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Social Foraging Theory [Minkštas viršelis]

  • Formatas: Paperback / softback, 376 pages, aukštis x plotis: 235x152 mm, weight: 510 g, 13 tables, 66 line illus.
  • Serija: Monographs in Behavior and Ecology
  • Išleidimo metai: 04-Jun-2000
  • Leidėjas: Princeton University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0691048770
  • ISBN-13: 9780691048772
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
  • Formatas: Paperback / softback, 376 pages, aukštis x plotis: 235x152 mm, weight: 510 g, 13 tables, 66 line illus.
  • Serija: Monographs in Behavior and Ecology
  • Išleidimo metai: 04-Jun-2000
  • Leidėjas: Princeton University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0691048770
  • ISBN-13: 9780691048772
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:

Although there is extensive literature in the field of behavioral ecology that attempts to explain foraging of individuals, social foraging--the ways in which animals search and compete for food in groups--has been relatively neglected. This book redresses that situation by providing both a synthesis of the existing literature and a new theory of social foraging. Giraldeau and Caraco develop models informed by game theory that offer a new framework for analysis. Social Foraging Theory contains the most comprehensive theoretical approach to its subject, coupled with quantitative methods that will underpin future work in the field. The new models and approaches that are outlined here will encourage new research directions and applications.

To date, the analysis of social foraging has lacked unifying themes, clear recognition of the problems inherent in the study of social foraging, and consistent interaction between theory and experiments. This book identifies social foraging as an economic interaction between the actions of individuals and those of other foragers. This interdependence raises complex questions about the size of foraging groups, the diversity of resources used, and the propensity of group members to exploit each other or forage cooperatively. The models developed in the book will allow researchers to test their own approaches and predictions. Many years in development, Social Foraging Theory will interest researchers and graduate students in such areas as behavioral ecology, population ecology, evolutionary biology, and wildlife management.

Recenzijos

"Social Foraging Theory will stimulate and guide future work on the evolution and ecology of group foraging for years to come."--Graeme D. Ruxton, Book Reviews "This book will surely have a major influence on the field of behavioral ecology for years to come ... To offer a shameless directive, if you have any interest in the evolution of social behavior, do yourself a favor and read this book."--Thomas A. Waite, Ecology "This book's] framework is so useful and insightful that I expect it to be very widely used. I find it hard to imagine how the authors of any future paper published on the foraging of animals in groups could get away without citing this work. I think it will become a classic text."--Graeme D. Ruxton, Ethology "A well-written, extensive, and unique review of the theoretical model developed to predict and explain the foraging behaviors of animals while in groups... Behavioral ecologists specializing in animal foraging will find this book to be an indispensable resource."--Craig L. Frank, Quarterly Review of Biology "In what is certain to become a landmark publication, Luc-Alain Giraldeau and Thomas Caraco present a frame that links differing ecological questions that, to date, have rarely been related."--Michael Gillingham, ISBE Newsletter

Preface xi
Acknowledgments xv
Social Foraging Theory: Definitions, Concepts, and Methods
3(32)
What Is Social Foraging?
3(3)
Concepts and Methods of Social Foraging Theory
6(9)
Interactions Among Social Foragers
15(2)
Concluding Remarks
17(18)
Math Boxes 1.1-1.3
19(16)
PART One: Group Membership Games
Two-Person Games: Competitive Solutions
35(19)
Introduction
35(1)
Achieving an Aggregation Economy
36(4)
A Symmetric Group Membership Game
40(3)
An Asymmetric Group Membership Game
43(5)
Concluding Remarks
48(6)
Math Box 2.1
50(4)
Two-Person Games: Conditional Cooperation
54(31)
Introduction
54(2)
Food-Sharing with a Communal Cost
56(10)
Food-Calling and Cooperation
66(7)
Concluding Remarks
73(12)
Math Boxes 3.1-3.3
78(7)
Group Size in Aggregation Economies
85(34)
Introduction
85(2)
Which Group Size to Expect?
87(3)
The Effect of Genetic Relatedness on Equilibrium Group Size
90(6)
Integrating Entry Rules, Relatedness, and Aggressive Dominance
96(4)
Risk-Sensitive Group Membership Games
100(9)
Concluding Remarks
109(10)
Math Boxes 4.1-4.4
113(6)
Predicting Group Size in Dispersion Economies
119(32)
Introduction
119(2)
Introduction to Continuous Input Models
121(2)
Changing the Assumptions of Continuous Input Models
123(14)
Introduction to Interference Models
137(3)
Changing the Assumptions of Interference Models
140(6)
Concluding Remarks
146(5)
PART Two: Producer-Scrounger Decisions
An Introduction to Producer-Scrounger Games
151(23)
Introduction
151(1)
The Diversity of Kleptoparasitism
152(1)
Kleptoparasitism: A Game-Theoretic Approach
153(2)
A Symmetric Rate-Maximizing Producer-Scrounger Model
155(9)
Empirical Tests of the Rate-Maximizing Producer-Scrounger Model
164(4)
Concluding Remarks
168(6)
Math Box 6.1
170(4)
Producer-Scrounger Games in Stochastic Environments
174(31)
Introduction
174(1)
A Stochastic Producer-Scrounger Game
174(6)
Analysis of the Stochastic Game
180(4)
Numerical Evaluation
184(10)
Experimental Evidence of Risk-Sensitive Producer-Scrounger Decisions
194(2)
Concluding Remarks
196(9)
Math Boxes 7.1-7.2
199(6)
PART Three: Decisions within Patches
Social Patch and Prey Models
205(24)
Introduction
205(1)
Models of Social Patch Exploitation
206(14)
Tests of Social Patch Models
220(2)
Social Prey Models
222(3)
Concluding Remarks
225(4)
PART Four: Models of Phenotypic Diversity
Quantifying Phenotypic Diversity
229(24)
Composition of Foraging Groups
229(3)
Quantifying Variability in Foraging Behavior
232(2)
Phenotypic Diversity
234(12)
Concluding Remarks
246(7)
Math Box 9.1
248(5)
Learning in Foraging Groups
253(34)
Introduction
253(1)
Some Functional Definitions of Learning
253(2)
Learning How: Individual Learning Only
255(2)
Models of Individual Learning Only
257(12)
Learning How: Social Learning
269(2)
Models with Both Individual and Social Learning How
271(6)
Learning About: Individual Learning
277(1)
Learning About: Social Learning
277(3)
Concluding Remarks
280(7)
Math Boxes 10.1-10.3
282(5)
Efficiency of Diversity: The Skill Pool
287(38)
Background
288(1)
A Skill Pool: Static Model
289(13)
A Skill Pool: Stochastic Dynamic Model
302(13)
Conclusions
315(10)
Math Box 11.1
322(3)
PART Five: Final Thoughts
Synthesis and Conclusions
325(10)
Introduction
325(1)
Group Membership Models
325(5)
Searching Decisions within Groups
330(1)
Models for Decisions within Patches
331(1)
Models of Phenotypic Diversity
332(2)
Conclusions
334(1)
References 335(24)
Subject Index 359(2)
Species Index 361
Luc-Alain Giraldeau is Professor of Biology at Université du Québec ą Montréal. Thomas Caraco is Associate Professor of Biology at the State University of New York, Albany.