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Time, Language, and Ontology: The World from the B-Theoretic Perspective [Kietas viršelis]

3.80/5 (10 ratings by Goodreads)
(Associate Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy, Queen's University)
  • Formatas: Hardback, 208 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 241x163x17 mm, weight: 462 g
  • Serija: Oxford Studies of Time in Language and Thought 3
  • Išleidimo metai: 29-Jan-2015
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0198718160
  • ISBN-13: 9780198718161
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Time, Language, and Ontology: The World from the B-Theoretic PerspectiveDidesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: Hardback, 208 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 241x163x17 mm, weight: 462 g
  • Serija: Oxford Studies of Time in Language and Thought 3
  • Išleidimo metai: 29-Jan-2015
  • Leidėjas: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0198718160
  • ISBN-13: 9780198718161
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Pastovi nuoroda: https://www.kriso.lt/db/9780198718161.html
Raktažodžiai:
This book brings together, in a novel way, an account of the structure of time with an account of our language and thought about time. Joshua Mozersky argues that it is possible to reconcile the human experience of time, which is centred on the present, with the objective conception of time, according to which all moments are intrinsically alike. He defends a temporally centreless ontology along with a tenseless semantics that is compatible with - and indeed helps to explain the need for - tensed language and thought. This theory of time also, it is argued, helps to elucidate the nature of change and temporal passage, neither of which need be denied nor relegated to the realm of subjective experience only.

The book addresses a variety of topics including whether the past and future are real; whether temporal passage is a genuine phenomenon or merely a subjective illusion; how the asymmetry of time is to be understood; the nature of representation; how something can change its properties yet retain its identity; and whether objects are three-dimensional or four-dimensional. It is a wide-ranging examination of recent issues in metaphysics, philosophy of language and the philosophy of science and presents a compelling picture of the relationship of human beings to the spatiotemporal world.
General Preface xi
Acknowledgements xiii
1 Introduction: Time, tense, and the objective conception
1(6)
2 The reality of the future
7(28)
2.1 Introduction
7(1)
2.2 Preliminaries
8(2)
2.3 The empty future model
10(9)
2.4 The branching future model
19(9)
2.4.1 Ersatz branches
19(5)
2.4.2 Branch attrition and contextual truth
24(4)
2.5 More on the truth-value links
28(6)
2.6 Conclusion
34(1)
3 Restricting reality to the present
35(34)
3.1 Introduction
35(1)
3.2 Tense and presentism
35(4)
3.3 The grounding objection
39(9)
3.3.1 Property presentism
39(3)
3.3.2 Ersatz times
42(2)
3.3.3 Haecceities
44(1)
3.3.4 Epistemic presentism
45(1)
3.3.5 Will quasi-truth do the trick?
46(2)
3.4 More on truthmaking and grounding
48(10)
3.5 Skow's moving spotlight
58(5)
3.6 No unified reality: Kit Fine's `nonstandard' realism about tense
63(4)
3.7 Conclusion
67(1)
3.8 Review and preview
68(1)
4 Tensed predicates
69(20)
4.1 Introduction
69(1)
4.2 Tense and truth conditions
69(2)
4.3 Tense and translation
71(3)
4.4 Tensed predicates and entailment relations
74(1)
4.5 Tenseless predicates and entailment relations
75(6)
4.6 Some advantages of the date theory over the token-reflexive theory
81(1)
4.7 The referential--attributive distinction and the tensed copula
82(5)
4.8 The B-theory and the truth-value links
87(1)
4.9 Conclusion
88(1)
5 Experience and the present
89(24)
5.1 Introduction
89(1)
5.2 The problem
90(3)
5.3 Indexicals, linguistic meaning, and semantics
93(2)
5.4 Indexicals, perception, and causation
95(7)
5.5 Externalism, tense, and content
102(6)
5.6 Semantic objections
108(5)
57 Conclusion
113(2)
6 Objects and times
115(24)
6.1 Introduction
115(1)
6.2 Temporal predication: the contenders
116(3)
6.3 The relational account of temporal predication
119(4)
6.4 Objections and alternatives
123(11)
6.4.1 Lewis's objection
123(2)
6.4.2 Logical form and validity
125(4)
6.4.3 Mellor's `locational' theory
129(2)
6.4.4 The intensional account
131(3)
6.5 Change and pseudo-change
134(2)
6.6 A note on relational vs. substantive theories of time
136(2)
6.7 Conclusion
138(1)
7 Temporal parts
139(27)
7.1 Introduction
139(2)
7.2 Temporal parts and spatial-temporal analogies
141(5)
7.3 Three-dimensionalism
146(6)
7.4 Three-dimensional objects and `paradoxes' of composition and coincidence
152(6)
7.4.1 Coinciding entities
152(2)
7.4.2 Undetached parts
154(2)
7.4.3 Fission and fusion
156(1)
7.4.4 Some tentative conclusions
157(1)
7.5 The argument from vagueness
158(6)
7.6 Conclusion
164(2)
8 The B-theory and the passage of time
166(12)
8.1 The passage of time
166(4)
8.2 The direction of time
170(5)
8.3 General summary and conclusion
175(3)
References 178(9)
Index 187
M. Joshua Mozersky is Associate Professor in, and Head of, the Department of Philosophy at Queen's University. He works primarily on issues in the philosophy of science, ontology, and the philosophy of language. His articles have appeared in numerous journals including Philosophical Studies, Synthese, and International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, and in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time (OUP, 2011) and A Companion to the Philosophy of Time (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).