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El. knyga: Pretense and Pathology: Philosophical Fictionalism and its Applications

4.50/5 (2 ratings by Goodreads)
(University of Nevada, Las Vegas), (University at Albany, State University of New York)
  • Formatas: EPUB+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 24-Jul-2015
  • Leidėjas: Cambridge University Press
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781316287798
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Pretense and Pathology: Philosophical Fictionalism and its ApplicationsDidesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: EPUB+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 24-Jul-2015
  • Leidėjas: Cambridge University Press
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781316287798
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"In this book, Bradley Armour-Garb and James A. Woodbridge distinguish various species of fictionalism, locating and defending their own version of philosophical fictionalism. Addressing semantic and philosophical puzzles that arise from ordinary language, they consider such issues as the problem of non-being, plural identity claims, mental-attitude ascriptions, meaning attributions, and truth-talk. They consider 'deflationism about truth', explaining why deflationists should be fictionalists, and show how their philosophical fictionalist account of truth-talk underwrites a dissolution of the Liar Paradox and its kin. They further explore the semantic notions of reference and predicate-satisfaction, showing how philosophical fictionalism can also resolvepuzzles that these notions appear to present. Their critical examination of fictionalist approaches in philosophy, together with the development and application of their own brand of philosophical fictionalism, will be of great interest to scholars and upper-level students of philosophy of language, metaphysics, philosophical logic, philosophy of mind, epistemology, and linguistics"--

Recenzijos

'This book not only offers about the best account I have seen of what is distinctive about philosophical fictionalism, but also offers a compelling argument in favour of the authors' own thoroughgoing 'semantic pretence' version of fictionalism. A remarkable achievement.' F. W. Kroon, University of Auckland 'Pretense and Pathology is a superb examination of the important fictionalist metaphysical strategies, followed by an impressive development and defense of the authors' preferred form of fictionalism and its application to several vexed areas of discourse.' Kendall L. Walton, University of Michigan

Daugiau informacijos

This book provides a new philosophical fictionalism to solve traditional paradoxes and puzzles in the philosophy of language and metaphysics.
Preface ix
1 Philosophical fictionalism
1(38)
1.1 Two species of fictionalism
1(4)
1.2 Some important aspects of fiction (or, a minor foray into philosophy of fiction)
5(3)
1.3 Concerns with comparative fictionalism qua fictionalism
8(3)
1.4 The central tenets of fictionalism
11(7)
1.5 From comparative fictionalism to philosophical fictionalism
18(12)
1.6 Philosophical fictionalism and other distinctions within fictionalism
30(9)
2 Semantic pretense-involving fictionalism and existence-talk
39(38)
2.1 Make-believe, representational aids, and partially pretend claims
39(5)
2.2 Language-world connections, long-arm conceptual roles, and M-conditions
44(6)
2.3 Types of pretense in partially pretend claims
50(5)
2.4 Pragmatic PIF and its problems
55(5)
2.5 Prior SPIF accounts and the Engagement Complaints
60(4)
2.6 Our SPIF account of existence-talk
64(13)
3 Propositional realism and a SPIF account of proposition-talk
77(39)
3.1 Propositions and proposition-talk
77(2)
3.2 Benacerraf's challenges as problems for propositions
79(5)
3.3 Our SPIF account of proposition-talk
84(29)
3.4 Our SPIF account of proposition-talk and Benacerraf's challenges
113(3)
4 T-deflationism and a SPIF account of truth-talk
116(36)
4.1 Understanding T-deflationism
116(3)
4.2 From mathematical fictionalism to truth-theoretic fictionalism
119(11)
4.3 Our SPIF account of truth-talk
130(20)
4.4 Conclusions for truth-talk
150(2)
5 Diagnosing and treating the Liar Paradox and other apparent alethic pathologies
152(41)
5.1 Unearthing (apparent) semantic pathology
152(2)
5.2 Pretense and meaninglessness
154(3)
5.3 Meaninglessness and understanding
157(4)
5.4 Meaninglessness, generalization, and denial
161(2)
5.5 Semantic characterization and s-defectiveness
163(2)
5.6 S-Defectiveness and liar sentences
165(3)
5.7 Replies to further potential revenge concerns
168(12)
5.8 Extended apparent alethic pathology
180(7)
5.9 Diagnosing and treating extended apparent alethic pathology
187(3)
5.10 Closing remarks
190(3)
6 SPIF accounts of reference-talk and predicate-satisfaction-talk and apparent non-alethic semantic pathology
193(31)
6.1 Our SPIF account of reference/denotation-talk
193(9)
6.2 Our SPIF account of predicate-satisfaction-talk
202(3)
6.3 Apparent non-alethic semantic pathology revealed
205(5)
6.4 Diagnosing and treating apparent non-alethic semantic pathology
210(12)
6.5 Conclusions for reference/denotation-talk and predicate-satisfaction-talk
222(2)
7 Extensions and objections
224(35)
7.1 Plural identity-talk
224(17)
7.2 M-conditions-talk
241(3)
7.3 Circularity worries and putative restrictions on fictionalism
244(7)
7.4 A challenge to our dissolution of apparent semantic pathology
251(7)
7.5 Concluding remarks
258(1)
Bibliography 259(8)
Index 267
Bradley Armour-Garb is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University at Albany, State University of New York and a Fellow of Wolfson College, University of Oxford. He is co-editor of and a contributor to several books including The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays (2004), Deflationism and Paradox (2005), and Deflationary Truth (2005). He is also the editor of and a contributor to The Relevance of the Liar (forthcoming). James A. Woodbridge is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. He is the author of 'Truth as a Pretense' in Fictionalism in Metaphysics (2005). He has also published articles with Bradley Armour-Garb in journals including Noūs, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Analysis, Philosophical Studies, and the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, and in edited collections such as New Waves in Truth (2010), Recent Trends in Philosophical Logic (2014), and Unifying the Philosophy of Truth (2015).
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