Preface |
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i | |
Figures |
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viii | |
Tables |
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ix | |
Summary |
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xi | |
Acknowledgments |
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xix | |
Abbreviations |
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xxi | |
1 Introduction |
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1 | (8) |
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1 | (2) |
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Assessment Questions Raised in Public Law 114-278 |
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3 | (1) |
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Data Sources and Our Approach to the Research Questions |
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4 | (3) |
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The Structure of This Report |
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7 | (2) |
2 Background on the TWIC Program and Maritime Facilities |
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9 | (21) |
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The Role of Access Control Programs |
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9 | (2) |
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Background and Purpose of the TWIC Program |
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11 | (6) |
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Division of Responsibilities for the TWIC Program |
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17 | (7) |
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Complexities of Characterizing the Port Environment |
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24 | (4) |
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28 | (2) |
3 Previous GAO and OIG Concerns About the TWIC Program |
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30 | (8) |
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Themes from Previous GAO and OIG Reports |
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31 | (5) |
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Open GAO and OIG Recommendations |
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36 | (2) |
4 Security Threats to the Maritime Environment |
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38 | (14) |
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Attacks Specific to the Transportation Sector |
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38 | (6) |
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The Threat of Terrorism in the United States Today |
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44 | (5) |
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Threats of Crime in the Port Environment |
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49 | (2) |
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51 | (1) |
5 The Risk-Mitigation Value of the TWIC STA |
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52 | (34) |
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52 | (5) |
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The STA's Use of the Terrorism Watch List |
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57 | (2) |
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Prior Criminal History as a Terrorism Risk Factor |
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59 | (9) |
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The Value of the STA Process to Counterterrorism Efforts |
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68 | (1) |
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Immigration Status as a Risk Factor for Crime or Terrorism |
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69 | (7) |
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Criminal History as a Risk Factor for Security Threats in General |
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76 | (3) |
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Facility Perceptions of the STA Process |
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79 | (3) |
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Efficiency of the STA Process |
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82 | (2) |
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84 | (2) |
6 TWIC Use at Maritime Facilities |
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86 | (16) |
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Facility Personnel's and Users' Experiences with the TWIC |
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88 | (1) |
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89 | (7) |
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Facility Personnel's and Users' Observations About TWIC Readers |
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96 | (3) |
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99 | (1) |
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Counterfeit Cards Were Seen Infrequently |
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100 | (1) |
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101 | (1) |
7 TWIC's Limits in Addressing Risks to Maritime Security |
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102 | (22) |
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Security Measures Affect Adversary Attack Choices |
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102 | (2) |
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TWIC's Contribution to Vulnerability Reduction Is Inherently Limited |
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104 | (9) |
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Empirical Evidence of Breaches of Access Control Measures |
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113 | (3) |
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Limitations of TWIC Inspection Data |
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116 | (1) |
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TWIC's Strengths and Weaknesses in Mitigating Risk |
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117 | (2) |
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Facility Security Personnel Reiterated the Limitations of TWIC |
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119 | (3) |
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122 | (2) |
8 A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of the TWIC-Reader Rule Requirements |
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124 | (26) |
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Methodology for Determining Costs and Benefits of the TWIC-Reader Rule |
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125 | (2) |
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Foundations of the TWIC-Reader Rule Regulatory Analysis |
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127 | (1) |
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Building on the Framework in the Regulatory Analysis for the TWIC-Reader Rule Using Additional Cost Data |
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128 | (2) |
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A Comparison of the 2015 Regulatory Analysis and Our Break-Even Analysis |
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130 | (8) |
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Consideration of Regulatory Alternatives |
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138 | (5) |
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Expanded Break-Even Analysis Results |
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143 | (5) |
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148 | (2) |
9 Alternative Models and Redundancies |
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150 | (16) |
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Using Biometrics in the TWIC Program |
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150 | (5) |
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Other Transportation Credentials |
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155 | (2) |
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Alternative Operating Models for the Transportation Security Card |
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157 | (7) |
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164 | (2) |
10 Conclusion |
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166 | (13) |
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Summary of Conclusions About Public Law 114-278 |
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169 | (1) |
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Section 1(b)(3)(A)(i): Review the Appropriateness of the Vetting Standards |
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170 | (2) |
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Section 1(b)(3)(A)(ii): Review the Fee Structure and the Cost of Vetting |
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172 | (1) |
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Section 1(b)(3)(A)(iii): Find Any Unnecessary Redundancy or Duplication with Other Transportation Credentials |
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172 | (1) |
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Section 1(b)(3)(A)(iv): Determine the Appropriateness of Having Varying Threat Assessments and Access Control |
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173 | (1) |
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Section 1(b)(3)(B): Assess the Length of Time to Review TWIC Applications |
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174 | (1) |
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Section 1(b)(3)(C)(i): Assess TWIC's Addressal of Known and Likely Maritime Security Risks |
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174 | (1) |
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Section 1(b)(3)(C)(ii): Assess the Potential for a Nonbiometric Alternative |
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175 | (1) |
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Section 1(b)(3)(C)(iii): Determine the Impact of TWIC Cards and TWIC Readers |
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176 | (1) |
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Section 1(b)(3)(C)(iv): Review the Costs and Benefits of the TWIC Program |
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177 | (1) |
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Section 1(b)(3)(C)(v): Address Previous GAO and OIG Concerns |
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177 | (2) |
Appendix A. Port and Facility Interviews |
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179 | (12) |
Appendix B. Permanent and Interim Disqualifying Criminal Offenses for TWIC |
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191 | (2) |
Appendix C. MSRAM in Relation to the TWIC Program |
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193 | (5) |
Appendix D. The Status of GAO and OIG Recommendations |
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198 | (10) |
Appendix E. A Detailed Analysis of TWIC User Fees |
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208 | (10) |
Appendix F. Rationale for a Break-Even Analysis |
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218 | (6) |
Appendix G. Detailed Estimation of Costs and Benefits |
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224 | (27) |
Bibliography |
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251 | |