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El. knyga: Philosophical Perspective on Folk Moral Objectivism

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Philosophers have long debated whether morality is objective. But how do lay people think about this matter? A Philosophical Perspective on Folk Moral Objectivism discusses the philosophical aspects of this question in an accessible, integrated and coherent way.



Philosophers have long debated whether morality is objective. But how do lay people think about this matter? A Philosophical Perspective on Folk Moral Objectivism discusses the philosophical aspects of this question in an accessible, integrated and coherent way.

The first part argues that many empirical studies have been unsuccessful in fully or exclusively measuring beliefs about moral objectivity. Still, there are a few lessons that can be drawn from them. Most importantly, lay people are not objectivists. They believe that moral statements only express desires or that their truth is relative to individuals or cultures. The book’s second part considers ways in which these empirical findings may help assess philosophical theories about moral objectivity. Overall, findings about people’s moral objectivity beliefs suggest that morality is not objective. The truth of the matter may even lie beyond the traditional objectivism/non-objectivism dichotomy.

This book develops a unique perspective on a thriving new area of research. It is a valuable resource for upper level undergraduates, postgraduates and researchers in moral psychology, theoretical psychology, experimental philosophy, metaethics and philosophy of the mind.

Acknowledgements viii
1 Introduction
1(12)
1.1 Approach
4(2)
1.2 Clarifications
6(2)
1.3 Outline
8(5)
PART I Empirical Research
13(112)
2 The Methodology of Research on Moral Objectivity Beliefs
17(1)
2.1 Introduction
17(1)
2.2 Measures of Moral Objectivism
18(2)
2.3 Worries about Incompleteness
20(4)
2.4 Worries about Ambiguity
24(6)
2.5 Worries about Bias
30(3)
2.6 Further Worries
33(4)
2.7 Conclusion
37(4)
3 The Content of Moral Objectivity Beliefs
41(42)
3.1 Somewhat Implicit/Rather Immediate Beliefs
42(16)
3.2 Explicit/Somewhat Reflective Beliefs
58(11)
3.3 Very Implicit/Very Immediate Beliefs
69(4)
3.4 Conclusion
73(10)
4 The Correlates of Moral Objectivity Beliefs
83(21)
4.1 Introduction
83(1)
4.2 Cognitive Variables
84(5)
4.3 Behavioral Variables
89(4)
4.4 Other Variables
93(7)
4.5 Conclusion
100(4)
5 The Causes and Consequences of Moral Objectivity Beliefs
104(21)
5.1 Introduction
104(1)
5.2 Proximate Causes
105(4)
5.3 Ultimate Causes
109(7)
5.4 Consequences
116(5)
5.5 Conclusion
121(4)
PART II Philosophical Implications
125(85)
6 The Presumptive Argument for Objectivism
129(21)
6.1 Introduction
129(1)
6.2 The Empirical Premise
130(8)
6.3 The Explanatory Variant
138(3)
6.4 The Justificatory Variant
141(3)
6.5 The Conservatist Variant
144(4)
6.6 Conclusion
148(2)
7 The Debunking Argument for Non-Objectivism/Skepticism
150(22)
7.1 Introduction
150(2)
7.2 The Ultimate Variant
152(4)
7.3 The Proximate Variant
156(7)
7.4 Epistemic Implications
163(3)
7.5 The Argument's Scope
166(4)
7.6 Conclusion
170(2)
8 The Conceptual Argument for Objectivism/Error Theory
172(18)
8.1 Introduction
172(2)
8.2 Concepts and Beliefs
174(3)
8.3 Irrelevant Beliefs Objections
177(3)
8.4 Irrelevant Speakers Objections
180(4)
8.5 The Empirical Premise
184(4)
8.6 Conclusion
188(2)
9 Some Further Arguments
190(20)
9.1 Introduction
190(1)
9.2 The Methodological Argument
191(2)
9.3 The Abolitionist Argument
193(4)
9.4 The Projectivist Argument
197(5)
9.5 Conclusion
202(2)
10 Conclusion
204(1)
10.1 Empirical Findings
204(1)
10.2 Philosophical Findings
205(1)
10.3 The Bigger Picture
206(4)
References 210(14)
Index 224
Thomas Pölzler is a researcher and lecturer at the Philosophy Department of the University of Graz, Austria. He mainly works on moral psychology and metaethics. Among his many publications are Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences (Routledge, 2018) as well as articles in journals such as Synthese, Inquiry and Review of Philosophy and Psychology.