| Preface |
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xiii | |
| General introduction |
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1 | (10) |
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Part I Big picture questions |
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11 | (30) |
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13 | (2) |
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1 `I am no tree! I am an Ent!': (What is a language? Does it require speakers like us?) |
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15 | (6) |
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2 Ideal language or ordinary languages?: (When considering language, should we strive to construct an ideal version of language, or strive to understand languages as we already find them?) |
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21 | (7) |
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3 The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis: (If natural languages deeply influence the forms that our thinking takes, could they be so different that we "live" in substantially "different worlds"?) |
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28 | (6) |
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4 Conventions: (How do the social conventions of a language emerge, and how fundamental are they to language?) |
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34 | (7) |
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Part II Early analytic philosophy and pragmatism |
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41 | (44) |
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43 | (2) |
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5 Frege on sense and reference: (How can two expressions refer to the same things, yet have different meanings?) |
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45 | (6) |
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6 Russell on `the present King of France': (How can an expression that refers to nothing be meaningful?) |
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51 | (7) |
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7 Peirce on making ideas clear: (How does the meaning of an expression or sentence relate to our practical concerns about coping with the world we experience?) |
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58 | (6) |
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8 `Pittsburgh is west of Philadelphia' is true: (Does language have a special sort of correspondence with the world, or is it fundamentally about our interests?) |
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64 | (6) |
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9 `All bachelors are unmarried males': (Are there sentences that are true entirely in virtue of the meanings of their words?) |
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70 | (7) |
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10 `Cavagai!': (How could you translate another community's language from scratch?) |
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77 | (8) |
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Part III Wittgenstein on rule-following and private language |
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85 | (36) |
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87 | (2) |
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11 Wittgenstein on following a rule: (How is it possible for us to follow rules governing the meanings of words in the languages we speak?) |
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89 | (7) |
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12 The private language argument: (Would it be possible for someone to speak a language that only they could ever understand?) |
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96 | (6) |
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13 Ayer on Robinson Crusoe: (Could someone isolated from all other speakers continue to use and develop a language on their own?) |
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102 | (6) |
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14 `That is green': (Do the sentences of the language we speak have meanings unto themselves, or do they become meaningful only with the whole of a language?) |
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108 | (6) |
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15 `Kripkenstein': (Do Wittgenstein's rule-following arguments imply that there are no facts about meaning at all?) |
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114 | (7) |
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Part IV Semantic paradoxes |
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121 | (36) |
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123 | (2) |
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16 When what is isn't, and what isn't is (the liar paradox): (Can there be sentences or sets of sentences to which it is impossible to assign truth-values consistently?) |
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125 | (7) |
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17 Russell's paradox: (Can there be contradictions that emerge from the very notion of a set?) |
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132 | (6) |
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18 Berry's paradox: (Can there be paradoxes of reference, as well as truth?) |
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138 | (6) |
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19 Yablo's paradox: (Can there be paradoxes that don't involve self-reference?) |
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144 | (5) |
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20 `True, false, and whatever else you've got!': (Can there be true contradictions?) |
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149 | (8) |
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Part V Context-sensitivity |
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157 | (52) |
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159 | (2) |
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21 `I can't get there from here': (Can noun phrases designate different things in different contexts?) |
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161 | (7) |
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22 `Micah is getting so big: (How much of the language we use is context-sensitive? Could everything we say be context-sensitive?) |
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168 | (7) |
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23 Epistemic contextualism: (Does the meaning of the word `know' change with context?) |
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175 | (7) |
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24 `Every man who owns a donkey beats it': (How do indefinite descriptions work with pronouns?) |
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182 | (7) |
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25 `I': (Do certain indexicals such as the word `I' have special significance beyond their designation?) |
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189 | (6) |
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26 `You': (Are second-person expressions like `you' essential to natural languages?) |
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195 | (7) |
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27 `We': (How do collective assertions like "We the people" work when they are not necessarily true reports of everyone's attitudes?) |
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202 | (7) |
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Part VI Speech acts and pragmatics |
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209 | (58) |
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211 | (2) |
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28 `Truly, you have a dizzying intellect.': (How can we discern the meaning a speaker conveys when it is not said explicitly?) |
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213 | (7) |
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29 `The present King of France' (yet again): (What do we presuppose in making an assertion?) |
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220 | (7) |
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30 `Will no one rid me of this turbulent priest?': (Can we perform a speech act by apparently performing a different speech act?) |
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227 | (7) |
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31 Silencing: (Are there speech acts that systematically undermine the possibility of other speech acts?) |
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234 | (7) |
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32 Jokes: (What do jokes say, if we're not reporting facts?) |
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241 | (6) |
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33 Slurs: (What do they do, concretely speaking?) |
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247 | (6) |
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34 If you have been scanning the titles, looking for the entry with all the dirty words, it's this one: (What makes profanity offensive? Is it always offensive?) |
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253 | (7) |
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35 Propaganda: (When should we think of texts and speech acts as manipulating us for political ends?) |
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260 | (7) |
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Part VII Lingering issues about meaning |
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267 | (38) |
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269 | (2) |
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36 Metaphor: (How does what is said in a metaphor depend on the literal meanings of its component expressions?) |
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271 | (7) |
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37 The Frege-Ceach problem: (How should we understand the meanings of words and sentences that are overtly action-guiding?) |
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278 | (7) |
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38 Something on vagueness: (Is the apparent vagueness of some terms a real feature of their meaning, and if so, how can we account for it?) |
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285 | (6) |
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39 Meanings of fictional names: (Can there be referents and true claims for things that only exist in fiction?) |
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291 | (7) |
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40 `Londres est jolie': (Can two beliefs about the same referent differ in their truth because they differ in the names they use?) |
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298 | (7) |
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Part VIII Naturalism and externalism |
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305 | (68) |
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307 | (2) |
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41 The poverty of the stimulus: (How do children acquire a language so quickly, and with so little input?) |
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309 | (7) |
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42 `If I could talk to the animals': (When can we ascribe thoughts and meanings to non-human animals?) |
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316 | (7) |
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43 Broca's area: (To what degree can linguistic competence be assigned to a specific part of the brain?) |
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323 | (6) |
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44 `Hello world!': (Could digital computers count as speakers of natural languages?) |
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329 | (7) |
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45 Natural language and evolution: (Why did humans evolve to have the ability to speak languages at all?) |
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336 | (7) |
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46 What if Shakespeare didn't write Hamlet}: (Do names and natural kind terms have complex meanings, or do they simply designate?) |
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343 | (6) |
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47 Reference and chains of communication: (What makes a name uniquely refer to someone, assuming it does so?) |
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349 | (6) |
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48 Adventures on Twin Earth: (How do we fix the reference of natural kind terms, and how does this affect their meanings?) |
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355 | (6) |
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49 Empty kind terms: (What do the names of things that don't exist mean?) |
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361 | (6) |
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50 Could there ever be `unicorns?': (Could fictional kinds of things become real kinds of things?) |
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367 | (6) |
| Index |
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373 | |
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