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Philosophy of Action: A Contemporary Introduction [Minkštas viršelis]

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This book offers an accessible and inclusive overview of the major debates in the philosophy of action. It covers the distinct approaches taken by Donald Davidson, G.E.M. Anscombe, and numerous others to answering questions like "what are intentional actions?" and "how do reasons explain actions?" Further topics include intention, practical knowledge, weakness and strength of will, self-governance, and collective agency. With introductions, conclusions, and annotated suggested reading lists for each of the ten chapters, it is an ideal introduction for advanced undergraduates as well as any philosopher seeking a primer on these issues.

Recenzijos

"Sarah Paul succeeds in a seemingly impossible task: she provides a clear and concise view of a sprawling and complex area of philosophy, without sacrificing accuracy or depth. Her compelling, lucid style will make this field accessible to non-specialists, and her insightful and synoptic vision of the contemporary philosophical debates about action will make this book valuable to experts as well. This is the best introduction to the field, a must-read for anyone interested in philosophy of action." Sergio Tenenbaum, University of Toronto

"In this book Sarah Paul achieves the near impossible: she provides a lucid survey of contemporary action theory that is assertive enough to serve as both guide and antagonist for readers while being fair to competing views in ways their critics rarely are. This is, by far, the best introduction to action theory I know." Kieran Setiya, MIT

Acknowledgments ix
1 Introduction: What Is the Philosophy of Action?
1(7)
2 What Is the Problem of Action?
8(9)
2.1 Activity and Passivity
9(1)
2.2 Goal-Directedness
9(1)
2.3 Attributability
10(1)
2.4 "Actish" Phenomenal Quality
11(1)
2.5 Voluntary Action
11(1)
2.6 Rational Action, or Acting for Reasons
12(1)
2.7 Practical Knowledge
12(1)
2.8 Intentional Action
13(1)
2.9 Intention
13(1)
2.10 Autonomy, Identification, and Self-Governance
14(1)
2.11 Further Choice Points
14(1)
2.11a Which Cases Are Paradigmatic?
14(1)
2.11b Questions About Action: Conceptual or Ontological?
15(1)
2.12 Conclusion
15(2)
Suggested Reading
16(1)
3 Action Explanation
17(21)
3.1 Guises of Rationalizing Explanation
18(1)
3.2 Reasons for Action: Motivating vs. Normative
19(1)
3.3 More on the "Why?" Question
20(2)
3.4 Action Explanation: Four Views
22(13)
3.4a The Rational Interpretation View
22(2)
3.4b The Causal Theory of Action Explanation
24(5)
3.4c Teleological Realism
29(4)
3.4d Naive Action Theory
33(2)
3.5 Arational Action
35(3)
Summary
36(1)
Suggested Reading
37(1)
4 The Ontology of Action
38(29)
4.1 Which Things in the World Can Be Actions?
39(2)
4.2 Under a Description
41(1)
4.3 Basic Actions
41(5)
4.3a Bodily Movements
43(1)
4.3b Volitions
44(1)
4.3c Beyond the Body
45(1)
4.4 The Accordion Effect
46(1)
4.5 How Many Actions?
47(1)
4.6 The Causal Theory of Action
48(9)
4.6a Objection I: Deviant Causal Chains, Redux
53(3)
4.6b Objection 2: The Disappearing Agent
56(1)
4.7 Alternatives to the Causal Theory
57(5)
4.7a Quietism
57(1)
4.7b Agent-Causation and Causal Powers
58(2)
4.7c Formal Causation
60(1)
4.7d An "Actish" Phenomenal Quality
61(1)
4.8 Omissions
62(1)
4.9 Mental Actions
63(4)
Summary
64(1)
Suggested Reading
65(2)
5 Intention
67(19)
5.1 Methodological Priority: Present or Future?
67(2)
5.2 Goal States and Plan States
69(1)
5.3 Reductive Accounts of Intention
69(5)
5.3a Predominant Desire
71(1)
5.3b Predominant Desire Plus Belief
71(2)
5.3c Evaluative Judgment
73(1)
5.4 Plan States and Plan Rationality
74(4)
5.5 Cognitivism About Intention
78(2)
5.6 A Distinctively Practical Attitude
80(2)
5.7 Intending and Intentional Action
82(4)
Summary
84(1)
Suggested Reading
85(1)
6 Practical Knowledge
86(15)
6.1 What Do We Mean by "Practical Knowledge?"
86(4)
6.1a Knowledge Without Observation
87(1)
6.1b Knowledge Without Inference
88(1)
6.1c Mistakes Are in the Performance, Not the Judgment
88(1)
6.1d The Cause of What It Understands
89(1)
6.1e Contradicted by Interference
89(1)
6.2 The Scope and Object of Practical Knowledge
90(3)
6.3 Accounts of Practical Knowledge
93(8)
6.3a Cognitivism About Intention
93(2)
6.3b Imperfective Knowledge
95(2)
6.3c The Inferential Account
97(2)
Summary
99(1)
Suggested Reading
100(1)
7 Does Action Have a Constitutive Aim?
101(13)
7.1 The Guise of the Good
102(3)
7.2 The Aim of Self-Understanding
105(2)
7.3 The Aim of Self-Constitution
107(2)
7.4 The Will to Power
109(1)
7.5 No Constitutive Aim
110(1)
7.6 Implications for Ethics and Metaethics
110(4)
Summary
112(1)
Suggested Reading
113(1)
8 Identification and Self-Governance
114(11)
8.1 Frankfurt on Identification
115(1)
8.2 Watson's Objection and Platonic Alternative
116(2)
8.3 Frankfurt Redux: Wholeheartedness
118(1)
8.4 Bratman on Self-governing Policies
119(1)
8.5 Skepticism About Self-Governance: A Genealogical Worry
120(1)
8.6 Self-Governance and Plan Rationality
121(4)
Summary
123(1)
Suggested Reading
123(2)
9 Temptation, Weakness, and Strength of Will
125(16)
9.1 Is Synchronic Akrasia Even Possible?
127(1)
9.2 A Failure of Reasoning?
128(2)
9.3 A Divergence Between Evaluation and Motivation?
130(1)
9.4 Is Akrasia Necessarily Irrational?
131(2)
9.5 Weakness of Will Over Time
133(2)
9.6 Self-Control
135(6)
Summary
139(1)
Suggested Reading
140(1)
10 Collective Agency
141(13)
10.1 Questions and Constraints
141(1)
10.2 Group Agents
142(2)
10.3 Collective Intentions
144(1)
10.3a Tuomela and Miller
145(1)
10.3b Searle
146(1)
10.3c Bratman
146(2)
10.3d Velleman
148(1)
10.3e Gilbert
149(1)
10.4 Acting Together
150(2)
Summary
152(1)
Suggested Reading
153(1)
11 Concluding Thoughts
154(3)
Bibliography 157(7)
Index 164
Sarah K. Paul is Associate Professor of Philosophy at New York University Abu Dhabi and Global Associate Professor of Philosophy at New York University.