Atnaujinkite slapukų nuostatas

Risk-Mitigation Value of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential: A Comprehensive Security Assessment of the Twic Program [Minkštas viršelis]

  • Formatas: Paperback / softback, 309 pages
  • Išleidimo metai: 31-Oct-2021
  • Leidėjas: RAND
  • ISBN-10: 1977403409
  • ISBN-13: 9781977403407
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
  • Formatas: Paperback / softback, 309 pages
  • Išleidimo metai: 31-Oct-2021
  • Leidėjas: RAND
  • ISBN-10: 1977403409
  • ISBN-13: 9781977403407
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) is designed to enhance security at U.S. ports. This report provides the findings from an assessment of the TWIC program, along with the assessors’ recommendations.

Preface i
Figures viii
Tables ix
Summary xi
Acknowledgments xix
Abbreviations xxi
1 Introduction 1(8)
Background on TWIC
1(2)
Assessment Questions Raised in Public Law 114-278
3(1)
Data Sources and Our Approach to the Research Questions
4(3)
The Structure of This Report
7(2)
2 Background on the TWIC Program and Maritime Facilities 9(21)
The Role of Access Control Programs
9(2)
Background and Purpose of the TWIC Program
11(6)
Division of Responsibilities for the TWIC Program
17(7)
Complexities of Characterizing the Port Environment
24(4)
Summary
28(2)
3 Previous GAO and OIG Concerns About the TWIC Program 30(8)
Themes from Previous GAO and OIG Reports
31(5)
Open GAO and OIG Recommendations
36(2)
4 Security Threats to the Maritime Environment 38(14)
Attacks Specific to the Transportation Sector
38(6)
The Threat of Terrorism in the United States Today
44(5)
Threats of Crime in the Port Environment
49(2)
Summary
51(1)
5 The Risk-Mitigation Value of the TWIC STA 52(34)
The Purpose of the STA
52(5)
The STA's Use of the Terrorism Watch List
57(2)
Prior Criminal History as a Terrorism Risk Factor
59(9)
The Value of the STA Process to Counterterrorism Efforts
68(1)
Immigration Status as a Risk Factor for Crime or Terrorism
69(7)
Criminal History as a Risk Factor for Security Threats in General
76(3)
Facility Perceptions of the STA Process
79(3)
Efficiency of the STA Process
82(2)
Summary
84(2)
6 TWIC Use at Maritime Facilities 86(16)
Facility Personnel's and Users' Experiences with the TWIC
88(1)
Facility Use of the TWIC
89(7)
Facility Personnel's and Users' Observations About TWIC Readers
96(3)
Confidence in the CCL
99(1)
Counterfeit Cards Were Seen Infrequently
100(1)
Summary
101(1)
7 TWIC's Limits in Addressing Risks to Maritime Security 102(22)
Security Measures Affect Adversary Attack Choices
102(2)
TWIC's Contribution to Vulnerability Reduction Is Inherently Limited
104(9)
Empirical Evidence of Breaches of Access Control Measures
113(3)
Limitations of TWIC Inspection Data
116(1)
TWIC's Strengths and Weaknesses in Mitigating Risk
117(2)
Facility Security Personnel Reiterated the Limitations of TWIC
119(3)
Summary
122(2)
8 A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of the TWIC-Reader Rule Requirements 124(26)
Methodology for Determining Costs and Benefits of the TWIC-Reader Rule
125(2)
Foundations of the TWIC-Reader Rule Regulatory Analysis
127(1)
Building on the Framework in the Regulatory Analysis for the TWIC-Reader Rule Using Additional Cost Data
128(2)
A Comparison of the 2015 Regulatory Analysis and Our Break-Even Analysis
130(8)
Consideration of Regulatory Alternatives
138(5)
Expanded Break-Even Analysis Results
143(5)
Summary
148(2)
9 Alternative Models and Redundancies 150(16)
Using Biometrics in the TWIC Program
150(5)
Other Transportation Credentials
155(2)
Alternative Operating Models for the Transportation Security Card
157(7)
Summary
164(2)
10 Conclusion 166(13)
Summary of Conclusions About Public Law 114-278
169(1)
Section 1(b)(3)(A)(i): Review the Appropriateness of the Vetting Standards
170(2)
Section 1(b)(3)(A)(ii): Review the Fee Structure and the Cost of Vetting
172(1)
Section 1(b)(3)(A)(iii): Find Any Unnecessary Redundancy or Duplication with Other Transportation Credentials
172(1)
Section 1(b)(3)(A)(iv): Determine the Appropriateness of Having Varying Threat Assessments and Access Control
173(1)
Section 1(b)(3)(B): Assess the Length of Time to Review TWIC Applications
174(1)
Section 1(b)(3)(C)(i): Assess TWIC's Addressal of Known and Likely Maritime Security Risks
174(1)
Section 1(b)(3)(C)(ii): Assess the Potential for a Nonbiometric Alternative
175(1)
Section 1(b)(3)(C)(iii): Determine the Impact of TWIC Cards and TWIC Readers
176(1)
Section 1(b)(3)(C)(iv): Review the Costs and Benefits of the TWIC Program
177(1)
Section 1(b)(3)(C)(v): Address Previous GAO and OIG Concerns
177(2)
Appendix A. Port and Facility Interviews 179(12)
Appendix B. Permanent and Interim Disqualifying Criminal Offenses for TWIC 191(2)
Appendix C. MSRAM in Relation to the TWIC Program 193(5)
Appendix D. The Status of GAO and OIG Recommendations 198(10)
Appendix E. A Detailed Analysis of TWIC User Fees 208(10)
Appendix F. Rationale for a Break-Even Analysis 218(6)
Appendix G. Detailed Estimation of Costs and Benefits 224(27)
Bibliography 251