Atnaujinkite slapukų nuostatas

El. knyga: Reference Book

4.00/5 (10 ratings by Goodreads)
(Magdalen College, Oxford), (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor)
  • Formatas: PDF+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 29-Mar-2012
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780191629181
  • Formatas: PDF+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 29-Mar-2012
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780191629181

DRM apribojimai

  • Kopijuoti:

    neleidžiama

  • Spausdinti:

    neleidžiama

  • El. knygos naudojimas:

    Skaitmeninių teisių valdymas (DRM)
    Leidykla pateikė šią knygą šifruota forma, o tai reiškia, kad norint ją atrakinti ir perskaityti reikia įdiegti nemokamą programinę įrangą. Norint skaityti šią el. knygą, turite susikurti Adobe ID . Daugiau informacijos  čia. El. knygą galima atsisiųsti į 6 įrenginius (vienas vartotojas su tuo pačiu Adobe ID).

    Reikalinga programinė įranga
    Norint skaityti šią el. knygą mobiliajame įrenginyje (telefone ar planšetiniame kompiuteryje), turite įdiegti šią nemokamą programėlę: PocketBook Reader (iOS / Android)

    Norint skaityti šią el. knygą asmeniniame arba „Mac“ kompiuteryje, Jums reikalinga  Adobe Digital Editions “ (tai nemokama programa, specialiai sukurta el. knygoms. Tai nėra tas pats, kas „Adobe Reader“, kurią tikriausiai jau turite savo kompiuteryje.)

    Negalite skaityti šios el. knygos naudodami „Amazon Kindle“.

John Hawthorne and David Manley present an original treatment of the semantic phenomenon of reference and the cognitive phenomenon of singular thought. In Part I, they argue against the idea that either is tied to a special relation of causal or epistemic acquaintance. Part II challenges the alleged semantic rift between definite and indefinite descriptions on the one hand, and names and demonstratives on the other--a division that has been motivated in part by appeals to considerations of acquaintance. Drawing on recent work in linguistics and philosophical semantics, Hawthorne and Manley explore a more unified account of all four types of expression according to which none of them paradigmatically fits the profile of a referential term. On the preferred framework put forward in The Reference Book, all four types of expression involve existential quantification but admit of uses that exhibit many of the traits associated with reference--a phenomenon that is due to the presence of what Hawthorne and Manley call a 'singular restriction' on the existentially quantified domain. The book concludes by drawing out some implications of the proposed semantic picture for the traditional categories of reference and singular thought.

Recenzijos

All in all, The Reference Book is one of the most important contributions to the philosophy of language of the past few years. Acquaintance theorists will have to engage with the criticisms of their views offered in the first part of the book. The unified account of noun phrases defended in the second part will be a central contestant in the debate over the semantics of noun phrases. And the wealth of examples discussed throughout will provide an invaluable source for semanticists and philosophers of language. There is no doubt in my mind that The Reference Book is to become a standard reference for future work on singular thought and the semantics of noun phrases. * Luca Incurvati, Analysis * ...a wonderful book. The authors' writing style is lively...readable, and clear, and their very careful consideration of all sides of every issue should leave readers with a whole new appreciation of the complexity of those issues, and a sense that many of their automatic assumptions about the functioning of NPs in English (and most likely other languages as well) need to be revised. * Barbara Abbott, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews * [ an] excellent book ...exemplifies today's philosophy of language at its best. * Tim Crane, Times Literary Supplement *

Acknowledgments vii
Part I Against acquaintance
1 Introduction: reference and singular thought
3(34)
1.1 Preliminaries
3(1)
1.2 Themes from Russell
4(4)
1.3 Reference after Russell
8(7)
1.4 Singular thought after Russell
15(4)
1.5 Acquaintance after Russell
19(6)
1.6 Should auld acquaintance be forgot?
25(10)
1.7 Gameplan
35(2)
2 A defense of liberalism
37(34)
2.1 The spy argument
37(3)
2.2 Acquaintance and attitude reports
40(5)
2.3 Turning the tables
45(5)
2.4 Harmony, Sufficiency, and impoverished cases
50(3)
2.5 `Believing of'
53(3)
2.6 The Neptune argument
56(5)
2.7 The irrelevance of constraint
61(3)
2.8 Sources of confusion
64(4)
2.9 Conditional reference fixers
68(3)
3 Epistemic acquaintance
71(22)
3.1 Knowing-which and discrimination
71(3)
3.2 Evans on acquaintance
74(4)
3.3 Objections
78(5)
3.4 Knowledge of existence
83(2)
3.5 Understanding and knowledge
85(8)
Part II Beyond acquaintance
4 From the specific to the singular
93(62)
4.1 Indefinites: preliminary observations
93(6)
4.2 Specificity: the bifurcated view
99(6)
4.3 Interlude: presupposition
105(2)
4.4 Specificity: the simple view
107(10)
4.5 Interlude: covert domain restriction
117(5)
4.6 Specificity as domain restriction
122(11)
4.7 Singular restrictors
133(3)
4.8 Acquaintance again
136(2)
4.9 Coy and candid restrictions
138(3)
4.10 Variant views
141(3)
4.11 Specifics in attitude ascriptions
144(7)
4.12 The representation requirement
151(4)
5 What `the'?
155(48)
5.1 Three approaches to uniqueness
155(1)
5.2 Existentialism
156(12)
5.3 Exceptions to specificity?
168(7)
5.4 Russellianism
175(6)
5.5 Neo-Fregeanism
181(9)
5.6 Three arguments for a neo-Fregean `the'
190(6)
5.7 Five arguments against a neo-Fregean `the'
196(6)
5.8 The upshot
202(1)
6 Et tu, `Brute'?
203(40)
6.1 Demonstratives
203(2)
6.2 Non-rigid uses
205(2)
6.3 Salience
207(4)
6.4 Modal themes
211(7)
6.5 The view so far
218(1)
6.6 Names
219(2)
6.7 The predicate view: details
221(3)
6.8 Two ineffective arguments
224(3)
6.9 Calling and describing
227(6)
6.10 Against the predicate view
233(2)
6.11 Bare and bound?
235(4)
6.12 Varieties of validity
239(2)
6.13 Names: a tentative verdict
241(2)
Afterword 243(6)
Bibliography 249(10)
Index 259
John Hawthorne is Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at the University of Oxford, having previously been Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey. His books include Knowledge and Lotteries, Metaphysical Essays, and Relativism and Monadic Truth.



David Manley is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. His papers have appeared in such journals as Mind, The Journal of Philosophy, Noūs, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.