Foreword |
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xi | |
Acknowledgments |
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xiii | |
Abbreviations |
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xv | |
Introduction |
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1 | (16) |
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What Is This Handbook About? |
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2 | (1) |
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A Guide for Reformers, Journalists, and Civil Society Activists |
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3 | (2) |
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The Main Theoretical Narrative and the Guiding Principle of the Handbook |
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5 | (1) |
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Collective Action: The How To Change Solution |
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6 | (8) |
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14 | (1) |
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15 | (2) |
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1 Political Economy: What It Is and What It Is Not |
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17 | (32) |
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17 | (1) |
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Political Economy Analysis, Diagnostics, and Tools |
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18 | (4) |
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Reform Stories: Seeing the World through the Lens of Political Economy |
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22 | (6) |
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Deconstructing and Understanding Poverty Reduction Reform: An Empirical Puzzle |
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28 | (12) |
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The Limits, Perils, and Promises of Political-Economy Analysis |
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40 | (4) |
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44 | (5) |
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49 | (230) |
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2 Accountability and Corruption: The What Question |
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51 | (28) |
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52 | (1) |
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52 | (10) |
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Common Symptoms of Malfunctioning Institutions: Corruption and Its Relatives |
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62 | (11) |
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73 | (6) |
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3 The Collective Action Problem in Development: The Why Question |
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79 | (32) |
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81 | (1) |
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Collective Action Problems: At the Heart of Development |
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81 | (1) |
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82 | (3) |
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What Factors Inhibit Collective Action? |
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85 | (3) |
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Social Dilemmas of Delivering Public Goods |
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88 | (3) |
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Identifying and Evaluating Collective Action Problems |
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91 | (4) |
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Game Theory and Collective Action: Modeling Social Dilemmas with Nash Equilibria |
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95 | (3) |
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98 | (13) |
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Exercise 3.1 The Unscrupulous Diner's Dilemma |
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99 | (12) |
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4 Theories and Mechanisms of Political Economy: Institutions and Equilibria |
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111 | (46) |
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113 | (1) |
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Institutions, Incentives, and Collective Action |
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113 | (18) |
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Institutional Origins, Stability, and Change |
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131 | (9) |
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Symptoms of Institutional Failure: Lack of Enforcement |
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140 | (4) |
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Modeling the Role of Institutions with Game Theory |
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144 | (2) |
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146 | (11) |
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Exercise 4.1 The Prisoner's Dilemma Game |
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147 | (10) |
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5 Collective Choice and Agenda Setting |
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157 | (24) |
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159 | (1) |
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159 | (4) |
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163 | (8) |
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Agenda Setting as a Strategic Tool for Policy Making: A Note on Positivist and Normative Angles |
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171 | (2) |
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173 | (8) |
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Exercise 5.1 The Agenda-Setting Game |
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174 | (7) |
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6 Delegation Problems and the Principal-Agent Relationship |
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181 | (26) |
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183 | (1) |
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183 | (3) |
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The Principal, the Agent, and Their Incentives |
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186 | (1) |
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What Are the Main Technical Features of a Principal-Agent Model? |
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187 | (2) |
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Who or What Will Make Sure That the Agent Complies with the Mandate? Solving Delegation Problems |
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189 | (4) |
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Analyzing Principal-Agent Dilemmas Using Game Theory |
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193 | (2) |
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195 | (12) |
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Exercise 6.1 The Principal-Agent Game |
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196 | (11) |
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7 Causes and Effects of Information Asymmetries in the Policy-Making Process |
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207 | (26) |
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209 | (1) |
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The Political Economy of Information |
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210 | (7) |
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Broader Implications of Information Asymmetries |
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217 | (7) |
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Understanding the Nonlinear Relationship between Information Asymmetries and Pro-Development Collective Action |
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224 | (5) |
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229 | (4) |
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233 | (14) |
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234 | (1) |
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The Problem: Time Inconsistency |
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234 | (1) |
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What Is "Credible Commitment"? |
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235 | (6) |
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Credible Commitment, Collective Action, and Development |
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241 | (1) |
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The Importance of Collective Action-Induced Credible Commitment to Development: What the Data Say |
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242 | (1) |
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Modeling Credible Commitment as a Challenger Game |
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243 | (1) |
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244 | (3) |
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9 Solutions to Collective Action Problems |
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247 | (32) |
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248 | (1) |
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When Do Mobilization and Production of Public Goods Occur? |
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249 | (5) |
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Tools for Solving Collective Action Problems |
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254 | (10) |
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Conceptualizing Leadership, Trust, and Repeated Interaction through Games |
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264 | (2) |
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266 | (13) |
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Exercise 9.1 The Prisoner's Dilemma with Different Time Horizons/Institutional Incentives Game |
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267 | (12) |
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279 | (38) |
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10 How to Conduct Political-Economy Analyses: First Steps |
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281 | (22) |
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282 | (1) |
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Who Are the Stakeholders, and How Can Their Preferences Be Mapped? |
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283 | (3) |
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286 | (1) |
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287 | (1) |
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Methods and Instruments for Diagnostics and Analysis |
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288 | (3) |
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291 | (2) |
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293 | (10) |
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Exercise 10.1 The Leadership Game |
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294 | (9) |
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11 Recognizing Opportunity for Policy Change |
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303 | (14) |
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304 | (1) |
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Time Frames for Reform: Timing, Sequencing, Pacing, and Maintaining Momentum |
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304 | (6) |
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Complementary versus Trade-offs of Different Reform Areas |
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310 | (5) |
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315 | (2) |
Appendix A Fundamental Concepts in Game Theory |
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317 | (4) |
Appendix B Technical Appendix |
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321 | (2) |
Appendix C Political-Economy Concepts in Practice: Public Procurement Reform in the Philippines |
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323 | (10) |
Appendix D Political-Economy Homework Exercises |
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333 | (12) |
Index |
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345 | |