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El. knyga: Regret

(Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, Swansea University)
  • Formatas: PDF+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 16-Feb-2024
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press Inc
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780197651391
  • Formatas: PDF+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 16-Feb-2024
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press Inc
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780197651391

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"I have two main aims in this part of the book. The first is to pin down what regret is. My view, to put it nounally, is that regret is the painful feeling of self-chastisement (i.e., self-reproach, self-rebuke, self-recrimination, etc.) resulting from doing something that one thinks is a mistake. To put it verbally, to regret is to reproach oneself for acting poorly (more specifically, to reproach oneself for making a decision that is not justified by one's practical identity). This means that there aretwo components of regret. First, to regret is to experience the sting of self-reproach, which constitutes its phenomenological core. Second, regret concerns the things that we do, that is, our actions. More specifically, I claim that regret concerns our mistakes. This means that I treat regret as a distinct emotion, which differs from other, related emotions, such as guilt, remorse and disappointment. It also means that I reject many existing philosophical discussions of regret, especially Bernard Williams's account of agent-regret, according to which we can and, more importantly, ought to, regret things that we do entirely unintentionally / involuntarily. The focus on mistakes is central to the second aim, which is to identify when we should regret the things that we have done. This involves distinguishing different senses of "should", which, in turn, requires identifying the different reasons we can have for regret. As I explain, what is of fundamental importance is whether our regret is "fitting", that is, whether the features of the situation we are in "warrant" regret. The challenge is then to ascertain what features of a situation render regret a fitting response to it. I argue that it is when we make mistakes, and only when we make mistakes, that the situation warrants regret. Of course, this involves explaining what constitutes a "mistake". I argue for an evidence-relative perspectivist account of "mistake". In short, to make a mistake is to fail to act on good practical reasons that were epistemically available to you at the time you made your decision. As we shall see, this differs from the views of some influential philosophers. For example, I reject the claim that it is rational to regret a decision you believe to have been the best you couldhave made, even if that decision has very unwanted consequences. In contrast, the likes of Bernard Williams and Michael Stocker think that regret about such "tragic dilemmas" is both rational and praiseworthy. Thus, I endeavour to show why my account should be preferred to theirs"--

Philosopher Paddy McQueen provides a detailed examination of the nature of regret and its role in decision-making. Additionally, he explores how experiences of regret are shaped by social discourses, especially those about gender and parenthood.

Philosopher Paddy McQueen provides a detailed examination of the nature of regret and its role in decision-making. Contrary to influential philosophical accounts of regret, he argues that we should only regret choices we make that were not justified at the time, based on the information that was available to us. Consequently, he suggests that many of us should have fewer regrets than we do, and we should worry less than we do about whether we might come to regret a decision. In making this case, he engages with important areas of philosophical debate, such as reasons, time and justification, the temporal self, values and valuing, responsibility, the causal framing of events, and self-forgiveness. The result is a complex, novel account of when we should regret the things that we do.

In addition, McQueen explores how experiences of regret are shaped by social discourses, especially those about gender and parenthood. He examines how regret has become politicized in debates about abortion and trans identities and reveals ways in which regret is used to regulate people's reproductive choices. Through this cultural politics of regret, he challenges assumptions about gender identities and the expectations of regret that are attached to certain people's decisions. In so doing, he shows how confronting these assumptions and expectations can help to promote people's autonomy and well-being. Weaving these threads together, McQueen highlights the personal and political significance of regret.
Introduction

Part One: The Philosophy of Regret

Chapter One: Making Sense of Regret
1.1. Introduction
1.2. How To Develop an Account of Regret
1.3. What Regret Is (And What It Is Not)
1.4. The Psychology of Regret
1.5. Are There
Paddy McQueen is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Swansea University. Prior to that, he was a lecturer at Queen's University Belfast and an Irish Research Council post-doctoral researcher at University College Dublin. In addition to various journal articles, he has written three books, the most recent of which is entitled Critical Phenomenology: An Introduction, co-authored with Elisa Magrģ (Polity, 2022).