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El. knyga: Rise of Analytic Philosophy, 1879-1930: From Frege to Ramsey

(University of Cambridge, UK)
  • Formatas: 522 pages
  • Išleidimo metai: 08-Oct-2019
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781317689713
  • Formatas: 522 pages
  • Išleidimo metai: 08-Oct-2019
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781317689713

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In this book, Michael Potter offers a fresh and compelling portrait of the birth and first several decades of analytic philosophy, one of the most important periods in philosophy’s long history. He focuses on the period between the publication of Gottlob Frege’s Begriffsschrift in 1879 and Frank Ramsey’s death in 1930. Potter--one of the most influential writers on late 19thand early 20th century philosophy--presents a deep but accessible account of the break with Absolute Idealism and Neo-Kantianism, specifically, and more generally with many of the metaphysical preoccupations of philosophy’s preceding history. Potter’s focus is on philosophical logic and philosophy of mathematics, but he also relies heavily on important issues in metaphysics and meta-ethics to complete his story. The book provides an essential starting point for any student or philosopher attempting to understand Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Ramsey as well as their interactions and their intellectual milieux. It will also be of interest to a great many philosophers today who want to illuminate the problems they work on by better knowing their origins.

KEY FEATURES:

1. Discusses the interconnections of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein—founding thinkers in the history of analytic philosophy—and also brings the neglected Frank Ramsey into this conversation, providing a unique focus and depth to an introductory text

2. Increases the general awareness of the importance of the history of analytic philosophy for today’s non-historical debates, giving the book appeal in all areas of analytic philosophy

3. Written by one of the most influential philosophers of logic and writers in the history of analytic philosophy

4. Written for upper-level undergraduates, guaranteeing widespread accessibility

5. Includes coverage of topics and issues neglected in competing publications, including Russell’s Principles, solipsism in theTractatus, and the contributions of Frank Ramsey

6. Emphasizes the chronological development of authors’ views so as to provide a better understanding of their motivation

Recenzijos

"The book is an impressive achievement, and it will be an important contribution to the literature on Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Ramsey, and the history of early analytic philosophy. I thoroughly enjoyed reading it and learned a lot from it. It is not only a state-of-the-art contribution to scholarship but will also be a valuable textbook for courses on the history of early analytic philosophy, or on the work of one or more of the four philosophers discussed."

--David G. Stern, University of Iowa, USA

"This book is a significant contribution to studies in the history of analytic philosophy and will benefit upper-level undergraduates studying this material for the first time, as well as active researchers in the area."

--James Levine, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland

Acknowledgments xvi
Introduction 1(4)
PART I Frege
5(140)
1 Biography
7(3)
2 Logic before 1879
10(11)
Stoic logic
10(1)
Aristotelian logic
11(1)
Supposition
12(1)
Kinds of entity
13(1)
Relations
14(1)
Transcendental logic
15(2)
Empiricism and idealism
17(2)
Boole
19(2)
3 Begriffsschrift I: Foundations of Logic
21(11)
The aim of the concept-script
21(1)
The judgment stroke
22(2)
The content stroke
24(1)
Axioms, basic laws and rules
25(2)
Tone and conceptual content
27(1)
Function and argument
28(2)
Greek and Latin letters
30(2)
4 Begriffsschrift II: Prepositional Logic
32(5)
Syntax
32(1)
Semantics
33(2)
Rules and basic laws
35(2)
5 Begriffsschrift III: Quantification
37(7)
Syntax
37(3)
Semantics
40(2)
Rules and basic laws
42(2)
6 Begriffsschrift IV: Identity
44(4)
Syntax
44(1)
Semantics
44(3)
Basic laws
47(1)
7 Begriffsschrift V: The Ancestral
48(4)
Defining the ancestral
48(2)
Logic as non-trivial
50(1)
Impredicativity
50(2)
8 Early Philosophy of Logic
52(7)
Psychologism and empiricism
52(1)
Judgment and truth
53(2)
Defining the scope of logic
55(1)
Metalogic
56(3)
9 The Hierarchy
59(6)
Levels
59(1)
Applications
60(1)
Concept and object
61(2)
Objecthood and identity
63(2)
10 Grundlagen I: The Context Principle
65(5)
Semantic incompleteness
65(2)
The Lockean model
67(1)
Concept and object again
68(2)
11 Grundlagen II: Arithmetical Truth
70(6)
Game formalism
70(1)
Leibniz
71(1)
The a posteriori
72(2)
Analytic or synthetic?
74(2)
12 Grundlagen III: Numbers
76(8)
Numbers of what?
76(2)
Numbers as non-linguistic
78(1)
Numbers as objects
78(1)
Numbers as self-subsistent
79(1)
Numbers as non-actual
79(2)
Numbers as objective
81(1)
Numbers as abstract
82(1)
Numbers as logical
83(1)
13 Grundlagen IV: The Formal Project
84(8)
Numerically definite quantifiers
85(1)
Hume's Principle
85(1)
Section 64
86(1)
Deriving arithmetic
87(1)
The Julius Caesar problem again
88(1)
Other definitions
89(3)
14 Sense and Reference I: Singular Terms
92(8)
Rejection of the Begriffsschrift theory
92(1)
The sense of a singular term
93(2)
Names and descriptions
95(1)
Internalist and externalist conceptions of sense
96(4)
15 Sense and Reference II: Sentences
100(6)
The reference of a sentence
100(2)
Thoughts
102(2)
Referring to thoughts
104(2)
16 Sense and Reference III: Concept-Words
106(5)
Unsaturated senses
106(1)
Concepts
107(2)
The concept horse
109(2)
17 Grundgesetze I: Types
111(7)
Syntax
111(1)
Semantics
112(2)
Wittgenstein's objection again
114(1)
Truth and taking as true
115(3)
18 Grundgesetze II: Extensions
118(6)
Extensions and value-ranges
118(1)
Semantics
119(2)
The contradiction
121(1)
Logical objects again
122(2)
19 The Frege-Hilbert Correspondence
124(9)
The Foundations of Geometry
124(1)
Deductivism
125(2)
Uniqueness
127(1)
Existence and consistency
128(2)
Frege's 1906 definition
130(3)
20 Late Writings
133(7)
The structure of the realm of reference
134(1)
Thought and language
135(1)
Sameness of sense
136(1)
Indexicals
137(1)
Idealism
138(2)
21 Frege's Legacy
140(5)
Logic
140(1)
Language
141(2)
Mathematics
143(2)
PART II Russell
145(168)
22 Biography
147(4)
23 Bradley
151(4)
Absolute idealism
151(2)
Russell's conversion
153(2)
24 Geometry
155(9)
Metric geometry
155(2)
First deduction of metric geometry
157(1)
Second deduction of metric geometry
158(2)
Dimension
160(1)
Geometry and physics
160(1)
Deduction of descriptive geometry
161(2)
Public and private space
163(1)
25 McTaggart
164(4)
The Tiergarten programme
165(1)
The paradoxes of relativity
166(2)
26 German Mathematics
168(6)
The continuum
169(2)
The infinitely large
171(1)
Mathematical education
172(2)
27 Whitehead
174(5)
Universal Algebra
174(2)
A single paradox of relativity
176(1)
A wrong turning?
177(2)
28 Moore
179(9)
The existential theory of judgment
179(2)
Thing and concept
181(2)
The refutation of idealism
183(1)
Against Kant?
184(1)
Moore's influence
185(3)
29 Leibniz
188(7)
Analyticity and necessity
188(2)
External relations
190(2)
The paradox of relativity resolved
192(1)
Matter and position again
193(2)
30 Peano
195(6)
Classes
196(1)
Relations
196(1)
The 1900 draft of the Principles
197(1)
Logic and abstraction
198(3)
31 Early Logicism
201(6)
Russellian logicism
201(2)
Characterizing logic
203(2)
Knowledge of logic
205(2)
32 Denoting Concepts
207(6)
The variable
207(2)
Indefinite denoting concepts
209(1)
Definite denoting concepts
210(1)
Epistemology
211(2)
33 The Contradiction
213(5)
The paradoxes
213(1)
Types
214(2)
Reducibility
216(2)
34 On Denoting
218(10)
The Gray's Elegy argument
218(2)
Against Frege?
220(1)
The new theory of denoting phrases
220(1)
Scope
221(2)
Non-entities
223(1)
Significance
224(2)
The substitutional theory
226(2)
35 Truth
228(7)
The coherence theory
228(2)
The pragmatist theory
230(1)
The primitivist theory
231(1)
The correspondence theory
232(3)
36 Types
235(8)
The hierarchy of propositional functions
235(3)
The axiom of reducibility
238(2)
Identity
240(3)
37 Middle Logicism
243(8)
Continuities
243(2)
The vicious circle principle
245(1)
The universality of logic
246(1)
Classes as fictions
247(1)
The regressive method
248(2)
Logical truth
250(1)
38 Acquaintance
251(7)
Particulars
251(2)
Complexes
253(1)
Universals
254(1)
The variable
255(1)
The self
256(2)
39 Matter
258(7)
On the notion of cause
258(1)
Inference and construction
259(2)
The constructional base
261(1)
Public and private space
262(3)
40 Pre-war Judgment
265(9)
The 1906 theory and the Frege point
265(1)
The 1909 theory and the ontology of the Introduction
266(1)
The 1911 theory and the direction problem
267(1)
The 1913 theory and the verb
268(1)
The existential proposal
269(1)
Permutative complexes
270(1)
Judging a nonsense
271(3)
41 Facts
274(8)
Complex and fact
275(1)
Negative facts
276(1)
General facts
277(1)
Names and particulars
278(1)
Forms and universals
279(3)
42 Late Logicism
282(8)
The subject matter of logic
282(2)
The new theory of types
284(2)
Propositions are not names
286(1)
Bipolarity and truth
287(1)
Logic and necessity
288(2)
43 Post-war Judgment
290(7)
Language and vagueness
290(1)
Rejecting the subject
291(1)
Meaning
292(2)
The feeling of belief
294(3)
44 Neutral Monism
297(6)
Adopting neutral monism
297(2)
A second wave?
299(1)
The inference from percepts to events
300(1)
Emergence
301(2)
45 Russell's Legacy
303(10)
The demise of absolute idealism
303(1)
The external world programme
304(1)
Logicism
305(1)
Naturalism
306(1)
Cambridge analysis
307(1)
Ordinary language philosophy
308(4)
Later reception
312(1)
PART III Wittgenstein
313(104)
46 Biography
315(4)
47 Facts
319(4)
Facts
319(2)
Atomic facts
321(1)
Molecular facts
322(1)
48 Pictures
323(5)
Meaning
323(2)
Truth
325(1)
Relative inexpressibility
325(1)
Possibility
326(2)
49 Propositions
328(7)
Logical form
328(1)
Sign and symbol
329(2)
Absolute unsayability
331(1)
Wittgenstein's context principle
332(3)
50 Sense
335(5)
Truth-possibilities
335(1)
Tautology and contradiction
336(1)
Independence
337(2)
The general form of proposition
339(1)
51 Wittgenstein's Concept-Script
340(7)
The N-operation
341(1)
Propositional variables
341(1)
Direct enumeration
342(1)
Propositional functions
343(1)
Formal series
344(1)
Wittgenstein's vicious circle principle
345(2)
52 Objects
347(8)
Simplicity and elementary propositions
347(2)
The argument for substance
349(2)
Components
351(1)
Forms of object
351(2)
Thought and world
353(2)
53 Identity
355(5)
Wittgenstein's argument
355(1)
Doing without identity
356(2)
Identity and classes
358(2)
54 Solipsism
360(4)
The argument for solipsism
360(1)
The thinking subject
361(3)
55 Ordinary Language
364(4)
Vagueness
364(1)
Austerity
365(1)
Philosophy
366(2)
56 Minds
368(6)
Judgment
368(1)
The empirical subject
369(2)
Logic and psychology
371(1)
Theory of knowledge
372(2)
57 Logic
374(4)
The propositions of logic
374(2)
Logic as transcendental
376(2)
58 The Metaphysical Subject
378(6)
The eye and the visual field
379(1)
The a priori order
380(1)
Talking of the I
381(3)
59 Arithmetic
384(4)
Numbers
384(2)
Dependence on infinity
386(2)
60 Science
388(4)
The mesh
388(1)
Principles
389(1)
The independence of the will
390(2)
61 Ethics
392(6)
Moral nonsense
393(1)
The willing subject
394(1)
The lecture on ethics
395(1)
Religion
396(2)
62 The Mystical
398(10)
The riddle
398(2)
Quietism
400(1)
The dialectical reading
401(1)
The resolute reading
402(3)
The frame
405(1)
The preface
406(2)
63 The Legacy of the Tractatus
408(9)
The independence of elementary propositions
409(1)
The shape of space
410(1)
Atomism
411(1)
The picture theory
412(2)
Philosophy
414(3)
PART IV Ramsey
417(56)
64 Biography
419(4)
65 Truth
423(8)
Propositions
423(1)
Truth
424(2)
Expressing and describing
426(2)
Reverse semantics
428(3)
66 Knowledge
431(4)
Reliabilism
431(2)
Induction
433(1)
Human logic
434(1)
67 The Foundations of Mathematics I: Types
435(5)
Ramsey's simple hierarchy
435(2)
Saying the unsayable
437(1)
A transcendental argument
438(2)
68 The Foundations of Mathematics II: Logicism
440(5)
Propositional functions in extension
440(2)
Wittgenstein's objections
442(1)
The demise of the transcendental argument
443(2)
69 Universals
445(5)
Incompleteness
445(1)
Narrow and wide ranges
446(1)
Complex universals
447(1)
Unigrade and multigrade terms
448(2)
70 Degrees of Belief
450(8)
Logical probabilities
450(1)
Betting
451(1)
Synchronic Dutch books
452(2)
Diachronic Dutch books
454(1)
Degrees of belief and frequencies
455(1)
Partial belief and desire
456(2)
71 Facts and Propositions
458(4)
Chicken beliefs
458(2)
Partial belief and chickens
460(2)
72 Last Papers
462(6)
Laws
462(1)
The Ramsey test
463(2)
Causation
465(1)
Theories
465(3)
73 Ramsey's Legacy
468(5)
Truth and meaning
468(2)
Logicism
470(1)
Universals
471(2)
Bibliography 473(20)
Index 493
Michael Potter is Professor of Logic at Cambridge University, UK, and a Life Fellow of Fitzwilliam College. His studies in the history of analytic philosophy include Reasons Nearest Kin (2000) and Wittgensteins Notes on Logic (2009). He is also noted for work in the foundations of mathematics, including Set Theory and its Philosophy (2004).