Acknowledgements |
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vii | |
Introduction |
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xiii | |
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1 The Ideal State of Emergency |
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1 | (32) |
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1 | (1) |
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2 | (1) |
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The Dictatorship of the Roman Republic |
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3 | (8) |
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The Function and Powers of the Dictator |
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4 | (3) |
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Controls on the Roman Dictatorship |
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7 | (3) |
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Unleashing the Tyranny of Dictatorship |
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10 | (1) |
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The `Ideal' Emergency in Legal Systems Today |
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11 | (10) |
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12 | (1) |
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International Human Rights Law |
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12 | (3) |
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Constitutional Definitions |
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15 | (4) |
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19 | (2) |
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The Ideal Type Emergency Paradigm |
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21 | (9) |
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The Existence of a Serious Threat to the State Recognised by an Organ of the State |
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22 | (1) |
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A Reactive or Defensive Mechanism |
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23 | (1) |
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The Consolidation of Powers in a Branch/Office of Government |
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24 | (1) |
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The Enactment of Exceptional Measures that would not have been Permitted in a State of Normalcy |
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25 | (1) |
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The Necessity of the Measures Enacted |
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26 | (1) |
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The Separation of Normalcy and Emergency |
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27 | (3) |
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30 | (3) |
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2 The Permanent State of Emergency |
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33 | (32) |
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33 | (1) |
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The Permanent State of Emergency: Separating Normalcy from Emergency |
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34 | (14) |
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Individual Separation: Distinguishing Friend from Enemy |
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35 | (2) |
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37 | (6) |
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Legal Manifestations of Geographical Distinctions |
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43 | (2) |
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Temporal Separation: The Permanent State of Emergency |
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45 | (3) |
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The Fall of the Emergency Paradigm? |
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48 | (1) |
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Is the Emergency Paradigm Obsolete? Focusing on the Decision-Maker |
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48 | (14) |
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Framing the Emergency: Focusing on the Decision-Makers |
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50 | (2) |
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Democratic Decision-Making and States of Emergency |
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52 | (2) |
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The Broadening of Emergency Powers: Expanding the `Penumbra' |
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54 | (1) |
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Terrorism as a Permanent Emergency |
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54 | (3) |
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57 | (4) |
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61 | (1) |
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62 | (3) |
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3 Permanent States of Emergency and Constituent Power |
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65 | (34) |
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65 | (1) |
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Power beyond Law? The State of Emergency and the Legal Order |
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66 | (2) |
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The State of Emergency and the Pure Theory of Law |
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68 | (3) |
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Power beyond the Law: Rejecting the Identity Thesis? |
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69 | (2) |
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Carl Schmitt and the State of Exception |
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71 | (6) |
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The Concept of the Political: The Friend-Enemy Distinction |
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71 | (2) |
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Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism: The State of Exception |
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73 | (1) |
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Carl Schmitt and the State of Exception |
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74 | (3) |
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Confronting the State of Exception: Preserving the Identity Thesis |
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77 | (8) |
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Conflicts between Norms: The Hierarchy of Norms |
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78 | (2) |
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Conflicts between Constitutional Norms |
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80 | (2) |
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Unconstitutional Constitutional Norms: The Case for Judicial Review |
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82 | (3) |
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The Permanent State of Emergency as an Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment |
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85 | (1) |
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86 | (2) |
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The Permanent State of Emergency and the Validity and Effectiveness of Constitutional Norms |
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88 | (3) |
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Permanent States of Emergency and the Repudiation of Constitutional Norms |
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90 | (1) |
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The Permanent State of Emergency as a Claim for the Constituent Power |
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91 | (4) |
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Constituent Power and the State of Emergency: The Case of Ireland |
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95 | (3) |
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98 | (1) |
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4 Permanent States of Emergency and Legal Black Holes |
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99 | (28) |
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99 | (1) |
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100 | (5) |
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National Security and Judicial Review |
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105 | (5) |
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From Administrative Review to Constitutional Review |
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110 | (6) |
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The Constitutional Validity of Legislation |
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111 | (2) |
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Political Questions and Judicial Review |
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113 | (3) |
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Sceptical Views of Judicial Review and the Rule of Law |
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116 | (3) |
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Legal Black Holes and Zones Beyond Law |
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119 | (6) |
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Zones Beyond Law v Legal Black Holes: The Irish Example |
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120 | (3) |
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The Non-Justiciability of Article 28.3.3° and Constituent Power |
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123 | (2) |
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125 | (2) |
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5 Permanent States of Emergency and Legal Grey Holes |
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127 | (34) |
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127 | (1) |
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127 | (12) |
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Emergency Powers and Legal Grey Holes in Practice |
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130 | (1) |
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130 | (2) |
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Article 15 ECHR and the Meaning of `Public Emergency Threatening the Life of the Nation' |
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132 | (2) |
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134 | (2) |
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136 | (3) |
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Fortifying the Rule of Law? Human Rights and Legal Grey Holes |
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139 | (8) |
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National Security and Human Rights |
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143 | (4) |
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Legal Grey Holes and Constituent Power |
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147 | (11) |
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The Two Limbs of the Schmittian Challenge |
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148 | (4) |
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Beyond Human Rights Norms |
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152 | (1) |
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Ireland: Beyond the Security-Liberty Divide |
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152 | (3) |
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Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution: Beyond the Security-Liberty Divide |
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155 | (2) |
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Beyond National Security Emergencies |
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157 | (1) |
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158 | (3) |
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6 Alternatives to Constitutional States of Emergency |
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161 | (36) |
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161 | (1) |
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Why Emergency? The Problem with `Business as Usual' |
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161 | (4) |
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`Business as Usual' and the `Shielding Effect' of Emergency Powers |
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164 | (1) |
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The Deepening of Emergency Powers: Legislative Accommodation |
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165 | (9) |
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Legislative Accommodation: United States |
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166 | (1) |
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Legislative Accommodation: United Kingdom |
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167 | (4) |
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The `Deepening' Effect of Legislative Accommodation |
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171 | (3) |
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Permanent States of Emergency and Parliamentary Sovereignty |
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174 | (15) |
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Prerogative Powers in a State of Emergency |
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175 | (1) |
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Common Law Constitutionalism and Parliamentary Sovereignty |
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176 | (3) |
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Common Law Constitutionalism and Emergency Powers |
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179 | (3) |
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Parliamentary Sovereignty and Constituent Power |
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182 | (4) |
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Relational Constituent Power |
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186 | (1) |
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Parliamentary Sovereignty and Constituent Power: Conclusions |
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187 | (2) |
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The Extra-Legal Measures Model |
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189 | (5) |
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ELM and the Source of Legal Authority |
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191 | (1) |
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ELM and the Authority of Affirmation |
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192 | (1) |
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Extra-Legal Measures: Conclusions |
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193 | (1) |
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194 | (3) |
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7 Resisting the Permanent State of Emergency |
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197 | (18) |
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197 | (1) |
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Reviewing the Existence of a State of Emergency |
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198 | (6) |
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198 | (4) |
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Independent Reviewers in a Culture of Justification |
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202 | (2) |
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Engineering Constitutions against Permanent States of Emergency |
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204 | (5) |
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Legislative Scrutiny of Emergency Powers: Bruce Ackerman's Super-Majoritarian Escalator |
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204 | (1) |
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Time-Limits and Sunset Clauses |
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205 | (1) |
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`Discrete Conditions': The `Shielding Effect' of Emergency Powers |
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206 | (1) |
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207 | (1) |
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Proportionality as a Controlling Factor |
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208 | (1) |
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The Transformative Nature of Permanent States of Emergency |
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209 | (4) |
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Permanent States of Emergency and Constitutional Moments |
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211 | (2) |
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213 | (2) |
Index |
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215 | |