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Privacy Fix: How to Preserve Privacy in the Onslaught of Surveillance [Kietas viršelis]

(Chicago-Kent College of Law),
  • Formatas: Hardback, 280 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 235x158x18 mm, weight: 480 g, Worked examples or Exercises
  • Išleidimo metai: 21-Oct-2021
  • Leidėjas: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1108486711
  • ISBN-13: 9781108486712
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
  • Formatas: Hardback, 280 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 235x158x18 mm, weight: 480 g, Worked examples or Exercises
  • Išleidimo metai: 21-Oct-2021
  • Leidėjas: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1108486711
  • ISBN-13: 9781108486712
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Online surveillance of our behavior by private companies is on the increase, particularly through the Internet of Things and the increasing use of algorithmic decision-making. This troubling trend undermines privacy and increasingly threatens our ability to control how information about us is shared and used. Written by a computer scientist and a legal scholar, The Privacy Fix proposes a set of evidence-based, practical solutions that will help solve this problem. Requiring no technical or legal expertise, the book explains complicated concepts in clear, straightforward language. Bridging the gap between computer scientists, economists, lawyers, and public policy makers, this book provides theoretically and practically sound public policy guidance about how to preserve privacy in the onslaught of surveillance. It emphasizes the need to make tradeoffs among the complex concerns that arise, and it outlines a practical norm-creation process to do so.

Going beyond current books on privacy, The Privacy Fix proposes specific solutions to public policy issues connected with online privacy and practical steps for readers to protect themselves online. Requiring no technical or legal expertise, the book explains complicated concepts in clear, straightforward language.

Recenzijos

'Highly recommended.' G. E. Kaupins, Choice Connect

Daugiau informacijos

Evidence-based solutions and practical steps to preserve privacy online.
List of Figures
viii
List of Tables
ix
Preface xi
1 Surveillance and Self-Realization
1(21)
The Self and Self-Realization
3(1)
Current Critiques of Surveillance
4(2)
An Overview of the Argument
6(7)
Knowing What Others Will Do
13(3)
Why Privacy in Public Is Essential to Self-Realization
16(1)
Lack of Norms
17(1)
Trust
18(1)
Is This Book Necessary?
19(2)
The Test Case of Artificial Intelligence
21(1)
2 Artificial Intelligence-Enhanced Surveillance
22(21)
A Thought Experiment
25(1)
Low Accuracy
26(2)
Decontextualization
28(2)
Data Preparation
30(5)
Explainabilitv and Transparency
35(5)
Feedback Mechanisms
40(1)
Broad-based Predictions
41(1)
Meeting the Threat of AI-Enhanced Surveillance
42(1)
3 Social Roles, Common Knowledge, and Coordination
43(35)
Social Roles As a Source of Common Knowledge
45(1)
Common Knowledge
46(4)
Social Roles As Common Knowledge Generators
50(3)
Why Proper Performance of Social Roles Involves Coordination Problems
53(3)
Common Knowledge of the Four-Part Pattern
56(3)
The Examples
59(11)
Completing the "Surveillance Ignored" View
70(1)
Appendix
71(1)
Coordination Games
71(4)
More Than Two Players
75(1)
Coordination Problems
75(1)
The Common Knowledge Solution
76(2)
4 Coordination Norms
78(25)
Norms
79(3)
Coordination Norms
82(3)
Examples
85(4)
Informational Norms
89(1)
A World without Informational Norms
90(7)
Not Our World
97(2)
Appendix: Informational Privacy As a Common Pool Resource
99(1)
Natural Resource Common Pool Resources
99(1)
Need, Supply, and Use
100(1)
Subtractiveness
101(1)
Nonexcludability
102(1)
Conclusion
102(1)
5 Notice and Choice: The Allure and the Illusion
103(14)
Free and Informed Consent through Informational Norms
104(5)
The Failure of Notice and Choice
109(6)
The Need for Collective Control
115(2)
6 The Threat of Collapse, The Prospects of Resistance
117(22)
The Threat of Collapse
118(7)
The Stasi As a Reference Point
125(2)
Making Surveillance Difficult
127(1)
Cases in Which a Party to the Informational Norm Conducts Surveillance
128(3)
Cases in Which a Non-Party to the Norm Conducts Surveillance
131(5)
Resistance Where Relevant Norms Do Not Exist
136(2)
Resistance, Acquiescence, Acceptance
138(1)
7 Acquiescence
139(21)
Vaclav Havel's Greengrocer
139(1)
Acquiescence in "Party to the Norm" Cases
140(8)
Shadow Conformity
148(1)
Acquiescence in "Not a Part)' to the Norm" Cases
149(10)
Acquiescence Where Relevant Informational Norms Do Not Exist
159(1)
How Common Is Acquiescence?
159(1)
8 Accept or Take Control?
160(21)
A Process of Acculturation
160(3)
Party to the Norm
163(6)
Not a Party to the Norm
169(2)
No Norms
171(1)
Time to Take Control
172(1)
Acceptable Tradeoffs
173(3)
A Norm-Creation Model
176(4)
A Test Case
180(1)
9 Regulating Artificial Intelligence
181(23)
The Proxy Problem
182(5)
Level Playing Field Fairness
187(10)
A Regulatory Proposal
197(2)
A Role for the Federal Trade Commission
199(2)
Creating an Informational Norm
201(3)
Conclusion 204(1)
Index 205
Robert H. Sloan is Professor and Department Head of Computer Science at University of Illinois Chicago. Richard Warner is Professor and Faculty Director of the Center for Law and Computers at Chicago-Kent College of Law.