Preface |
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ix | |
Preface to Third Edition |
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xii | |
Introduction |
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1 | (10) |
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9 | (2) |
Part 1: Social Justice |
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11 | (46) |
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Concept v. conceptions: the case of justice |
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13 | (7) |
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20 | (2) |
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Rawls: justice as fairness |
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22 | (9) |
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Nozick: justice as entitlement |
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31 | (9) |
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Popular opinion: justice as desert |
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40 | (8) |
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Social justice v. global justice |
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48 | (6) |
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54 | (1) |
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55 | (2) |
Part 2: Liberty |
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57 | (38) |
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58 | (2) |
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Three distinctions between conceptions of liberty |
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60 | (13) |
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1 Effective freedom v. formal freedom |
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61 | (4) |
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2 Freedom as autonomy v. freedom as doing what one wants |
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65 | (4) |
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3 Freedom as political participation v. freedom beginning where politics ends |
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69 | (4) |
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Freedom, private property, the market and redistribution |
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73 | (9) |
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Resisting the totalitarian menace |
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82 | (10) |
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92 | (1) |
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93 | (2) |
Part 3: Equality |
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95 | (48) |
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97 | (5) |
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102 | (7) |
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109 | (7) |
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Equality and relativities: should we mind the gap? |
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116 | (8) |
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124 | (3) |
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Three positions that look egalitarian but aren't really |
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127 | (6) |
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1 Utilitarianism (or any aggregative principle) |
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127 | (2) |
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2 Diminishing principles, priority to the worse off, and maximin |
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129 | (2) |
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3 Entitlement and sufficiency |
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131 | (2) |
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133 | (7) |
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140 | (1) |
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141 | (2) |
Part 4: Community |
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143 | (44) |
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Correcting misunderstandings and misrepresentations |
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146 | (23) |
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Objection 1 Liberals assume that people are selfish or egoistic |
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148 | (2) |
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Objection 2 Liberals advocate a minimal state |
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150 | (1) |
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Objection 3 Liberals emphasize rights rather than duties or responsibilities |
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151 | (4) |
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Objection 4 Liberals believe that values are subjective or relative |
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155 | (3) |
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Objection 5 Liberals neglect the way in which individuals are socially constituted |
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158 | (3) |
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Objection 6 Liberals fail to see the significance of communal relations, shared values and a common identity |
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161 | (3) |
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Objection 7 Liberals wrongly think that the state can and should be neutral |
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164 | (5) |
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169 | (2) |
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171 | (11) |
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1 Liberalism, neutrality and multiculturalism |
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171 | (5) |
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2 Liberalism, the nation-state and global justice |
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176 | (6) |
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182 | (3) |
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185 | (2) |
Part 5: Democracy |
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187 | (24) |
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189 | (3) |
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192 | (10) |
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1 Directness or indirectness of the decision |
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192 | (3) |
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2 Accountability of representatives |
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195 | (2) |
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3 Equality (of opportunity) for influence |
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197 | (2) |
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4 Scope of authority of democratic will |
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199 | (3) |
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202 | (3) |
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Is democracy paradoxical? |
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205 | (3) |
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Subjectivism, democracy and disagreement |
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208 | (3) |
The values of democracy |
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211 | (21) |
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Intrinsic 1: freedom as autonomy |
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212 | (4) |
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Intrinsic 2: self-realization |
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216 | (1) |
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217 | (4) |
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Instrumental 1: good or correct decisions |
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221 | (5) |
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Instrumental 2: intellectual and moral development of citizens |
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226 | (2) |
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Instrumental 3: perceived legitimacy |
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228 | (1) |
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229 | (1) |
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230 | (2) |
Conclusion |
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232 | (6) |
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237 | (1) |
Index |
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238 | |