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Risk-Informed Analysis of Transportation Worker Identification Credential Reader Requirements [Minkštas viršelis]

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  • Formatas: Paperback / softback, 172 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 279x216x9 mm, weight: 417 g, Illustrations, unspecified
  • Išleidimo metai: 15-Feb-2023
  • Leidėjas: RAND Corporation
  • ISBN-10: 1977409822
  • ISBN-13: 9781977409829
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Risk-Informed Analysis of Transportation Worker Identification Credential Reader RequirementsDidesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: Paperback / softback, 172 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 279x216x9 mm, weight: 417 g, Illustrations, unspecified
  • Išleidimo metai: 15-Feb-2023
  • Leidėjas: RAND Corporation
  • ISBN-10: 1977409822
  • ISBN-13: 9781977409829
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Pastovi nuoroda: https://www.kriso.lt/db/9781977409829.html
Raktažodžiai:
A 2016 U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) regulation, "Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)-Reader Requirements," requires certain maritime facilities determined to be of high risk to use electronic and biometric access control programs in the facilities' secure areas. The final version of this rule, known as the final reader rule, has been delayed (from 2020) until May 8, 2023, for three categories of facilities that handle certain dangerous cargoes (CDCs) in bulk. The USCG asked the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center to reestimate the population of such regulated facilities that could be subject to the final reader rule delay, develop an objective risk assessment model for these facilities, and conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the regulation. This report describes the researchers' analytical efforts to address these three research areas. Because there is no database of Maritime Transportation Security Act-regulated facilities that has all the requisite information about CDCs that facilities handle in bulk, the researchers resorted to other data sources, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's databases, an online survey, and interviews, to estimate the facility population. For the facility risk model, they used the modeling approach for assessing potential consequence included in the risk engine of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program, harmonizing the TWIC and CFATS programs in consequence assessment. Because there was no credible estimate for the probability of a transportation security incident, the researchers used a break-even analysis to assess whether the final reader rule is cost-effective.

This report assesses the cost-effectiveness of a U.S. Coast Guard rule that requires any facility handling certain dangerous cargoes to biometrically verify the identity of anyone accessing a secure area of that facility.

About This Report iii
Summary v
Figures and Tables
xiii
Chapter One Introduction
1(8)
1.1 The Motivation for This Study
1(1)
1.2 The Focus of This Study
2(1)
1.3 Background on the TWIC Reader Rule
3(1)
1.3.1 Origins of the TWIC Program
3(1)
1.3.2 Overview of TWIC Rulemaking
3(1)
1.4 Determining Which Facilities Belonged in Risk Group A
4(1)
1.5 Methodology
5(1)
1.6 The Organization of This Report
6(3)
Chapter Two Risk Analysis for CDCs
9(12)
2.1 Introduction
9(1)
2.2 Review of Existing Tools and Data Sources
10(1)
2.3 Development of a Risk Analysis Tool for CDCs
11(9)
2.3.1 Design Fundamentals
12(2)
2.3.2 Implementation
14(4)
2.3.3 Results
18(2)
2.4 Summary
20(1)
Chapter Three Estimating the Facility Population
21(20)
3.1 Introduction
21(2)
3.1.1 Interpretation of the Covered Population
21(1)
3.1.2 Prior Population Estimates
22(1)
3.2 Data Sources
23(6)
3.2.1 The MISLE Database
23(1)
3.2.2 Insufficiency of MSRAM Data
24(1)
3.2.3 EPA's RMP Program
24(1)
3.2.4 EPA's TRI
25(2)
3.2.5 Facility-Level Data Collection
27(1)
3.2.6 Supplementary Interviews
28(1)
3.3 Methodology
29(4)
3.3.1 Facility Matching
29(1)
3.3.2 Lower-Bound Estimation
30(1)
3.3.3 Upper-Bound Estimation
30(3)
3.4 Results
33(5)
3.4.1 The Data Sources Had Some Overlap
33(2)
3.4.2 Supergroups Distinguish Facilities with CDCs
35(1)
3.4.3 Between 471 and 711 Facilities Handled CDCs
36(1)
3.4.4 The Original Risk Group A Did Not Properly Classify Facilities Handling CDCs
36(2)
3.4.5 Six Substances Account for Half of All Reports of CDCs
38(1)
3.4.6 Many Facilities Handle Multiple CDCs
38(1)
3.5 Summary
38(3)
Chapter Four Developing the Facility Risk Model
41(18)
4.1 Introduction
41(1)
4.2 MSRAM Has Limitations
42(3)
4.3 Facility Risk Model
45(12)
4.3.1 The Risk Engine in the CFATS Program Risk Tiering Methodology
45(2)
4.3.2 Development of a Facility Risk Model
47(10)
4.4 Summary
57(2)
Chapter Five A Cost--Benefit Analysis of the Reader Rule Delay
59(18)
5.1 Introduction
59(3)
5.1.1 The Rationale for Break-Even Analysis
59(2)
5.1.2 Data Sources
61(1)
5.2 Estimation of Costs
62(6)
5.2.1 TWIC Capital Costs
62(2)
5.2.2 Maintenance Costs
64(1)
5.2.3 Operational Costs
64(1)
5.2.4 Additional Costs
65(1)
5.2.5 Government Costs
66(1)
5.2.6 Summary of Costs
66(2)
5.3 Estimation of Benefits
68(4)
5.3.1 Limitations to Quantifying Benefits in a Comprehensive Way
68(1)
5.3.2 Monetizing Averted Losses
69(1)
5.3.3 Consequence and Facility Typology
69(1)
5.3.4 Discussion of Regulatory Options Based on Facility Typology
70(2)
5.4 The Break-Even Analysis
72(2)
5.5 Summary
74(3)
Chapter Six Conclusions
77(6)
6.1 Background
77(1)
6.2 Data Sources
78(1)
6.3 Approaches
78(2)
6.3.1 Risk Analysis for CDCs
79(1)
6.3.2 Facility Population Estimation
79(1)
6.3.3 A Facility Risk Model
79(1)
6.3.4 A Cost-Benefit Analysis
80(1)
6.4 Key Findings
80(1)
6.5 Implementation Will Be an Ongoing Process
81(2)
APPENDIXES
A A Review of TWIC-Relevant Regulations
83(8)
A.1 Origins of the TWIC Program
83(1)
A.2 The History of TWIC Rulemaking
84(3)
A.3 Determining Which Facilities Belong in Risk Group A
87(1)
A.4 Cost-Benefit Analyses of the TWIC Reader Rule
87(2)
A.5 Definition of Key Terms
89(2)
B CDCs Authorized to Be Transported by Vessels in Bulk
91(4)
C Processing of PAD in the ERG
95(4)
D Processing of USCG NRC Incident Data
99(4)
E Processing of EPA RMP Facility Data
103(2)
F The Facility Survey Instrument
105(8)
F.1 Introduction and Consent
105(1)
F.2 Section I: Facility Information
106(1)
F.3 Section II: CDC Handling
107(3)
F.4 Section III: TWIC Related Security Infrastructure
110(1)
F.5 Section IV: Cost Information
111(2)
G Company Interviews
113(10)
G.1 Interview Objectives
113(1)
G.2 Selecting Companies for Interviews
113(1)
G.3 The Facility Population
114(1)
G.4 Interviews and Participants
114(1)
G.5 Interview Protocol
115(4)
G.6 Key Information
119(1)
G.7 Company Concerns About the Final Reader Rule
120(3)
H Analysis of the MSRAM Data
123(8)
H.1 Data
123(2)
H.2 Analysis
125(1)
H.3 Conclusions
125(6)
I Incorporating LandScan USA Population Data into a Simplified Model to Estimate Facility Consequences
131(8)
I.1 The LandScan USA Population Data
131(1)
I.2 Representative Population Density and Its Use for a Simplified Model to Estimate Facility Consequences
132(7)
J Creating a Synthetic Data Set for Analysis of Consequence Distributions
139(4)
Abbreviations 143(4)
References 147