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As a growing area of research, the philosophy of time is increasingly relevant to different areas of philosophy and even other disciplines. This book describes and evaluates the most important debates in philosophy of time, under several subject areas: metaphysics, epistemology, physics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, cognitive science, rationality, and art.

Questions this book investigates include the following. Can we know what time really is? Is time possible, especially given modern physics? Must there be time because we cannot think without it? What do we experience of time? How might philosophy of time be relevant to understanding the mind–body relationship or evidence in cognitive science? Can the philosophy of time help us understand biases toward the future and the fear of death? How is time relevant to art—and is art relevant to philosophical debates about time? Finally, what exactly could time travel be? And could time travel satisfy emotions such as nostalgia and regret?

Through asking such questions, and showing how they might be best answered, the book demonstrates the importance philosophy of time has in contemporary thought. Each of the book’s ten chapters begins with a helpful introduction and ends with study questions and an annotated list of further reading. This and a comprehensive bibliography at the end of the book prepare the reader to go further in their study of the philosophy of time.

List of Figures
xiv
Preface xv
About This Book xvi
Acknowledgements xix
1 Epistemology of Time
1(28)
Overview I Introduction
2(1)
Theoretical Time Is Not Folk Time
3(1)
A World Without Time Is Not a World We Understand
4(1)
Folk Time
5(2)
Objects and Events
7(1)
Temporal Properties and Relations
8(1)
Independent Time
9(1)
Substantivalism
9(1)
Relationalism
10(1)
Objection: A Frozen World Is Possible
11(1)
Objection: We Can Have Indirect Knowledge of Substantival Time
12(1)
Frozen Worlds
12(3)
Objection 1 We Do Not Know There Is a Global Freeze (Other Explanations Available)
15(1)
Response: Inference to the Simplest Explanation
15(2)
Objection 2 Time in an Unchanging World Still Needs the World
15(1)
Objection 3 Shoemaker-Style Arguments Do Not Suit Lived Experience
16(1)
Scepticism about Time
17(1)
Kant's Antinomies
17(1)
Thesis: Time Has a Beginning
18(1)
Antithesis: Time Has No Beginning
18(1)
Elapsing Time and Temporal Passage
19(1)
Idealism or Scepticism?
19(1)
Sextus Empiricus
20(1)
Scepticism about Change
21(1)
Objection: This Argument Is Against the Reality of Change
21(1)
Against Time's Divisibility or Indivisibility
22(1)
The Argument Against Time as Past, Present, and Future
23(2)
Objection 1 We Cannot Suspend Reliefs about Time
24(1)
Objection 2 Scepticism Depends on One's Metaphysics of Time
24(1)
Knowledge of Time through Perception
25(1)
The Causal Truth-Maker Principle
25(1)
Temporal Order Cannot Cause Belief
26(1)
Study Questions
27(1)
Suggested Readings
28(1)
2 Metaphysics of Time I: Time and Change
29(29)
Overview
29(1)
Introduction
30(1)
McTaggart's Paradox
31(1)
The Two Main Concepts of Events in Time
31(1)
A-Series
32(1)
B-Series
32(1)
McTaggart's Argument
33(3)
Solution I: A-Series Positions Are Determined by B-Series Positions
36(1)
Indexicals
36(2)
Objection: The B-Series Is Not Enough for Change
38(1)
Objection 1 The B-Series Does Not Provide Real A-Series Positions
38(1)
Objection 2 The B-Series Does Not Capture Real Change
38(1)
Motion and A-Series Change
39(1)
Indexical A-Series Change
40(1)
Objection: This Is Not Real Change
40(1)
Analogy between a Fundamental A-Series and Absolute Space
41(1)
Tense Theory
42(1)
Temporal Passage
42(1)
The Unique and Real Present
43(1)
Real Present and Temporal Passage
43(1)
Real Present and the Real A-Series
44(1)
Time Defined by Events and a Static A-Series
44(1)
Kinds of Tense Theory
45(1)
Presentism
45(1)
Presentism Is Intuitive
46(1)
Presentism Solves McTaggart's Paradox
47(3)
Objection 1 No Real A-Series
48(1)
Objection 2 Presentism Lacks Truth-Makers for Truths about the Past
48(2)
Objection 3 Presentism and Physics
50(1)
Eternalism
50(1)
The "Moving Spotlight"
50(1)
Objection: Events Must Change
51(1)
The Growing Block Theory
51(1)
Tenseless Theory
52(1)
Change, Static and Dynamic
53(2)
R-Theory
55(1)
Study Questions
56(1)
Suggested Readings
56(2)
3 Metaphysics of Time II: Change and Persistence in Objects
58(26)
Overview
58(1)
Introduction
59(1)
Concrete Particulars
59(2)
An Object Exists in Space
61(1)
Spatial Parts
62(1)
An Object Exists in Time
62(1)
An Object Persists
63(1)
Endurantism: An Object is at Each Time it Persists
63(1)
Being Wholly Present
64(1)
Objection: Endurantism Has No Spatial Analogue
65(1)
The Persistence of Objects through Change
65(1)
Hinchliffs Four Conditions of Change
66(1)
Objection: There Is No Analogy for Specific Properties
67(1)
Leibniz' Law
68(1)
Numerical Identity
69(1)
Relations-to-Times: Temporal Location Is Not a Property
70(1)
Adverbialism
71(1)
The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics
72(1)
Intrinsic Properties
73(1)
Temporary Intrinsic Properties
74(1)
Endurantism
74(1)
Relations-to-Times and Adverbialism
75(1)
Temporal Parts: A Different Object is at Each Time an Object Persists
76(1)
Objection: Objects Are Continuants
77(1)
Response 1 An Object Can Have Infinite Parts
77(1)
Response 2 This Objection Requires Continuous Time
78(1)
Perdurance: The Ordinary Object Is the Persisting Object
78(1)
Exdurantism (Stage Theory): The Ordinary Object Is the Object at Each Time
79(2)
Intuitions about Persistence
81(1)
Study Questions
82(1)
Suggested Readings
83(1)
4 Philosophy of Physics and Time
84(35)
Overview
84(1)
Introduction
85(1)
Physics Without Time
86(1)
Substantivalism and Early Physics
87(1)
Relative Simultaneity
88(1)
Relative Frames
88(2)
Relative Is Neither Private Nor Subjective
90(1)
Relative Time
91(1)
The Constant Speed of Light
91(3)
Inertial Frames
94(1)
Possible Absolute Simultaneity and Temporal Order
94(1)
Minkowski Space-Time
95(1)
Relative Temporal Order
96(2)
STR and Relative Temporal Order
98(1)
Objection: There Is Absolute Temporal Order in STR
99(1)
Response: Not All Earlier Events Are Causally Related to Later Events
99(1)
Causal Order and Perceived Temporal Order
99(2)
Causal Order and the Intuition of Temporal Order
101(1)
Backwards Causation
102(1)
Entropy
103(1)
Bardon's Entropy Account of Perception
104(3)
Objections to Relative Time
107(1)
Bergson's Objections to Relative Time
107(1)
Objection 1 Real Time Is Continuous
107(1)
Objection 2 Relative Time Is Merely Imagined Time
108(1)
Objection 3 Experienced Time Requires Absolute Time
109(1)
Tense Theory Objections
110(1)
Tense Theory and Temporal Order
111(1)
Tense Theory and Relative Simultaneity
112(1)
Presentism
112(1)
Privileged Frames of Reference
113(1)
The Ether
113(1)
Objection: We Cannot Detect the Privileged Frame
114(2)
Tenseless Theory
116(1)
Study Questions
117(1)
Suggested Readings
118(1)
5 Philosophy of Language and Time
119(31)
Overview
119(1)
Time and the Linguistic Turn
120(2)
Metaphors of Temporal Passage
122(1)
Objection: Metaphors of Passage Have Meaning
123(1)
Merely Apparent Metaphysical Meaning
124(1)
Modifiers
125(1)
Temporal Properties of Linguistic Expressions
126(1)
Tokens
127(1)
Propositions
128(1)
Changing Propositional Truth-Values
129(1)
Truth-Makers and Facts
130(1)
Truth-Makers for Propositional Variation in Truth-Value
130(2)
Objection: Propositions Are Abstract and Not in Time
132(1)
Truth-Makers and Tokens
132(1)
Implicit Context
133(1)
Token-Reflexive Truth-Conditions
133(2)
Linguistic Responses to McTaggart's Paradox
135(2)
Irreducible Tense
137(1)
Tense Language and Tokens
137(2)
Objection 1 Propositions Cannot Change Truth-Value in Tense Theory
138(1)
Response: Tense is a Modifier
139(1)
Objection 2 Tense Tokens Are Not Merely Linguistic Entities
140(1)
Response: The Tokens Only Undermine Mere Linguistic Solutions
140(1)
Tenseless Facts
140(2)
Objection: Some Tensed Propositions Cannot Have Tokens
142(1)
Response: Date-Reflexive Theory
143(1)
Tense Logic
144(1)
Logical Operators and Truth-Value
144(1)
Tense Logic and the Metaphysics of Time
145(3)
Objection 1 We Talk as if Tense are Properties, Locations, or Facts
145(1)
Objection 2 Tense Logic Assumes Presentism
146(1)
Objection 3 Tense Operators Do Not Need an Unreal Past and Future
146(2)
Study Questions
148(1)
Suggested Readings
148(2)
6 Philosophy of Mind and Time
150(33)
Overview
150(1)
Introduction
151(1)
Time is Only in the Mind: St Augustine's Argument
152(2)
Objection 1 Time Is Unreal Not Mind-Dependent
153(1)
Objection 2 The Past and Future Are Real
154(1)
Objection 2 The Present Can Have Duration
154(1)
Tense Theory
154(1)
Tenseless Theory
155(2)
Temporal Experience
157(1)
The Appearance of Time in the World
158(1)
Time We Do Not Experience
158(1)
Time We Do Experience
159(1)
Objection: Time-Lag
160(1)
Response: Apparent Time
161(1)
Apparent Reality
161(1)
Phenomenological Presentism
161(1)
Appearance of Actual Times
162(1)
Duration
163(1)
Temporal Order
163(1)
Experiences of Change
164(1)
Perceived Change
164(2)
Perceived Change and Philosophical Theories of Time
166(1)
Temporal Passage
167(1)
Illusionists and Veridicalists
168(1)
Phenomenological Models of Time
169(1)
Retention Theory: The Tripartite Structure of the Phenomenology of Time
170(1)
Physical Time and Phenomenological Time
171(1)
Primary Impressions in Husserl's Retention Theory
171(1)
Protentions and Retentions
172(1)
Objection: Nesting
173(1)
Response: Descriptive Abstraction
174(1)
Perceptual Experience and Retention Theory
174(3)
Extensionalism
177(2)
Objection 1 No Succession
178(1)
Response: Diachronic Co-Consciousness
179(1)
Objection 2 Diachronic Co-Consciousness Does Not Connect Different Experiences
179(1)
Response: Overlap Theory
180(1)
Objection 3 The Overlap Is Not Explained
180(1)
Objection 4 Time-Consciousness Must Have a Tripartite Structure
181(1)
Study Questions
181(1)
Suggested Readings
182(1)
7 Philosophy of Cognitive Science and Time
183(32)
Overview
183(1)
Introduction
184(1)
The Neural Correlate of Consciousness (NCC)
185(1)
Reasons for NCCs
186(1)
NCCs and Causation
186(1)
The Relationship between the Temporal Structure of Consciousness and NCCs
187(1)
Isomorphism
187(1)
Heteromorphism
188(1)
Timing
188(1)
The NCC Has No Relation in Time to the Experience
189(2)
Objection 1 Causation Is Not Possible across Different Time Series
190(1)
Objection 2 We Cannot Know from Empirical Research When Consciousness Happens
190(1)
The NCC is Earlier or Later than the Experience
191(1)
Objection 1 Denies the Possibility of Mind-Brain Identity Theory
191(1)
Objection 2 It Is Difficult to Know from Empirical Research When Consciousness Happens
192(1)
The NCC Is Simultaneous with the Experience
192(1)
The Timing of Free Will
193(1)
Measuring the Timing of the Will
194(2)
Objections
196(2)
Response: We Should Assume that Apparent Simultaneity Is Actual Simultaneity
198(1)
Rejoinder 1 Phenomenology Is Not a Theoretical Constraint
198(1)
Rejoinder 2 Apparent Simultaneity and Absent Duration
199(1)
Limited Experience in Time
200(1)
Simultaneity Thresholds
200(1)
Temporal Illusions
201(2)
Examples of Temporal Illusion
203(1)
The Cutaneous "Rabbit"
203(1)
The Flash-Lag Effect
204(1)
The Phi Phenomenon
205(1)
Illusions of Simultaneity and Temporal Order
206(1)
Illusions Are Evidence of Heteromorphic Representation
207(1)
Objection: Hidden Time
208(1)
Illusions of Simultaneity
209(1)
Illusions of Temporal Order and Duration
209(1)
Philosophical Positions on Time
210(1)
Presentism and the Growing Block Theory
211(1)
Eternalism
211(1)
Tense Theory
212(1)
Tenseless Theory
212(1)
Study Questions
212(1)
Suggested Readings
213(2)
8 Rationality of Time
215(25)
Overview
215(1)
Rational and Irrational
216(2)
Temporal Bias
218(2)
Tense Bias
220(1)
Present Bias (P-Bias)
220(1)
Future Bias (F-Bias)
221(1)
Parfit's Surgery
222(1)
The Rationality of Tense Bias
223(1)
Reality Is More Important than Unreality
223(1)
Objection: This Only Works for Presentism and Present Bias
224(1)
We Have Control Over the Future
224(1)
Objection: There Are Significant Uncontrollable Future Events
225(1)
Biases Give an Evolutionary Advantage
225(1)
Objection: Evolutionary Explanations Are Neutral with Respect to the Rationality of Beliefs
226(1)
Near Bias (N-bias)
227(1)
Reality of the Near Over the Far
228(1)
Objection: We Often Want Unpleasant Things Sooner Rather than Later, and Pleasant Things Later Rather than Sooner
228(2)
Persson's Explanation of Temporal Bias
230(1)
Perceptual Bias
230(1)
The Mechanism of Spontaneous Induction (MSI)
230(1)
Imagining Sequences from the Present into the Future
231(1)
Persson's Proposal to Overcome Temporal Bias
232(1)
Temporal Neutrality
232(2)
Event Neutrality
234(1)
Death
235(1)
The Symmetry Argument
235(2)
Tense and Death
237(1)
Tense and F-Bias
238(1)
Study Questions
239(1)
Suggested Readings
239(1)
9 Philosophy of Art and Time
240(23)
Overview
240(1)
y Temporal Art
241(1)
Objections
242(1)
Rejoinder: What Defines an Artwork in Only Some Cases Requires Time (or Space)
243(1)
Sauvage's Concepts of Temporal Artwork
243(1)
Objection: We Can Infer Time through All Artworks
244(1)
Temporal Artwork as Constraining Imagination
245(1)
Formal Properties of Temporal Artwork
245(1)
Instant God
246(1)
Art's Representation of Time
247(1)
Realist Painting
248(1)
Painting and Time
249(1)
Movement
250(1)
Temporal Art and Time
250(1)
Deleuze's Direct Cinema
251(1)
Time Cannot Self-Represent
252(1)
The Movement in the Image
253(2)
Ephemeral Art
255(1)
Philosophical Theories of Time and Temporal Art
256(2)
Music Is Inexplicable Given Four-Dimensional Space-Time
258(1)
Art, Bergson, and Relativistic Physics
259(1)
Relative Time and Temporal Art
260(1)
Study Questions
261(1)
Suggested Readings
261(2)
10 Philosophy of Time Travel
263(28)
Overview
263(1)
Introduction
264(1)
Defining Time Travel
265(1)
Time Travel and Space Travel
266(1)
Space Travel by Leaving the Previous Space
267(1)
Time Travel by Leaving the Previous Time
267(1)
Forward Time Travel
268(1)
Skipping
269(1)
Backward Time Travel
270(1)
Personal Time
271(1)
Causation in Time Travel
272(1)
Epiphenomenal Travel
272(1)
Causal Travel
273(1)
Causal Loops
273(1)
Self-Creating and Uncreated Objects
274(1)
The Time Machine Instruction Manual
274(1)
Wear and Tear Paradox
275(2)
Feynman's Time-Travelling Particle
277(3)
Changing the Past
280(1)
The Grandfather Paradox
281(1)
Multiple Timelines
282(1)
Objection 1 The Past Is Not Changed
283(1)
Response: The New Timeline Is Created
283(1)
Objection 2 A Created Timeline Has the Same Problems as the Grandfather Paradox
283(1)
Pseudo-Time Travel
284(1)
Parallel Universe Travel
284(1)
Causation between Parallel Worlds
285(2)
Back to the Future Time Travel
287(1)
Satisfying Regret
288(1)
Study Questions
288(2)
Suggested Readings
290(1)
Bibliography 291(11)
Index 302
Sean Enda Power is Postdoctoral Researcher in the Department of Philosophy at University College Cork, Ireland. He has authored, among other work, The Philosophy of Time and Perceptual Experience (Routledge, 2018) and has co-edited The Illusions of Time (2019). He is a previous Irish Research Council Postdoctoral Fellow and a previous Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Time, University of Sydney.