Preface to the Fourth Edition |
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xiii | |
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1 The Relationship between Philosophy and Science |
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1 | (19) |
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1 | (1) |
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2 | (1) |
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Philosophy and the Emergence of the Sciences |
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3 | (2) |
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Science and the Divisions of Philosophy |
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5 | (1) |
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What If There Are No Questions Left Over when Science Is Finished? |
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6 | (2) |
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A Short History of Philosophy as the Philosophy of Science |
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8 | (10) |
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18 | (1) |
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18 | (1) |
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19 | (1) |
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2 Why Is Philosophy of Science Important? |
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20 | (16) |
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20 | (1) |
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Scientific Questions and Questions about Science |
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20 | (3) |
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Modern Science Has Implications for Philosophy |
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23 | (6) |
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The Cultural Significance of Science |
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29 | (2) |
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Why Is Science the Only Feature of Western Culture Universally Adopted? |
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31 | (2) |
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33 | (1) |
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34 | (1) |
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34 | (2) |
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36 | (20) |
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36 | (1) |
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Defining Scientific Explanation |
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37 | (2) |
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The Role of Laws in Scientific Explanation |
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39 | (2) |
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41 | (3) |
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Problems for the Covering Law Model |
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44 | (5) |
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A Competing Conception of Scientific Explanation |
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49 | (4) |
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53 | (1) |
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54 | (1) |
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54 | (2) |
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56 | (18) |
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56 | (1) |
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57 | (1) |
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Counterfactual Support as a Symptom of the Necessity of Laws |
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58 | (2) |
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Counterfactuals and Causation |
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60 | (1) |
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Coming to Grips with Nomic Necessity |
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61 | (7) |
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68 | (3) |
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71 | (1) |
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72 | (1) |
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72 | (2) |
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5 Causation, Inexact Laws, and Statistical Probabilities |
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74 | (16) |
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74 | (1) |
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75 | (5) |
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80 | (2) |
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Statistical Laws and Probabilistic Causes |
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82 | (4) |
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Explanation as Unification |
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86 | (1) |
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87 | (1) |
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88 | (1) |
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88 | (2) |
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6 Laws and Explanations in Biology and the "Special Sciences" |
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90 | (16) |
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90 | (1) |
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Dissatisfaction with Causal Explanations |
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91 | (2) |
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Proprietary Laws in the "Special Sciences" |
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93 | (2) |
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Functional Laws and Biological Explanations |
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95 | (4) |
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Explaining Purposes or Explaining Them Away? |
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99 | (1) |
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From Intelligibility to Necessity |
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100 | (3) |
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103 | (1) |
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104 | (1) |
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105 | (1) |
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7 The Structure of Scientific Theories |
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106 | (19) |
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106 | (1) |
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How Do Theories Work? The Example of Newtonian Mechanics |
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107 | (5) |
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Theories as Explainers: The Hypothetico-Deductive Model |
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112 | (6) |
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The Philosophical Significance of Newtonian Mechanics and Theories |
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118 | (5) |
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123 | (1) |
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123 | (1) |
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124 | (1) |
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8 Epistemic and Metaphysical Issues about Scientific Theories |
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125 | (26) |
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125 | (1) |
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Reduction, Replacement, and the Progress of Science |
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126 | (7) |
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The Problem of Theoretical Terms |
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133 | (7) |
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Scientific Realism vs. Antirealism |
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140 | (7) |
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147 | (1) |
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148 | (1) |
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149 | (2) |
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9 Theory Construction vs. Model Building |
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151 | (18) |
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151 | (1) |
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152 | (4) |
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Semantic vs. Syntactic Approaches to Theories and Models |
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156 | (3) |
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A Case Study: Darwin's Theory of Natural Selection |
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159 | (3) |
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Models and Theories in Evolutionary Biology |
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162 | (4) |
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166 | (1) |
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167 | (1) |
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167 | (2) |
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10 Induction and Probability |
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169 | (21) |
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169 | (1) |
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170 | (5) |
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Statistics and Probability to the Rescue? |
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175 | (6) |
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How Much Can Bayes' Theorem Really Help? |
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181 | (6) |
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187 | (1) |
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188 | (1) |
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188 | (2) |
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11 Confirmation, Falsification, Underdetermination |
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190 | (16) |
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190 | (1) |
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Epistemological Problems of Hypothesis Testing |
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191 | (4) |
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Induction as a Pseudo-Problem: Popper's Gambit |
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195 | (5) |
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200 | (4) |
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204 | (1) |
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205 | (1) |
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205 | (1) |
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12 Challenges from the History of Science |
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206 | (17) |
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206 | (1) |
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A Role for History in the Philosophy of Science? |
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207 | (5) |
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New Paradigms and Scientific Revolutions |
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212 | (5) |
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Are Scientific Research Programs Rational? |
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217 | (4) |
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221 | (1) |
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222 | (1) |
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222 | (1) |
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13 Naturalism in the Philosophy of Science |
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223 | (14) |
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223 | (1) |
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Quine and the Surrender of First Philosophy |
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223 | (5) |
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Naturalism, Multiple Realizability, and Supervenience |
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228 | (6) |
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Naturalism's Problem of Justification |
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234 | (1) |
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235 | (1) |
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236 | (1) |
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236 | (1) |
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14 The Contested Character of Science |
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237 | (19) |
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237 | (1) |
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238 | (2) |
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The "Strong Program" in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge |
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240 | (4) |
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Postmodernism and the Science Wars |
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244 | (3) |
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Does the Sokal Hoax Prove Anything? |
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247 | (2) |
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Scientism, Sexism, and Significant Truths |
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249 | (5) |
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254 | (1) |
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254 | (1) |
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255 | (1) |
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15 Science, Relativism, and Objectivity |
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256 | (10) |
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256 | (1) |
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Relativism and Conceptual Schemes |
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256 | (3) |
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Dealing with Incommensurability |
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259 | (4) |
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Conclusion: The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme |
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263 | (2) |
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265 | (1) |
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265 | (1) |
Glossary |
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266 | (8) |
Bibliography |
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274 | (8) |
Index |
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282 | |