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Semantics for Reasons [Kietas viršelis]

(Reader in Philosophy, University of St Andrews), (Lecturer in Computer Science and Engineering, The Ohio State University)
  • Formatas: Hardback, 176 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 220x145x17 mm, weight: 354 g
  • Išleidimo metai: 04-Jul-2019
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0198832621
  • ISBN-13: 9780198832621
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
  • Formatas: Hardback, 176 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 220x145x17 mm, weight: 354 g
  • Išleidimo metai: 04-Jul-2019
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0198832621
  • ISBN-13: 9780198832621
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Semantics for Reasons is a book about what we mean when we talk about reasons. It not only brings together the theory of reasons and natural language semantics in original ways but also sketches out a litany of implications for metaethics and the philosophy of normativity. In their account of how the language of reasons works, Bryan R. Weaver and Kevin Scharp propose and defend a view called Question Under Discussion (QUD) Reasons Contextualism. They use this view to argue for a series of novel positions on the ontology of reasons, indexical facts, the reasons-to-be-rational debate, moral reasons, and the reasons-first approach.
Acknowledgments vii
Introduction 1(7)
1 Reasons
8(16)
1.1 Contributory, Conclusive, and Sufficient Reasons
9(3)
1.2 Adaptive, Evaluative, and Practical Reasons
12(2)
1.3 Normative, Motivating, and Explanatory Reasons
14(3)
1.4 Permissive and Obligatory Reasons
17(1)
1.5 Internal and External Reasons
18(1)
1.6 Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Reasons
19(5)
2 Logical Form
24(22)
2.1 Reasons Locutions
24(4)
2.2 Ambiguity
28(5)
2.3 Context Dependence
33(8)
2.4 Contrastivism
41(2)
2.5 Weight
43(3)
3 Semantics
46(3)
3.1 Conceptual Analysis and Natural Language Semantics
46(3)
32 Semantic Theories
49(29)
3.3 Contexts
51(1)
3.4 Contents
52(3)
3.5 Distinctions
55(2)
3.6 The Maze Example and Eight Semantic Kinds of Reasons
57(6)
3.7 Love Analogy
63(4)
3.8 A Formal Semantics for Reasons
67(11)
4 The Competition
78(22)
4.1 Finlay's Conceptual Analysis
78(4)
4.2 Blackburn and Expressivism
82(3)
4.3 Henning's Information Contextualism
85(7)
4.4 Kolodny's Semantic Relativism
92(8)
5 Implications
100(47)
5.1 The Ontology of Reasons
100(8)
5.2 Indexical Facts
108(2)
5.3 Reasons to be Rational
110(10)
5.4 Moral Reasons
120(12)
5.5 Reasons First
132(15)
Works Cited 147(12)
Index 159
Bryan R. Weaver received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Reading in 2012 and is now a Senior Lecturer in Computer Science and Engineering and an affiliate of the Center for Ethics and Human Values at The Ohio State University. He has published on the philosophy of sex, and he works on the philosophies of normativity and perception, as well as metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics.

Kevin Scharp received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh in 2005 and is now a Reader in Philosophy at the University of St Andrews and the director of the Arché Philosophical Research Centre. He taught previously at The Ohio State University. He has published on philosophical logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and philosophy of science. He is the author of a book, Replacing Truth (Oxford 2013), and editor of a collection of Wilfrid Sellars' essays.