A New Foundation |
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1 2 x 2 games and the strategic form |
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1 | (8) |
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2 | (2) |
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1.2 2 x 2 games in strategic form |
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4 | (2) |
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1.3 Conventions for payoff matrices |
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6 | (2) |
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8 | (1) |
2 144 games |
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9 | (24) |
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9 | (1) |
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2.2 The strategic form in payoff space |
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10 | (5) |
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2.2.1 The inducement correspondence |
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11 | (1) |
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2.2.2 Using payoff-space representations to analyse games |
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12 | (3) |
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15 | (1) |
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2.4 Counting the 2 x 2 games |
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16 | (4) |
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2.4.1 Using order graphs to count the 2 x 2 games |
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17 | (2) |
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2.4.2 Numbering the 2 x 2 games |
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19 | (1) |
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20 | (5) |
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2.5.1 Types of order graphs |
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21 | (3) |
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2.5.2 Quasi-symmetric games |
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24 | (1) |
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2.5.3 Assignment and reflection |
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25 | (1) |
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25 | (2) |
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2.7 Appendix: Relating payoff patterns to the indexing system |
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27 | (6) |
3 Elementary topology of 2 x 2 games |
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33 | (24) |
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35 | (1) |
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36 | (4) |
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3.2.1 Talking about the neighbours |
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37 | (3) |
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40 | (3) |
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3.4 Constructing the graph of 2 x 2 games |
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43 | (13) |
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3.4.1 Subgraph/subspace/subgroup generated by a single swap: Z2 |
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44 | (1) |
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3.4.2 Two non-overlapping operations: Z2 x Z2 |
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45 | (1) |
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3.4.3 Overlapping operations: P6 |
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46 | (2) |
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48 | (2) |
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3.4.5 Structure of a stack |
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50 | (1) |
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50 | (2) |
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3.4.7 Topology of a layer |
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52 | (1) |
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3.4.8 The Euler - Poincare characteristic |
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52 | (1) |
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3.4.9 The four-layered torus |
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53 | (1) |
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54 | (1) |
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3.4.11 Pipes and hotspots |
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54 | (2) |
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3.5 Structure and content |
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56 | (1) |
4 Symmetric games |
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57 | (16) |
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4.1 The seven most studied 2 x 2 games |
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57 | (1) |
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4.2 The nature of a symmetric game |
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58 | (1) |
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4.3 Counting the symmetric games |
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59 | (3) |
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4.3.1 Identifying the symmetric games |
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60 | (2) |
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4.4 The space of symmetric games |
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62 | (3) |
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4.5 A map of the symmetric games |
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65 | (3) |
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4.5.1 Types of symmetric games |
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65 | (2) |
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4.5.2 The world of the symmetric games: a flying octahedron |
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67 | (1) |
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4.6 Do the symmetric games matter'? |
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68 | (2) |
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4.7 Appendix: Other subspaces under the symmetric operations |
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70 | (3) |
5 A Family for the PD |
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73 | (20) |
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73 | (1) |
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5.2 The nature of the Prisoner's Dilemma |
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74 | (2) |
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5.3 Overlapping neighbourhoods |
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76 | (5) |
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5.3.1 Conditions defining the PD as intersecting regions |
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80 | (1) |
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5.4 The Prisoner's Dilemma Family |
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81 | (2) |
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5.5 An alibi for one prisoner |
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83 | (2) |
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5.6 The asymmetry of the Alibi games |
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85 | (4) |
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5.6.1 Evolution with PDF games |
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85 | (1) |
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5.6.2 Bargaining in Alibi games |
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86 | (3) |
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5.7 Rank-sum inefficiency in the PDF |
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89 | (1) |
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90 | (3) |
6 Connecting the layers |
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93 | (12) |
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6.1 Least among equals: the X12 swaps |
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93 | (2) |
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6.2 Instability zone - X12 swaps matter |
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95 | (2) |
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97 | (5) |
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6.3.1 The pipe with the PD, microcosm of the 2 x 2 games |
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98 | (2) |
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100 | (2) |
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102 | (3) |
7 37 Holes, Coordination games, Battles of the Sexes and the hotspots |
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105 | (10) |
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7.1 Location and structure of hotspots |
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106 | (2) |
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7.2 How many holes? Thirty-seven |
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108 | (1) |
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7.3 Hotspots and their games |
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109 | (4) |
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7.3.1 The two-equilibrium hotspot |
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109 | (3) |
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7.3.2 The no-equilibrium hotspot |
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112 | (1) |
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113 | (1) |
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7.4 Geography of the social dilemmas |
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113 | (2) |
8 Classifying conflict |
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115 | (16) |
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8.1 Conflict, no conflict, mixed interests |
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115 | (3) |
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8.2 Describing conflict using inducement correspondences |
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118 | (1) |
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8.3 A single-surface map of the 144 games |
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119 | (2) |
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121 | (3) |
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8.5 Giver and taker: the Type games |
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124 | (1) |
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125 | (1) |
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126 | (1) |
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8.8 Completing the classification |
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126 | (3) |
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8.9 Structure of conflict |
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129 | (2) |
9 A Periodic Table for the 2 x 2 Games |
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131 | (16) |
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9.1 The Periodic Table of the 2 x 2 games: indexing |
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132 | (3) |
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135 | (1) |
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9.3 Conflict and common interest |
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136 | (1) |
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137 | (1) |
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9.5 Two, one or no dominant strategies |
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138 | (2) |
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9.5.1 Two, one or no Nash equilibria |
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139 | (1) |
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9.5.2 Dominant strategies and unmixed interests |
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139 | (1) |
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140 | (1) |
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141 | (2) |
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143 | (4) |
10 The real world |
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147 | (12) |
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10.1 A real-valued version of the model |
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148 | (2) |
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10.2 An evolutionary investigation |
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150 | (6) |
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10.2.1 The ecology of errors |
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153 | (3) |
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10.3 In conclusion: ordinal boundaries and real behaviour |
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156 | (3) |
Glossary |
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159 | (10) |
Bibliography |
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169 | (4) |
Index |
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173 | |