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ix | |
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xi | |
Acknowledgements |
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xiii | |
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1 | (8) |
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Why were central banks made independent? |
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1 | (1) |
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Measures of central bank independence |
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2 | (3) |
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5 | (1) |
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6 | (3) |
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9 | (24) |
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Means of influencing central banks |
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9 | (1) |
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10 | (5) |
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Measures of monetary policy |
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15 | (5) |
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Direct political influence on the Deutsche Bundesbank |
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20 | (6) |
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Indirect influence on the Deutsche Bundesbank |
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26 | (3) |
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Interpretation of the empirical studies |
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29 | (4) |
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Political Pressure in OECD Countries Before Elections |
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33 | (14) |
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33 | (1) |
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When do political business cycles occur? |
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34 | (5) |
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39 | (6) |
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45 | (2) |
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The Rhetoric of Central Banks |
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47 | (28) |
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47 | (1) |
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Monetary policy indices as indicators for a central bank's rhetoric |
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47 | (5) |
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52 | (3) |
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Rhetoric of the Bundesbank |
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55 | (13) |
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Rhetoric of the Bank of Japan |
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68 | (2) |
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Rhetoric of the US Federal Reserve |
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70 | (2) |
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72 | (3) |
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A New Indicator for (Political) Pressure |
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75 | (22) |
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75 | (1) |
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Potential sources of external pressure on monetary policy |
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76 | (2) |
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78 | (2) |
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Properties of the new `Pressure Indicator' |
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80 | (5) |
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Comparison of different indicators for `Pressure' and `Conflicts' |
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85 | (2) |
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87 | (2) |
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89 | (6) |
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95 | (2) |
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The Role of Public Support |
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97 | (16) |
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97 | (1) |
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98 | (1) |
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Traditional Macroeconomic model |
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99 | (2) |
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Traditional Public Choice model |
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101 | (2) |
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The `Extended' Public Choice model |
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103 | (7) |
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110 | (3) |
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The European Context: An Economic Analysis |
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113 | (26) |
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113 | (1) |
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The role of the single monetary policy in a monetary union |
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114 | (2) |
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Economic reasons for inflation differentials |
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116 | (5) |
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Analysing inflation dispersion in EMU |
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121 | (5) |
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Simulating national inflation rates in the euro area |
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126 | (10) |
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136 | (3) |
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The European Context: A Political Assessment |
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139 | (14) |
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139 | (1) |
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The structure of the European Central Bank and the Eurosystem |
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140 | (1) |
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The legal status of the European Central Bank |
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140 | (2) |
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Political pressure on the ECB |
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142 | (7) |
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Public support for the ECB |
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149 | (2) |
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151 | (2) |
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The Impact of EMU Enlargement |
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153 | (26) |
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153 | (1) |
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Economic consequences of EMU enlargement |
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154 | (14) |
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Political consequences from EMU enlargement |
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168 | (5) |
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Institutional consequences of EMU enlargement |
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173 | (3) |
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176 | (3) |
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179 | (8) |
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179 | (1) |
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180 | (3) |
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183 | (4) |
Notes |
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187 | (6) |
Appendixes |
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193 | (14) |
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A. Germany's Institutional Setting |
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193 | (6) |
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A.1 Germany's political system |
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193 | (2) |
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A.2 The structure of the Deutsche Bundesbank |
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195 | (1) |
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A.3 Aims and instruments of the Deutsche Bundesbank |
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196 | (3) |
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B. The refined `corridor' for the standard deviation |
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199 | (2) |
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201 | (6) |
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C.1 Interest Rates as Indicators for Monetary Policy |
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201 | (1) |
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c.2 Monetary Policy Indices as Indicators for Monetary Policy |
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201 | (1) |
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c.3 The Newspaper Indicators for `Pressure' and `Support' |
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202 | (2) |
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c.4 The European Context: An Economic Analysis |
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204 | (1) |
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c.5 The Impact of EMU Enlargement |
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204 | (3) |
Bibliography |
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207 | (14) |
Author Index |
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221 | (4) |
Subject Index |
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225 | |