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Strategic Bargaining and Cooperation in Greenhouse Gas Mitigations: An Integrated Assessment Modeling Approach [Kietas viršelis]

(SUNY at Binghamton)
  • Formatas: Hardback, 208 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 229x152x14 mm, weight: 454 g, 59 figures, 32 tables
  • Išleidimo metai: 01-Nov-2008
  • Leidėjas: MIT Press
  • ISBN-10: 0262240548
  • ISBN-13: 9780262240543
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
  • Formatas: Hardback, 208 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 229x152x14 mm, weight: 454 g, 59 figures, 32 tables
  • Išleidimo metai: 01-Nov-2008
  • Leidėjas: MIT Press
  • ISBN-10: 0262240548
  • ISBN-13: 9780262240543
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:

A fresh approach to the economics of climate change that bridges integratedassessment modeling and game theoretic modeling.Strategic Bargaining and Cooperation in GreenhouseGas Mitigations: An Integrated Assessment Modeling Approach



The impact of climate change is widespread, affecting rich and poor countries and economies both large and small. Similarly, the study of climate change spans many disciplines, in both natural and social sciences. In environmental economics, leading methodologies include integrated assessment (IA) and game theoretic modeling, which, despite their common premises, seldom intersect. In Strategic Bargaining and Cooperation in Greenhouse Gas Mitigations, Zili Yang connects these two important approaches by incorporating various game theoretic solution concepts into a well-known integrated assessment model of climate change. This framework allows a more comprehensive analysis of cooperation and strategic interaction that can inform policy choices in greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation. Yang draws on a wide range of findings from IA and game theory to offer an analysis that is accessible to scholars in both fields. Yang constructs a cooperative game of stock externality provision--the economic abstraction of climate change--within the IA framework of the influential RICE model (developed by William D. Nordhaus and Zili Yang in 1996). The game connects the solution of an optimal control problem of stock externality provision with the bargaining of GHG mitigation quotas among the regions in the RICE model. Yang then compares the results of both game theoretic and conventional solutions of the RICE model from incentive and strategic perspectives and, through numerical analysis of the simulation results, demonstrates the superiority of game theoretic solutions. Yang also applies the game theoretic solutions of RICE to such policy-related concerns as unexpected shocks in economic/climate systems and redistribution and transfer issues in GHG mitigation policies. Yang's innovative approach sheds new light on the behavioral aspects of IA modeling and provides game theoretic modeling of climate change with a richer economic substance.

Preface ix
Introduction
1(8)
Integrated Assessment of Climate Change
1(4)
Game-Theoretic Analysis of Environmental Issues
5(1)
Motivation and Scope of This Research
6(3)
Modeling Global Environmental Issues as a Cooperative Game of Stock Externality Provisions
9(18)
Introduction
9(1)
Efficient Provision of Detrimental Externality and the Incentives
10(3)
The Game of Stock Externality Provisions
13(10)
The Solution Concepts of the Cooperative Game
23(2)
Efficiency and Game-Theoretic Solutions
25(2)
The RICE Model
27(26)
An Overview
27(1)
Model Description and Calibration
28(5)
Solution Concepts in the RICE Model
33(3)
Solution Algorithms
36(17)
Cooperative Game Solutions and Other Solutions in the RICE Model
53(50)
Two Benchmarks: BaU and Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium Scenarios
53(4)
Why Conventional Solutions Are Unfit for Analyzing International Cooperation
57(13)
Cooperative Game Solutions of the RICE Model
70(16)
Synthesis
86(12)
Side Payments toward Equalization of Mitigation Costs
98(5)
Analysis of Game-Theoretic Solutions in RICE
103(30)
Stability of the Grand Coalition
103(5)
Sensitivity Analysis from a Strategic Perspective
108(25)
Policy Applications of Game-Theoretic Solutions in RICE
133(28)
Incentive Compatibilities of Unilateral Actions
133(3)
Renegotiation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs)
136(14)
Distribution Analysis of GHG Mitigation Policies from Strategic Perspectives
150(7)
The Second-Best Subcoalitions of GHG Mitigations
157(4)
Epilogue: Further Research Directions
161(4)
Appendixes
165(14)
The Description of the RICE Model
165(2)
GAMS Code of the Example in Section 2.1
167(1)
GAMS Codes of the RICE Model (Core Part)
168(11)
Notes 179(4)
References 183(4)
Index 187