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x | |
| Preface |
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xi | |
| Acknowledgements |
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xiii | |
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Introductory survey of the interpretations: some historical background |
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1 | (13) |
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Introductory survey of the interpretations |
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1 | (2) |
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Origins and development of probability theory (c. 1650 to c. 1800): mathematics |
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3 | (5) |
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Origins and development of probability theory (c. 1650 to c. 1800): practical applications and philosophy |
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8 | (6) |
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14 | (11) |
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Universal determinism and Laplace's demon |
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14 | (3) |
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17 | (1) |
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18 | (4) |
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Why was probability theory not developed in the Ancient World? |
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22 | (3) |
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25 | (25) |
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Cambridge in the Edwardian era |
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25 | (4) |
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Probability as a logical relation |
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29 | (4) |
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Measurable and non-measurable probabilities: the Principle of Indifference |
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33 | (4) |
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Paradoxes of the Principle of Indifference |
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37 | (5) |
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Possible solutions to the paradoxes |
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42 | (8) |
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50 | (38) |
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Ramsey's criticisms of Keynes |
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52 | (1) |
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Subjective foundations for mathematical probability: the Ramsey-De Finetti theorem |
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53 | (12) |
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A comparison of the axiom system given here with the Kolmogorov axioms |
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65 | (4) |
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Apparently objective probabilities in the subjective theory: exchangeability |
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69 | (6) |
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The relation between independence and exchangeability |
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75 | (2) |
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Criticism of De Finetti's exchangeability reduction |
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77 | (6) |
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Some objections to Bayesianism |
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83 | (2) |
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De Finetti's route to subjective probability |
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85 | (3) |
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88 | (25) |
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Probability theory as a science |
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88 | (4) |
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The empirical laws of probability |
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92 | (4) |
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The limiting frequency definition of probability |
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96 | (9) |
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The problem of randomness |
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105 | (4) |
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The relation between Von Mises' axioms and the Kolmogorov axioms |
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109 | (4) |
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The propensity theory: (I) general survey |
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113 | (24) |
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Popper's introduction of the propensity theory |
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114 | (5) |
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Can there be objective probabilities of single events? |
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119 | (6) |
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Classification of propensity theories |
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125 | (1) |
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The propensity theories of Miller, the later Popper and Fetzer |
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126 | (3) |
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Propensity and causality: Humphreys' paradox |
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129 | (8) |
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The propensity theory: (II) development of a particular version |
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137 | (32) |
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Criticisms of operationalism: a non-operationalist theory of conceptual innovation in the natural sciences |
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138 | (7) |
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A falsifying rule for probability statements |
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145 | (5) |
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Derivation of the empirical laws of probability |
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150 | (10) |
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The Kolmogorov axioms and the propensity theory |
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160 | (9) |
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Intersubjective probability and pluralist views of probability |
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169 | (18) |
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Intersubjective probability |
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169 | (6) |
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The spectrum from subjective to objective |
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175 | (5) |
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Pluralist views of probability |
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180 | (7) |
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An example of pluralism: differences between the natural and social sciences |
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187 | (19) |
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General arguments for interpreting probabilities in economics as epistemological rather than objective |
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188 | (7) |
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Soros on the difference between the natural and social sciences |
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195 | (5) |
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Operationalism is appropriate for the social sciences, but not for the natural sciences |
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200 | (6) |
| Notes |
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206 | (6) |
| References |
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212 | (6) |
| Index |
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218 | |
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