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El. knyga: Replacing Truth

4.00/5 (10 ratings by Goodreads)
(Ohio State University)
  • Formatas: PDF+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 11-Jul-2013
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780191662836
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Replacing TruthDidesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: PDF+DRM
  • Išleidimo metai: 11-Jul-2013
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780191662836
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Kevin Scharp proposes an original theory of the nature and logic of truth on which truth is an inconsistent concept that should be replaced for certain theoretical purposes. Replacing Truth opens with an overview of work on the nature of truth (e.g., correspondence theories, deflationism), work on the liar and related paradoxes, and a comprehensive scheme for combining these two literatures into a unified study of the concept truth. Scharp argues that truth is best understood as an inconsistent concept, and proposes a detailed theory of inconsistent concepts that can be applied to the case of truth. Truth also happens to be a useful concept, but its inconsistency inhibits its utility; as such, it should be replaced with consistent concepts that can do truth's job without giving rise to paradoxes. To this end, Scharp offers a pair of replacements, which he dubs ascending truth and descending truth, along with an axiomatic theory of them and a new kind of possible-worlds semantics for this theory. As for the nature of truth, he goes on to develop Davidson's idea that it is best understood as the core of a measurement system for rational phenomena (e.g., belief, desire, and meaning). The book finishes with a semantic theory that treats truth predicates as assessment-sensitive (i.e., their extension is relative to a context of assessment), and a demonstration of how this theory solves the problems posed by the liar and other paradoxes.

Recenzijos

Logicians have been trying to solve the Liar Paradox and its associated family of insolubiles for the best part of two and a half thousand years; so one might well have thought that there could be no very new views on the topic. The subject is deep and hard, however; and this is not the case. In Replacing Truth, Kevin Scharp has come up with one. * Graham Priest, Mind * Scharp presents an intriguing example of conceptual engineering, proposing to discard our apparently inconsistent concept of truth and replace it with two shiny new and arguably consistent concepts. In doing so, he provides an informative and welcome survey of current approaches to truth and paradox, rightly urging that a unified theory of the two notions is essential. There is much to be learned from his discussion. * Stephen Read, The Philosophical Quarterly * rich and rewarding . . . I find the book very productive to engage with; its vision, clarity of purpose, and creativity all come in large measures. . . . Scharp's voice is indispensable in this conversation. * David Ripley, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *

List of Figures
ix
List of Tables
ix
Acknowledgments xi
Conventions xiii
Introduction 1(2)
0.1 Methodology
2(6)
0.1.1 The two camps in the analytic tradition
2(1)
0.1.2 Concepts and philosophy
3(1)
0.1.3 Six philosophical methods
4(3)
0.1.4 Metrological naturalism
7(1)
0.2 Scope and organization
8(3)
1 The Market
11(24)
1.1 Theories of the nature of truth
13(3)
1.2 Philosophical approaches
16(7)
1.3 Logical approaches
23(2)
1.4 Combinations of philosophical and logical approaches
25(5)
1.5 Unified theories of truth
30(5)
2 Inconsistent Concepts
35(22)
2.1 Concepts
35(1)
2.2 Inconsistent concepts
36(7)
2.3 Possessors and principles
43(6)
2.4 Pragmatics and constitutive principles
49(4)
2.5 Competence and constitutive principles
53(4)
3 The Obvious Argument
57(27)
3.1 Monsters
57(5)
3.2 In and out
62(16)
3.2.1 Truth's expressive role
63(1)
3.2.2 Kripke's objections to the orthodox approach
64(2)
3.2.3 Content determination
66(5)
3.2.4 Aletheic contextualism
71(2)
3.2.5 Semantic blindness
73(2)
3.2.6 Field on truth and determinate truth
75(3)
3.3 Logic
78(6)
4 Revenge
84(42)
4.1 Revenge paradoxes
84(4)
4.2 Revenge objections
88(12)
4.2.1 Too easy?
89(5)
4.2.2 Expressibility delimiters
94(5)
4.2.3 A diagnosis
99(1)
4.3 The revenge argument
100(16)
4.3.1 Self-refutation
102(2)
4.3.2 The burden of proof
104(2)
4.3.3 Unintelligible?
106(4)
4.3.4 Importing revenge
110(2)
4.3.5 Language-specific truth predicates
112(4)
4.4 The abductive argument
116(5)
4.5 The meaning argument
121(5)
5 Replacement
126(20)
5.1 Inconsistency views
126(11)
5.1.1 Dialetheism
126(2)
5.1.2 Patterson
128(1)
5.1.3 Ludwig
129(5)
5.1.4 Eklund
134(1)
5.1.5 Yablo
135(1)
5.1.6 Burgess
136(1)
5.2 Replacement arguments
137(2)
5.3 Paradox and persons
139(3)
5.4 Conditions of adequacy
142(1)
5.5 Two theories
143(1)
5.6 The parable of Mindy
144(2)
6 The Prescriptive Theory
146(42)
6.1 The replacements: ascending truth and descending truth
146(3)
6.2 Montague's theorem
149(3)
6.3 Safety
152(1)
6.4 A formal theory: ADT
153(2)
6.5 Other replacements
155(2)
6.6 Semantics for ADT
157(12)
6.6.1 Normal modal logic and relational semantics
157(2)
6.6.2 Problems with using relational semantics for ADT
159(1)
6.6.3 Classical modal logic and neighborhood semantics
160(1)
6.6.4 Yet another problem
161(1)
6.6.5 Xeno semantics
161(5)
6.6.6 First-order modal logic
166(1)
6.6.7 Revision sequences and modal logic
167(2)
6.6.8 Summary of problems and solutions
169(1)
6.7 Features of ADT
169(19)
6.7.1 Interpreting ADT
169(1)
6.7.2 Principles of ascending and descending truth
170(2)
6.7.3 Non-principles
172(1)
6.7.4 The aletheic paradoxes
173(1)
6.7.5 The expressive role
174(1)
6.7.6 Contingent unsafety
175(1)
6.7.7 Revenge
175(3)
Appendix: A fixed-point theorem
178(10)
7 Metrological Naturalism and ADT
188(16)
7.1 Davidson's theory of truth
188(4)
7.2 Measurement theory
192(4)
7.3 Davidson and measurement theory
196(4)
7.4 The nature of ascending and descending truth
200(4)
8 Minimal Mutilation
204(21)
8.1 Proof
205(1)
8.2 Inquiry
205(1)
8.3 Objectivity
206(1)
8.4 Belief
207(1)
8.5 Meaning
207(8)
8.6 Assertion
215(1)
8.7 Knowledge
216(1)
8.8 Validity
217(1)
8.9 Predication
218(3)
8.10 Reference
221(4)
9 The Descriptive Theory
225(49)
9.1 Theories of inconsistent concepts
225(5)
9.1.1 Conditions of adequacy
225(3)
9.1.2 Theories
228(2)
9.2 Confusion and relative truth
230(2)
9.3 Relative truth and formal semantics
232(4)
9.4 An assessment-sensitivity theory of truth
236(5)
9.5 Other options
241(6)
9.6 An example
247(6)
9.6.1 Syntax for L
247(1)
9.6.2 Semantics for L
247(3)
9.6.3 Presemantics and postsemantics for L
250(3)
9.7 Resolving the paradoxes
253(3)
9.7.1 Validity
254(1)
9.7.2 The liar
255(1)
9.7.3 Other paradoxes
255(1)
9.7.4 Truth-tellers
255(1)
9.8 Problems for semantic relativism
256(7)
9.9 Pragmatics and `true'
263(3)
9.10 The nature of truth
266(2)
9.11 A unified theory of truth: CAM
268(1)
9.12 Expressive role
269(2)
9.13 Revenge
271(3)
10 The Aletheic Revolution
274
10.1 Post-revolutionary practice
275(3)
10.2 Objections and replies
278
10.2.1 Guide to objections
278(1)
10.2.2 My uses of `true'
279(1)
10.2.3 Indispensability
279(1)
10.2.4 Primary aletheic principles
279(1)
10.2.5 Endorsement
280(1)
10.2.6 Deflationism
281(1)
10.2.7 Retention
282(3)
10.2.8 Retraction
285(1)
10.2.9 Generalization
286(1)
10.2.10 The principle of uniform solution
287
Conclusion 289(2)
Bibliography 291(26)
Index 317
List of Figures
xxi
List of Tables
xxiii
Contributors xxiv
I Setting the Stage
1 Max Boisot and the Dynamic Evolution of Knowledge
3(16)
Martin Ihrig
John Child
II Analyses of the Chinese System
2 From Fiefs to Clans and Network Capitalism: Explaining China's Emerging Economic Order
19(30)
Max Boisot
John Child
3 Analyses of the Chinese System
49(12)
John Child
III Organizational Complexity
4 Extreme Outcomes, Connectivity, and Power Laws: Towards an Econophysics of Organization
61(32)
Max Boisot
Bill McKelvey
5 Reflecting on Max Boisot's Ashby Space Applied to Complexity Management
93(16)
Bill McKelvey
IV The Strategic Management of Knowledge
6 The Creation and Sharing of Knowledge
109(20)
Max Boisot
7 The Strategic Management of Knowledge
129(14)
Martin Ihrig
Ian MacMillan
V Knowledge in Big Science
8 Generating Knowledge in a Connected World: The Case of the ATLAS Experiment at CERN
143(12)
Max Boisot
9 Knowledge in Big Science
155(14)
Agusti Canals
VI Innovations in Education
10 Chinese Boxes and Learning Cubes: Action Learning in a Cross-Cultural Context
169(12)
Max Boisot
Michel Fiol
11 Innovations in Education
181(18)
Dana Kaminstein
John Child
VII Concluding Reflections
12 The I-Space as a Key to History and to Culture
199(6)
Gordon Redding
13 The Three Phases of Max Boisot's Theorizing
205(8)
John-Christopher Spender
14 Writing with Max Boisot
213(8)
Marshall Meyer
15 Remembering Max Boisot: Recollections of a Gifted Intellect at Work
221(8)
Ron Sanchez
16 I-Space and the Value of Basic Research
229(8)
Markus Nordberg
17 Boisot and the God Particle
237(4)
Marzio Nessi
18 Conclusion and Outlook
241(8)
John Child
Martin Ihrig
Bibliography 249(26)
Index 275
Kevin Scharp received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh in 2005 and is now an Associate Professor of Philosophy at The Ohio State University. He works on philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and the history of analytic philosophy, and he is the editor of a collection of Wilfrid Sellars' essays.
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