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El. knyga: Permanent States of Emergency and the Rule of Law: Constitutions in an Age of Crisis

(Durham University)

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Permanent States of Emergency and the Rule of Law explores the impact that oxymoronic 'permanent' states of emergency have on the validity and effectiveness of constitutional norms and, ultimately, constituent power. It challenges the idea that many constitutional orders are facing permanent states of emergency due to the 'objective nature' of threats facing modern states today, arguing instead that the nature of a threat depends upon the subjective assessment of the decision-maker. In light of this, it further argues that robust judicial scrutiny and review of these decisions is required to ensure that the temporariness of the emergency is a legal question and that the validity of constitutional norms is not undermined by their perpetual suspension. It does this by way of a narrower conception of the rule of law than standard accounts in favour of judicial review of emergency powers in the literature, which tend to be based on the normative value of human rights. In so doing it seeks to refute the fundamental constitutional challenge posed by Carl Schmitt: that all state power cannot be constrained by law.

Recenzijos

Greenes is a timely book addressing issues which so obviously affect legal systems across the world. It is theoretically robust. It is intellectually honest and willing to engage with counter-positions. It sets a challenge and rises to it. -- Fergal Davis, Kings College, London * The Irish Jurist *

Daugiau informacijos

Permanent States of Emergency and the Rule of Law: Constitutions in an Age of Crisis' offers a compelling argument in favour of judicial review of the decision to declare a state of emergency that departs from standard accounts in the literature.
Acknowledgements vii
Introduction xiii
1 The Ideal State of Emergency
1(32)
Introduction
1(1)
The `Ideal' Emergency
2(1)
The Dictatorship of the Roman Republic
3(8)
The Function and Powers of the Dictator
4(3)
Controls on the Roman Dictatorship
7(3)
Unleashing the Tyranny of Dictatorship
10(1)
The `Ideal' Emergency in Legal Systems Today
11(10)
Defining the Phenomenon
12(1)
International Human Rights Law
12(3)
Constitutional Definitions
15(4)
The Emergency Response
19(2)
The Ideal Type Emergency Paradigm
21(9)
The Existence of a Serious Threat to the State Recognised by an Organ of the State
22(1)
A Reactive or Defensive Mechanism
23(1)
The Consolidation of Powers in a Branch/Office of Government
24(1)
The Enactment of Exceptional Measures that would not have been Permitted in a State of Normalcy
25(1)
The Necessity of the Measures Enacted
26(1)
The Separation of Normalcy and Emergency
27(3)
Conclusion
30(3)
2 The Permanent State of Emergency
33(32)
Introduction
33(1)
The Permanent State of Emergency: Separating Normalcy from Emergency
34(14)
Individual Separation: Distinguishing Friend from Enemy
35(2)
Geographical Separation
37(6)
Legal Manifestations of Geographical Distinctions
43(2)
Temporal Separation: The Permanent State of Emergency
45(3)
The Fall of the Emergency Paradigm?
48(1)
Is the Emergency Paradigm Obsolete? Focusing on the Decision-Maker
48(14)
Framing the Emergency: Focusing on the Decision-Makers
50(2)
Democratic Decision-Making and States of Emergency
52(2)
The Broadening of Emergency Powers: Expanding the `Penumbra'
54(1)
Terrorism as a Permanent Emergency
54(3)
Economic Emergencies
57(4)
De Facto Emergencies
61(1)
Conclusion
62(3)
3 Permanent States of Emergency and Constituent Power
65(34)
Introduction
65(1)
Power beyond Law? The State of Emergency and the Legal Order
66(2)
The State of Emergency and the Pure Theory of Law
68(3)
Power beyond the Law: Rejecting the Identity Thesis?
69(2)
Carl Schmitt and the State of Exception
71(6)
The Concept of the Political: The Friend-Enemy Distinction
71(2)
Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism: The State of Exception
73(1)
Carl Schmitt and the State of Exception
74(3)
Confronting the State of Exception: Preserving the Identity Thesis
77(8)
Conflicts between Norms: The Hierarchy of Norms
78(2)
Conflicts between Constitutional Norms
80(2)
Unconstitutional Constitutional Norms: The Case for Judicial Review
82(3)
The Permanent State of Emergency as an Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment
85(1)
Constitutional Desuetude
86(2)
The Permanent State of Emergency and the Validity and Effectiveness of Constitutional Norms
88(3)
Permanent States of Emergency and the Repudiation of Constitutional Norms
90(1)
The Permanent State of Emergency as a Claim for the Constituent Power
91(4)
Constituent Power and the State of Emergency: The Case of Ireland
95(3)
Conclusion
98(1)
4 Permanent States of Emergency and Legal Black Holes
99(28)
Introduction
99(1)
Legal Black Holes
100(5)
National Security and Judicial Review
105(5)
From Administrative Review to Constitutional Review
110(6)
The Constitutional Validity of Legislation
111(2)
Political Questions and Judicial Review
113(3)
Sceptical Views of Judicial Review and the Rule of Law
116(3)
Legal Black Holes and Zones Beyond Law
119(6)
Zones Beyond Law v Legal Black Holes: The Irish Example
120(3)
The Non-Justiciability of Article 28.3.3° and Constituent Power
123(2)
Conclusions
125(2)
5 Permanent States of Emergency and Legal Grey Holes
127(34)
Introduction
127(1)
Legal Grey Holes
127(12)
Emergency Powers and Legal Grey Holes in Practice
130(1)
Ireland
130(2)
Article 15 ECHR and the Meaning of `Public Emergency Threatening the Life of the Nation'
132(2)
The United Kingdom
134(2)
Judicial Push Back?
136(3)
Fortifying the Rule of Law? Human Rights and Legal Grey Holes
139(8)
National Security and Human Rights
143(4)
Legal Grey Holes and Constituent Power
147(11)
The Two Limbs of the Schmittian Challenge
148(4)
Beyond Human Rights Norms
152(1)
Ireland: Beyond the Security-Liberty Divide
152(3)
Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution: Beyond the Security-Liberty Divide
155(2)
Beyond National Security Emergencies
157(1)
Conclusions
158(3)
6 Alternatives to Constitutional States of Emergency
161(36)
Introduction
161(1)
Why Emergency? The Problem with `Business as Usual'
161(4)
`Business as Usual' and the `Shielding Effect' of Emergency Powers
164(1)
The Deepening of Emergency Powers: Legislative Accommodation
165(9)
Legislative Accommodation: United States
166(1)
Legislative Accommodation: United Kingdom
167(4)
The `Deepening' Effect of Legislative Accommodation
171(3)
Permanent States of Emergency and Parliamentary Sovereignty
174(15)
Prerogative Powers in a State of Emergency
175(1)
Common Law Constitutionalism and Parliamentary Sovereignty
176(3)
Common Law Constitutionalism and Emergency Powers
179(3)
Parliamentary Sovereignty and Constituent Power
182(4)
Relational Constituent Power
186(1)
Parliamentary Sovereignty and Constituent Power: Conclusions
187(2)
The Extra-Legal Measures Model
189(5)
ELM and the Source of Legal Authority
191(1)
ELM and the Authority of Affirmation
192(1)
Extra-Legal Measures: Conclusions
193(1)
Conclusions
194(3)
7 Resisting the Permanent State of Emergency
197(18)
Introduction
197(1)
Reviewing the Existence of a State of Emergency
198(6)
Ensuring Robust Review
198(4)
Independent Reviewers in a Culture of Justification
202(2)
Engineering Constitutions against Permanent States of Emergency
204(5)
Legislative Scrutiny of Emergency Powers: Bruce Ackerman's Super-Majoritarian Escalator
204(1)
Time-Limits and Sunset Clauses
205(1)
`Discrete Conditions': The `Shielding Effect' of Emergency Powers
206(1)
Limited Emergency Powers
207(1)
Proportionality as a Controlling Factor
208(1)
The Transformative Nature of Permanent States of Emergency
209(4)
Permanent States of Emergency and Constitutional Moments
211(2)
Final Conclusions
213(2)
Index 215
Alan Greene is an Assistant Professor in Law at Durham University.