Among the various conceptions of truth is one according to which "is true" is a transparent, entirely see-through device introduced for only practical (expressive) reasons. This device, when introduced into the language, brings about truth-theoretic paradoxes (particularly, the notorious Liar and Curry paradoxes). The options for dealing with the paradoxes while preserving the full transparency of "true" are limited. In Spandrels of Truth, Beall concisely presents and defends a modest, so-called dialetheic theory of transparent truth.
| 1 The Basic Picture |
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1.1 Ttruth qua constructed device |
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1.5 Basic picture: merely 'semantic' gluts |
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Appendix: LPTT non-triviality |
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| 2 Suitable Conditional |
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2.2 Curry and a suitable conditional |
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2.4 Truth preservation and validity |
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Appendix: BXTT non-triviality |
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| 3 Just True |
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3.2 What just true is not |
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3.3 What just true is: just ttruth |
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3.5 Limited notions of 'just true' |
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Appendix: a note on 'just true' in BX |
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| 4 A Look at the Field |
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4.1 Broad background projects |
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4.2 Kripke: basic paracomplete |
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4.3 Field: advanced paracomplete |
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4.4 Choosing among rivals? |
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4.5 Summary and closing remarks |
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| 5 Objections and Replies |
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5.1 Dialetheism, in general |
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5.2 Negation, gaps, and unsettledness |
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5.3 Truth, mathematics, and metaphysics |
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5.5 Orthodoxy: Priestly dialetheism |
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| A Overlap without Inconsistency? |
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A.1 Philosophical picture: paranormal |
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A.2 An alternative picture: merely instrumental gluts |
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| B List of Common Abbreviations |
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| References |
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| Index |
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Jc Beall is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut, a member of the UConn Group in Logic, and an Associate Fellow of Arché, the AHRC Research Centre for the Philosophy of Logic, Language, Mathematics, and Epistemology. Though having wide philosophical interests, Beall has published mainly in philosophical logic and the philosophy of logic.
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