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El. knyga: Skepticism

(University of California, Irvine & University of Edinburgh), (University of Modena, Italy)
  • Formatas: 212 pages
  • Serija: New Problems of Philosophy
  • Išleidimo metai: 09-Feb-2022
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780429609138
  • Formatas: 212 pages
  • Serija: New Problems of Philosophy
  • Išleidimo metai: 09-Feb-2022
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780429609138

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Skepticism is one of the perennial problems of philosophy: from antiquity, to the early modern period of Descartes and Hume, and right through to the present day. It remains a fundamental and widely studied topic and, as Annalisa Coliva and Duncan Pritchard show in Skepticism, it presents us with a paradox with important ramifications not only for epistemology but also for many other core areas of philosophy.

This book provides a thorough grounding in contemporary debates about skepticism, exploring the following key topics:











the core skeptical arguments, with a particular focus on Cartesian and Humean radical skepticism the epistemic principles that are held to underlie skeptical arguments, such as the Closure and Underdetermination principles the content externalism of Putnam, Davidson, and Chalmers, and how it might help us respond to radical skepticism the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction and how it relates to the skeptical problematic contextualism in epistemology and its anti-skeptical import the various interpretations of a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology the viability of epistemological disjunctivism, including whether it can be combined with hinge epistemology as part of a dual response to radical skepticism liberal and conservative responses to the Humean skeptical paradox.

Both authors are prominent figures who work on skepticism, and so one novelty of the book is that it provides an insight into their own contrasting responses to this philosophical difficulty. With the addition of annotated further reading and a glossary, this is an ideal starting point for anyone studying the philosophy of skepticism, along with students of epistemology, metaphysics, and contemporary analytic philosophy.
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1(11)
1 The skeptical paradox
12(18)
1.1 Introduction
12(1)
1.2 Skepticism
13(6)
1.3 The Cartesian skeptical paradox
19(6)
1.4 Humean skepticism and epistemic circularity
25(2)
1.5 Agrippa's trilemma
27(3)
Further reading
28(2)
2 Content and epistemic externalism
30(28)
2.1 Introduction
30(1)
2.2 Content externalism
31(13)
2.3 Epistemic externalism
44(14)
Further reading
55(3)
3 The denial of the Closure principle and contextualism
58(20)
3.1 Introduction
58(1)
3.2 The denial of the Closure principle
59(10)
3.3 The contextualist response: Cohen and DeRose
69(9)
Further reading
76(1)
Notes
77(1)
4 Hinge epistemology and Closure-based Cartesian skepticism
78(15)
4.1 Introduction
78(1)
4.2 Hinge epistemology in outline
79(4)
4.3 Hinge commitments and radical skepticism
83(10)
Further reading
92(1)
5 Epistemological disjunctivism
93(20)
5.1 Introduction
93(1)
5.2 Epistemological disjunctivism in outline
94(6)
5.3 Defending epistemological disjunctivism
100(7)
5.4 The `biscopic' response to radical skepticism
107(6)
Further reading
112(1)
6 Moore, liberals, and conservatives
113(32)
6.1 Introduction
113(4)
6.2 G. E. Moore's proof of the external world
117(3)
6.3 Pryor and the liberal account of perceptual justification
120(5)
6.4 Wright's conservative account of perceptual justification and entitlements
125(9)
6.5 Between liberals and conservatives: Wedgwood and Sosa's a priori strategies
134(11)
Further reading
143(1)
Notes
144(1)
7 Varieties of hinge epistemology: naturalism, contextualism, and constitutivism
145(30)
7.1 Introduction
145(2)
7.2 Strawson's naturalism
147(2)
7.3 Wittgenstein's normativism
149(5)
7.4 Williams' contextualism
154(8)
7.5 Coliva's constitutivism
162(13)
Further reading
173(1)
Notes
174(1)
Glossary 175(8)
Bibliography 183(17)
Index 200
Annalisa Coliva is Full Professor, Chancellor Fellow, and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of California, Irvine, USA. Her books include Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense (2010), Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology (2015), and The Varieties of Self-Knowledge (2016). With Maria Baghramian she is author of Relativism (Routledge, 2019).







Duncan Pritchard

is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Knowledge, Technology & Society at the University of California, Irvine, USA. His books include Epistemic Luck (2005), The Nature and Value of Knowledge (with Millar and Haddock, 2010), Epistemological Disjunctivism (2012), Epistemic Angst (2015), Scepticism: A Very Short Introduction (2019), and What Is This Thing Called Knowledge? (4th edn, Routledge, 2018).