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Political Pressure, Rhetoric and Monetary Policy: Lessons for the European Central Bank [Kietas viršelis]

  • Formatas: Hardback, 240 pages, aukštis x plotis: 234x156 mm
  • Išleidimo metai: 22-Aug-2002
  • Leidėjas: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
  • ISBN-10: 1843761572
  • ISBN-13: 9781843761570
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
  • Formatas: Hardback, 240 pages, aukštis x plotis: 234x156 mm
  • Išleidimo metai: 22-Aug-2002
  • Leidėjas: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
  • ISBN-10: 1843761572
  • ISBN-13: 9781843761570
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Philipp Maier offers a unique examination of the extent to which governments and various interest groups have exerted pressure on central banks. The book looks in particular at the Deutsche Bundesbank - which acted as the blueprint for the European Central Bank (ECB) - and utilises an original set of indicators to measure external pressure and support from the government and other institutions.The author demonstrates that although some of the rhetoric of the Bundesbank may have been a response to political pressure, the operation and conduct of German monetary policy has not been influenced. The role of various pressure groups remains a more contentious issue, as there is evidence that the Bundesbank may have acted to appease the financial sector. The author also finds that a high degree of public support towards the Bundesbank has helped to mitigate the effect of external forces. As the ECB was closely modelled on its German counterpart, the author is able to extend his analysis to the European level and draw out explicit predictions for the ECB. He argues that external pressure is unlikely to influence the conduct of monetary policy, as it will be less efficient and organised, and public support is likely to be high. In the future, however, this could be jeopardised by a rapid enlargement of EMU which may result in more concentrated and powerful pressure groups.

This interesting empirical study of the effect of governments, interest groups and public support on the behaviour and rhetoric of Central Banks will be welcomed by financial and monetary economists, students and scholars of European finance and European policymakers.

Recenzijos

'This book is a must-read for serious students and scholars of monetary institutions. It is comprehensive in its coverage of the relevant issues that arise in testing political economy theories of central banking, and is rich with ideas for testing possible political influences on central banks across the globe.' -- Michelle R. Garfinkel, Public Choice 'By empirically analysing the rhetoric and decisions of the 'most independent central bank in the world', Philipp Maier provides a fresh perspective on the eternal triangle of government, the financial sector and monetary authority. Maier's findings regarding the actual independence of the Bundesbank's monetary policy do not only provide a better explanation of the past. Equally important are the author's innovative analyses which provide a greater understanding of the future prospects and challenges for the European Central Bank, at a time when Europe's key monetary institution faces the impact of a broadening EMU.' -- Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, Netherlands Competition Authority, The Netherlands

List of Figures
ix
List of Tables
xi
Acknowledgements xiii
Introduction
1(8)
Why were central banks made independent?
1(1)
Measures of central bank independence
2(3)
Purpose of the study
5(1)
Outline of the study
6(3)
Review of the Literature
9(24)
Means of influencing central banks
9(1)
The models
10(5)
Measures of monetary policy
15(5)
Direct political influence on the Deutsche Bundesbank
20(6)
Indirect influence on the Deutsche Bundesbank
26(3)
Interpretation of the empirical studies
29(4)
Political Pressure in OECD Countries Before Elections
33(14)
Overview
33(1)
When do political business cycles occur?
34(5)
Empirical evidence
39(6)
Summary
45(2)
The Rhetoric of Central Banks
47(28)
Overview
47(1)
Monetary policy indices as indicators for a central bank's rhetoric
47(5)
The basic model
52(3)
Rhetoric of the Bundesbank
55(13)
Rhetoric of the Bank of Japan
68(2)
Rhetoric of the US Federal Reserve
70(2)
Summary
72(3)
A New Indicator for (Political) Pressure
75(22)
Overview
75(1)
Potential sources of external pressure on monetary policy
76(2)
The Havrilesky approach
78(2)
Properties of the new `Pressure Indicator'
80(5)
Comparison of different indicators for `Pressure' and `Conflicts'
85(2)
Estimation procedure
87(2)
Empirical evidence
89(6)
Summary
95(2)
The Role of Public Support
97(16)
Overview
97(1)
Methodology
98(1)
Traditional Macroeconomic model
99(2)
Traditional Public Choice model
101(2)
The `Extended' Public Choice model
103(7)
Summary
110(3)
The European Context: An Economic Analysis
113(26)
Overview
113(1)
The role of the single monetary policy in a monetary union
114(2)
Economic reasons for inflation differentials
116(5)
Analysing inflation dispersion in EMU
121(5)
Simulating national inflation rates in the euro area
126(10)
Summary
136(3)
The European Context: A Political Assessment
139(14)
Overview
139(1)
The structure of the European Central Bank and the Eurosystem
140(1)
The legal status of the European Central Bank
140(2)
Political pressure on the ECB
142(7)
Public support for the ECB
149(2)
Summary
151(2)
The Impact of EMU Enlargement
153(26)
Overview
153(1)
Economic consequences of EMU enlargement
154(14)
Political consequences from EMU enlargement
168(5)
Institutional consequences of EMU enlargement
173(3)
Summary
176(3)
Conclusion
179(8)
Overview
179(1)
Main findings
180(3)
Discussion
183(4)
Notes 187(6)
Appendixes 193(14)
A. Germany's Institutional Setting
193(6)
A.1 Germany's political system
193(2)
A.2 The structure of the Deutsche Bundesbank
195(1)
A.3 Aims and instruments of the Deutsche Bundesbank
196(3)
B. The refined `corridor' for the standard deviation
199(2)
C. Data sources
201(6)
C.1 Interest Rates as Indicators for Monetary Policy
201(1)
c.2 Monetary Policy Indices as Indicators for Monetary Policy
201(1)
c.3 The Newspaper Indicators for `Pressure' and `Support'
202(2)
c.4 The European Context: An Economic Analysis
204(1)
c.5 The Impact of EMU Enlargement
204(3)
Bibliography 207(14)
Author Index 221(4)
Subject Index 225
Philipp Maier, formerly Economist, Monetary and Economic Policy Department, De Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam, The Netherlands