competition interface for developing countries. The approach is then applied to a number of patent exploitation practices, including unilateral refusal to deal, patent tying, excessive pricing
for pharmaceuticals, reverse payment settlements, and restrictive licensing practices.

Recenzijos

In this illuminating monograph, Thomas Cheng offers valuable and nuanced insights into the significance of the patent-competition interface in developing countries. He skillfully explores the different trade-offs and technological capacities that characterize developing countries, and the way these ought to affect policy choices and implementation. A significant and detailed contribution to our understanding of the role of innovation and technology in developing countries, and the means to optimize them. * Ariel Ezrachi,, Slaughter & May Professor of Competition Law, University of Oxford * Patent policy is supposed to incentivize innovation and commercialization of new goods in return for a period of exclusive use, which could support monopoly power. Competition policy is aimed partially at offsetting this power to safeguard the interests of consumers. This inherent tension has long been evident in rich and technologically advanced countries. However, few scholars have analyzed the relevant tradeoffs in developing economies, where innovation and purchasing power are fundamentally different. Thomas Cheng's book is a comprehensive and novel treatment of these complex issues, combining deep legal scholarship with a sound understanding of economic incentives to craft a rich and nuanced approach to this vital, yet so far neglected, policy frontier. This is a landmark volume, which should be read closely by all scholars in intellectual property, competition, and innovation economics. * Keith E. Maskus, Professor of Economics, University of Colorado Boulder *

Table of Cases ix
Table of Legislation xv
Table of Other Legal Instruments xvii
Abbreviations xix
1 Introduction 1(6)
2 Innovation Incentives in Developing Countries 7(47)
A Introduction
7(1)
B The Patent-Competition Interface: An Overview
7(7)
C Dynamic Efficiency Considerations in Context
14(38)
1 Overview
14(2)
2 The Imprecise Nature of the Patent System as an Innovation Incentive Mechanism
16(9)
3 The Availability of Other Forms of Appropriation Mechanism to Recoup R&D Investments
25(6)
4 The Mismatch between Innovation Incentives Generated by the Patent System and the Technological Capacity of Developing Countries
31(18)
5 External Impact of Innovation Incentives Generated by Developing Country Patent Systems
49(3)
D Conclusion
52(2)
3 Technology Transfers in Developing Countries 54(28)
A Introduction
54(2)
B Technological Capacity and Technology Transfers
56(1)
C The More Nuanced Relationship between the Patent-Competition Rules and Technology Transfers
57(6)
1 Comparison between Innovation and Technology Transfer
57(2)
2 Classification of the Patent-Competition Rules According to their Relationship with Technology Transfer
59(2)
3 Some General Observations about the Relationship between Patent Protection and Incentives to Transfer Technology
61(2)
D Different Modes of Technology Transfer
63(19)
1 International Trade in Technological Goods
66(4)
2 Foreign Direct Investment
70(5)
3 Licensing
75(4)
4 Summing Up
79(1)
5 Involuntary Transfers
80(2)
4 A Proposed Approach to the Patent-Competition Interface 82(7)
A A Development Stage-Specific Approach
82(1)
B An Industry-Specific Approach
83(1)
C Feasibility of the Proposed Approach
83(3)
1 Enforcement Capacity
83(1)
2 Concerns under the TRIPS Agreement
84(2)
D Conclusion
86(3)
5 Unilateral Refusal to License Patents-A Theoretical Perspective 89(57)
A Patent Exploitation Practices in Developing Countries: A Classification
89(4)
B General Discussion
93(6)
1 Unilateral Refusal to Supply Patented Technology in the Developing Country Context
93(2)
2 Competition Policy v. Patent Policy Revisited
95(4)
C Overview of Relevant Legal Doctrines
99(12)
1 Introduction of the Unilateral Refusal to Deal and the Essential Facilities Doctrines
99(1)
2 Theories of Harm
100(11)
D Critique of the Doctrines
111(33)
1 Detrimental Impact on Innovation Incentives
113(20)
2 Implementation Difficulties
133(6)
3 Critiques Specific to the Essential Facilities Doctrine
139(5)
E Conclusion
144(2)
6 Unilateral Refusal to License Patents-A Proposed Framework 146(55)
A Theoretical Approaches
146(10)
1 Per Se Legality
147(1)
2 Scope of Patent Test
148(3)
3 Monopoly Leveraging Test
151(1)
4 Intent/Pretext Test
151(3)
5 Jonathan Baker's No Business Justification Rule
154(2)
B Case Law on Unilateral Refusal to License
156(30)
1 The United States
156(4)
2 The European Union
160(8)
3 Developing Countries
168(3)
4 Doctrinal Considerations Raised in the Case Law
171(15)
C A Proposed Framework for Developing Countries
186(14)
1 A Proposed Framework
186(1)
2 A Summary of Prior Discussions Relevant for Application of Framework
187(3)
3 Nature of Compulsory License and Technological Capacity
190(2)
4 Developing Country-Specific Considerations
192(4)
5 Country-Specific Recommendations
196(1)
6 Enforcement Capacity Issues
197(3)
D Conclusion
200(1)
7 Patent Tying 201(81)
A Introduction
201(2)
B Tying and Price Discrimination
203(18)
1 Different Types of Price Discrimination
204(3)
2 How Tying Facilitates Price Discrimination
207(4)
3 Price Discrimination as a Justification for Tying
211(8)
4 Implications for Developing Countries
219(2)
C Tying and Innovation Incentives
221(15)
1 Tying Enhances Patentee Reward and Hence Innovation Incentives
221(6)
2 Tying Undermines Innovation Incentives
227(8)
3 Implications for Developing Countries
235(1)
D Tying and Leveraging and Foreclosure
236(25)
1 The Leverage Theory and Foreclosure
237(5)
2 Offensive Leveraging and Foreclosure in the Tied Product Market
242(11)
3 Defensive Leveraging and the Enhancement of Market Power in the Tying Product Market
253(5)
4 Implications for Developing Countries
258(3)
E Tying and Static Welfare
261(7)
1 Static Welfare Harm
261(1)
2 Pro-competitive Benefits
262(6)
F Case Law on Tying
268(7)
1 The United States
268(4)
2 The European Union
272(3)
G A Proposed Framework for Developing Countries
275(6)
H Conclusion
281(1)
8 Excessive Pricing for Pharmaceuticals 282(101)
A Introduction
282(1)
B Drug Prices in Developing Countries
283(26)
1 Unaffordable Drug Prices in Developing Countries
284(9)
2 Differential Pricing for Drugs in Developing Countries
293(6)
3 Do High Drug Prices in Developing Countries Require Policy Intervention?
299(10)
C The TRIPS Agreement
309(25)
1 Transitional Arrangements for Developing Countries
309(1)
2 Public Health Exception
310(1)
3 Abuse/Anticompetitive Conduct Exception
311(2)
4 Article 30
313(3)
5 Article 31
316(18)
D Excessive Pricing Enforcement under Competition Law
334(16)
1 Pros and Cons of Enforcing Against Excessive Pricing
336(6)
2 Theoretical Discussion
342(8)
E Case Law on Excessive Pricing
350(25)
1 The United States
350(1)
2 The European Union
351(20)
3 Developing Countries
371(4)
F A Proposed Framework for Developing Countries
375(7)
1 The Case for Intervention Against Excessive Drug Prices in Developing Countries
375(4)
2 Test for Excessiveness
379(3)
G Conclusion
382(1)
9 Reverse Payment Settlements 383(40)
A Introduction
383(1)
B An Overview of Reverse Payment Settlements
383(2)
C Competitive Concerns of Reverse Payment Settlements
385(10)
1 Economic Incentives
386(2)
2 Consumer Harm
388(2)
3 Effects on Innovation Incentives and Generics' Incentive to Challenge
390(5)
D Doctrinal Approaches
395(7)
1 Per Se Illegality
395(1)
2 Presumptive Illegality
396(4)
3 Rule of Reason
400(2)
E Case Law on Reverse Payment Settlements
402(15)
1 The United States
403(5)
2 The European Union
408(9)
F A Proposed Framework for Developing Countries
417(4)
1 Determination of Legality
417(2)
2 Appropriate Remedy
419(1)
3 Implementation Issues
420(1)
G Conclusion
421(2)
10 Restrictive Licensing Practices 423(46)
A Introduction
423(2)
B No Challenge Clauses
425(19)
1 An Overview
425(1)
2 Arguments for and Against No Challenge Clauses
426(8)
3 Case Law on No Challenge Clauses
434(5)
4 A Proposed Framework for Developing Countries
439(5)
C Other Licensing Practices
444(23)
1 Licensing Practices That Do Not Enhance the Patentee's Market Power
445(5)
2 Licensing Practices That May Enhance the Patentee's Market Power
450(3)
3 Case Law on Restrictive Licensing Practices
453(8)
4 A Proposed Framework for Developing Countries
461(6)
D Conclusion
467(2)
11 Conclusion 469(6)
Bibliography 475(22)
Index 497
Thomas Cheng is an associate professor at the University of Hong Kong. He has written extensively on competition law in developing countries and on the competition law of a number of Asian jurisdictions, including Hong Kong, China, and Japan. His research has appeared in respected specialist U.S. journals, including Chicago Journal of International Law, Berkeley Business Law Journal, Virginia Law & Business Review, and University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law, and in leading competition law journals such as Journal of Antitrust Enforcement and World Competition. In 2020, he published Competition Law in Developing Countries, with Oxford University Press.