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Principles of Automated Negotiation [Kietas viršelis]

4.00/5 (4 ratings by Goodreads)
(Loughborough University), (University of Oxford), (Bar-Ilan University, Israel)
  • Formatas: Hardback, 289 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 235x156x17 mm, weight: 670 g, 5 Halftones, unspecified; 35 Line drawings, unspecified
  • Išleidimo metai: 13-Nov-2014
  • Leidėjas: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1107002540
  • ISBN-13: 9781107002548
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Principles of Automated NegotiationDidesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: Hardback, 289 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 235x156x17 mm, weight: 670 g, 5 Halftones, unspecified; 35 Line drawings, unspecified
  • Išleidimo metai: 13-Nov-2014
  • Leidėjas: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1107002540
  • ISBN-13: 9781107002548
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Pastovi nuoroda: https://www.kriso.lt/db/9781107002548.html
Raktažodžiai:
"With an increasing number of applications in the context of multiagent systems, automated negotiation is a rapidly growing area. Written by top researchers in the field, this state-of-the-art treatment of the subject explores key issues involved in the design of negotiating agents, covering strategic, heuristic, and axiomatic approaches. The authors discuss the potential benefits of automated negotiation as well as the unique challenges it poses for computer scientists and for researchers in artificial intelligence. They also consider possible applications and give readers a feel for the types of domains where automated negotiation is already being deployed. This book is ideal for graduate students and researchers in computer science who are interested in multiagent systems. It will also appeal to negotiation researchers from disciplines such as management and business studies, psychology and economics"--

Daugiau informacijos

Top researchers investigate the main challenges and state of the art in automated negotiation and discuss potential applications.
List of illustrations xi
Preface xiii
Acknowledgements xvi
Summary of key notation xvii
1 Introduction 1(16)
1.1 The structure of negotiation
2(2)
1.2 Parameters of automated negotiation
4(3)
1.3 A strategic approach
7(3)
1.4 Desiderata for automated negotiation
10(1)
1.5 Advantages and disadvantages of automated negotiation
11(2)
1.6 Structure of this book
13(1)
1.7 Historical notes and further reading
14(3)
2 Games in normal form 17(18)
2.1 Zero-sum and non-zero-sum games
19(1)
2.2 Pure and mixed strategies
20(1)
2.3 Rational behaviour in strategic settings
21(1)
2.4 Solution concepts
22(6)
2.5 Solution properties
28(2)
2.6 Social measures of utility
30(3)
2.7 A first glimpse of bargaining as a game
33(2)
3 Games in extensive form 35(21)
3.1 A formal definition
36(4)
3.2 Types of games and strategies
40(1)
3.3 Nash equilibrium
41(1)
3.4 Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
42(5)
3.5 Beliefs and sequential rationality
47(3)
3.6 Weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium
50(2)
3.7 Sequential equilibrium
52(1)
3.8 The role of information
53(3)
4 Negotiation domains 56(18)
4.1 Classifying negotiation domains
57(7)
4.2 Some example negotiation domains
64(8)
4.3 Historical notes and further reading
72(2)
5 Strategic analysis of single-issue negotiation 74(23)
5.1 The negotiation model
75(1)
5.2 An infinite-horizon alternating offers protocol
76(7)
5.3 A finite-horizon alternating offers protocol
83(3)
5.4 Negotiation with imperfect information
86(6)
5.5 Indivisible issue negotiation
92(1)
5.6 Negotiating an issue with discrete values
93(1)
5.7 More on negotiation protocols
94(1)
5.8 Historical notes and further reading
95(2)
6 Strategic analysis of multi-issue negotiation 97(24)
6.1 Negotiation procedures
97(1)
6.2 The negotiation model
98(2)
6.3 Negotiation with perfect information
100(12)
6.4 Negotiation with imperfect information
112(2)
6.5 Dealing with indivisible issues
114(3)
6.6 Negotiating multiple issues with discrete and continuous values
117(2)
6.7 Historical notes and further reading
119(2)
7 The negotiation agenda 121(18)
7.1 Negotiation agenda
122(1)
7.2 Optimal agendas: package-deal procedure
123(7)
7.3 Optimal agendas: sequential procedure
130(7)
7.4 Optimal agendas: simultaneous procedure
137(1)
7.5 Historical notes and further reading
137(2)
8 Multilateral negotiations 139(18)
8.1 Alternating offers protocol with multiple bargainers
139(2)
8.2 Auction protocols
141(4)
8.3 Contract net protocol
145(3)
8.4 Two-sided matching
148(3)
8.5 Bargaining for resource reallocation
151(4)
8.6 Historical notes and further reading
155(2)
9 Heuristic approaches 157(19)
9.1 Generating counter offers
157(5)
9.2 Predicting opponent preferences and generating counter offers
162(7)
9.3 Generating optimal agendas
169(2)
9.4 Design and evaluation of heuristic strategies
171(3)
9.5 Historical notes and further reading
174(2)
10 Man-machine negotiations 176(16)
10.1 Agent decision making
178(7)
10.2 Modelling human negotiators
185(5)
10.3 Virtual agent negotiators
190(1)
10.4 Historical notes and further reading
191(1)
11 Axiomatic analysis of negotiation 192(14)
11.1 Background
192(1)
11.2 Single-issue negotiation
193(6)
11.3 Multi-issue negotiation
199(2)
11.4 An alternative view of the Nash bargaining solution
201(2)
11.5 Axiomatic versus non-cooperative models of bargaining
203(1)
11.6 Historical notes and further reading
204(2)
12 Applications 206(18)
12.1 Business process management
206(3)
12.2 Electronic commerce
209(1)
12.3 Grid computing
210(1)
12.4 Load balancing
211(2)
12.5 M-services
213(2)
12.6 Data, task, and resource allocation
215(1)
12.7 Resolving policy disputes over natural resources
215(2)
12.8 Supply chain management in logistics
217(1)
12.9 Event scheduling
218(1)
12.10 Crowdsourcing
218(1)
12.11 Assisting and training human negotiators
219(2)
12.12 Energy exchange in remote communities
221(1)
12.13 Web-based software negotiation systems
222(2)
13 Related topics 224(9)
13.1 Social choice
224(5)
13.2 Argumentation
229(2)
13.3 Fair division
231(1)
13.4 Historical notes and further reading
232(1)
14 Concluding remarks 233(2)
Appendix A Proofs 235(11)
References 246(21)
Index 267
Shaheen Fatima is lecturer in the Department of Computer Science at Loughborough University. Her main research interests are in the study of strategic interactions and coalition formation in multi-agent systems. She has been working in the area for over 15 years and has published over 50 papers in top international conferences and journals. Sarit Kraus is Professor of Computer Science at Bar-Ilan University, Israel and an Adjunct Professor at the University of Maryland. She has focused her research on intelligent agents and multi-agent systems. In particular, she has developed Diplomat, the first automated agent that negotiated proficiently with people. Kraus has received the EMET Prize for her expertise and contributions to artificial intelligence, the IJCAI 'Computers and Thought Award', the ACM SIGART Agents Research award, and the prestigious Advanced ERC Grant. She also received a special commendation from the city of Los Angeles, together with Professor Tambe, Professor Ordonez and their students, for the creation of the ARMOR security scheduling system. Michael Wooldridge is Professor in the Department of Computer Science at the University of Oxford. He has been active in multi-agent systems research since 1989, and has published over 300 articles in the area. His main interests are in the use of formal methods for reasoning about autonomous agents and multi-agent systems. Wooldridge received the ACM Autonomous Agents Research Award in 2006.