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El. knyga: Time in Fiction

(University of Hertfordshire), (University of Cambridge)
  • Formatas: 272 pages
  • Išleidimo metai: 19-Feb-2016
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780191662805
  • Formatas: 272 pages
  • Išleidimo metai: 19-Feb-2016
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780191662805

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What can we learn about the world from engaging with fictional time-series? What should we make of stories involving time travellers who change the past, recurrence of a single day, foreknowledge of the future, the freezing or rewinding of time, or time-series which split into alternative courses of events? Do they show us radical alternative possibilities concerning the nature of time, or do they show that even the impossible can be represented in fiction? Neither, so this book argues. Defending the view that a fiction represents a single possible world, the authors show how apparent representations of radically different time-series can be explained in terms ofhow worlds are represented without there being any fictional world which has such a time-series. In this way, the book uses the complexities of fictional time to get to the core of the relation between truth in fiction and possibility. It provides a logic and metaphysics to deal with the fact that fictions can leave certain features of their fictional worlds indefinite, and draws comparisons and connections between fictional and scientific representations and hypotheses. Utilising the notion of a counterpart, the authors show how to understand claims concerning persistence of characters and their identity across fictions, and what it means for a fiction to be 'set' at an actual time. Consideration is given to motion in fiction, asking whether it is sometimes continuous and sometimes discrete, how to understand different rates of change, and whether fictional time itself can be said to flow.

Recenzijos

It is the most comprehensive work written on the topic. It is beautifully written, is a paradigm of precision and clarity, and engages the reader throughout. It is essential reading for anyone interested in either the meaphysics of time or of fiction. * Stuart Brock, Australasian Journal of Philosophy *

Introduction 1(10)
1 Theories of Fiction
11(14)
1.1 Realism vs Antirealism
11(5)
1.2 A Possible-Worlds Theory of Fiction
16(3)
1.2.1 Analysing fiction operators
16(1)
1.2.2 Reports of what happens in fictions
17(1)
1.2.3 Negative existentials
18(1)
1.3 Two Neighbouring Theories
19(6)
1.3.1 Lewis's account of truth in fiction
19(2)
1.3.2 Priest's account of non-existent objects
21(4)
Part I Tense in Fiction
2 Theories of Time and Tense
25(6)
2.1 Time's Flow
25(1)
2.2 B-Theories of Time
25(2)
2.3 A-Theories of Time
27(3)
2.4 Two Uses of `Present'
30(1)
3 Fictional Time---A-Series or B-Series?
31(11)
3.1 McTaggart: Fictional Events in the A-Series?
31(1)
3.2 Tense in Films and Plays: The Claim of Presentness
32(2)
3.3 The Claim of Presentness: Take 2
34(1)
3.4 Tense Without Location
35(4)
3.5 Non-Standard Presentation: Anachrony and Disunity
39(2)
3.6 Aesthetic Support for the B-Series?
41(1)
4 The Fictional Future
42(25)
4.1 The Plot of Macbeth
43(1)
4.2 Three Types of Tensed Truthbearers for Fiction
43(2)
4.3 Prophescenes
45(3)
4.4 Future-Tensed Beliefs of Fictional Narrators?
48(3)
4.5 Future-Tensed Beliefs of Actual Audience Members?
51(2)
4.6 Macbeth as an Agent
53(3)
4.7 Communicative Standards and the Sisters' Utterances
56(2)
4.8 Fate, Foreknowledge, and the Quasi-Miraculous
58(4)
4.9 The Relevance of Actuality and the Underdetermination of A/B-Theory by Data
62(5)
Part II Temporal Structures and the Structures of Representations
5 Branching Fictional Time?
67(16)
5.1 Fictional Branches
67(1)
5.2 Branching Representations of Time
68(2)
5.3 Ersatz Worlds
70(1)
5.4 Disunified Times, Unified Stories
71(2)
5.5 Branching Time, Causality, and Branching Representation
73(4)
5.6 The Double Take
77(1)
5.7 Thematic Evidence for Branching Time?
78(1)
5.8 A Preference for Branching Representations?
79(4)
5.8.1 A problem concerning fictional narrators
79(1)
5.8.2 Agnosticism?
80(3)
6 Pausing and Rewinding Fictional Time?
83(8)
6.1 Pausing
83(1)
6.2 Funny Games with Fictional Time
84(1)
6.3 Understanding Funny Games
85(1)
6.4 A Puzzle about Causation
86(1)
6.5 A Change of Scene or the Scene of a Change?
86(2)
6.6 Anachrony Revisited
88(1)
6.7 The Signs of Ageing
89(2)
7 Recurring Fictional Time?
91(26)
7.1 Groundhog Day
91(1)
7.2 Understanding Groundhog Day: First Attempts
92(3)
7.3 A Puzzle about Belief
95(1)
7.4 A Case of Mistaken Identity
96(5)
7.5 Do Our Analyses Conflict with Interpretative Guidelines?
101(2)
7.6 On Resisting Analyses and Missing the Point
103(2)
7.7 The Ethics of Recycling
105(5)
7.8 Other-Worldly Hypotheses, Supporting Evidence, and Quantum Suicide
110(7)
8 Time Travel
117(19)
8.1 What is Time Travel?
117(2)
8.2 The Physical Possibility of Time Travel
119(2)
8.2.1 Time travel to the fixture
119(1)
8.2.2 Time travel to the past (and its relevance to fictional truth)
119(2)
8.3 Paradox
121(3)
8.4 Presentism Revisited and Back to the (Fixed Fictional) Future
124(3)
8.5 An Unfixed Future without Backwards Causation
127(2)
8.6 Impossibility in Time-Travel Stories
129(7)
9 Fictional Duration and Motion: Discrete or Continuous?
136(15)
9.1 Static vs Moving Images
136(1)
9.2 Norms of Temporal Representation in Film
137(1)
9.3 Stop-Motion
138(5)
9.4 Representation of Time by Static Images
143(1)
9.5 Static Images and the Principle of Actuality
144(3)
9.6 Pictures and the Norm of Simultaneity
147(1)
9.7 Homomorphic Representation Revisited
148(3)
Part III Identity and Persistence
10 Identity and Development of Characters and Fictions
151(25)
10.1 Identity Conditions of Fictional Things Within Fictions
151(5)
10.2 Sequels and Series
156(3)
10.3 Identity Conditions of Fictional Things Across Fictions
159(6)
10.3.1 Trans-fictional sameness and counterparthood
160(3)
10.3.2 Counterparthood vs numerical identity
163(1)
10.3.3 Indicating counterparthood
164(1)
10.4 Identity, Character Formation, and Character Development
165(3)
10.4.1 Change during character formation
165(2)
10.4.2 Change during character development
167(1)
10.5 The Development of Fictional Truth
168(8)
10.5.1 `Expansion' of fictional worlds
169(5)
10.5.2 `Revision' of fictional worlds
174(2)
11 Identity of Fictional Times
176(19)
11.1 When is 1984?
176(1)
11.2 Fictions Involving Actual Objects
176(2)
11.3 Locations, Substantivalism, and Creationism
178(1)
11.4 Uncontentious Cases of Fictions Set in the Past
179(2)
11.5 Once upon a Time, a Long Time Ago, Before You Were Born ...
181(2)
11.6 J 984 and 1984
183(1)
11.7 Fictions Set in the Future
184(1)
11.8 Fiction and Prediction
185(3)
11.9 Imagining the Future and Double-Plus Imagining the Future
188(1)
11.10 1984 and Temporal Dislocation
189(6)
Part IV Worlds and their Representation
12 True to a Story vs True in a Fiction
195(23)
12.1 Previously in Time in Fiction ...
195(1)
12.2 Introducing True to a Story
196(1)
12.3 Featuring Ely Change
196(3)
12.4 No Standard Semantics Were Harmed in the Making of This Story
199(5)
12.5 Licensed for Distribution outside Time in Fiction
204(14)
12.5.1 Morality
205(1)
12.5.2 Thought experiments
205(1)
12.5.3 Priest's `Sylvan's Box: A Short Story and Ten Morals'
206(2)
12.5.4 Reasoning outside the box: Responses to Priest
208(10)
13 Indefiniteness and its Logic
218(21)
13.1 Schrodinger's Box: A Short Story (with Some Morals to Follow)
218(1)
13.2 Indefiniteness in Fiction
218(1)
13.3 Truth Tables for Indefiniteness
219(4)
13.4 Indefiniteness in Stories
223(2)
13.5 Schrodinger's Cat Repackaged: A Case of Incompleteness in the Actual World?
225(9)
13.5.1 A disanalogy with fiction
227(1)
13.5.2 Conditionals and truth-value links
228(1)
13.5.3 Flawed ways of attempting to preserve truth-value links
229(2)
13.5.4 The right way to preserve truth-value links
231(1)
13.5.5 Causation
232(1)
13.5.6 What is it like to be a cat?
233(1)
13.6 Quantum of Solace or Pussy Galore?
234(5)
14 Incomplete Time Series
239(14)
14.1 Indefiniteness Concerning Temporal Order
239(1)
14.2 An Analogy between Fiction and the Special Theory of Relativity?
240(3)
14.3 Indefiniteness over Duration and Metric
243(7)
14.3.1 Multilevel metrics: Inception and Narnia
245(5)
14.4 Temporal Structure of Fictional Worlds
250(3)
Bibliography 253(6)
Index 259
Craig Bourne is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Hertfordshire. Craig studied Philosophy at Pembroke College, Cambridge, taking a BA (1995-1998), MPhil (1998-1999), and PhD (1999-2002). He was a Research Fellow at St Catharine's College, Cambridge (2002-2006), Lecturer in the Cambridge Philosophy Faculty (2004-2005), and College Lecturer in Philosophy at Pembroke and New Hall, Cambridge (2006-2007). He is author of A Future for Presentism (OUP, 2006) and is currently co-editing a collection (with Emily Caddick Bourne) on Shakespeare and philosophy.

Emily Caddick Bourne is Academic Director and Teaching Officer in Philosophy at the University of Cambridge Institute of Continuing Education. Emily completed her BA (2004-2007), MPhil (2007-2008), and PhD (2008-2011) in Philosophy at Newnham College, Cambridge. Emily was, from 2011-2014, a Jacobsen Research Fellow at Birkbeck, University of London, based in the Institute of Philosophy. Emily is currently co-editing a collection (with Craig Bourne) on Shakespeare and philosophy.