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Understanding Policy Change: How to Apply Political Economy Concepts in Practice [Minkštas viršelis]

  • Formatas: Paperback / softback, 380 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 231x190x22 mm, weight: 987 g
  • Išleidimo metai: 30-Nov-2012
  • Leidėjas: World Bank Publications
  • ISBN-10: 0821395386
  • ISBN-13: 9780821395387
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
  • Formatas: Paperback / softback, 380 pages, aukštis x plotis x storis: 231x190x22 mm, weight: 987 g
  • Išleidimo metai: 30-Nov-2012
  • Leidėjas: World Bank Publications
  • ISBN-10: 0821395386
  • ISBN-13: 9780821395387
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
How does the social and political context in which decision-makers find themselves in affect their ability to realize their reform goals? How does this context facilitate or inhibit specific reform agendas and projects? How can we operationalize and evaluate these risks and opportunities in order to decide what reforms and projects are feasible given the circumstances? This book provides the reader with the full panoply of political economy tools and concepts necessary to understand, analyze, and integrate how political and social factors may influence the success or failure of their policy goals. Starting with the empirical puzzle of why corruption, rent seeking, and a lack of good governance emerge and persist in a host of countries and sectors the book reviews how collective action problems and the role of institutions, as well as a host of ancillary political economy concepts can affect the feasibility of different projects. However, the book is not just a one stop shop of political economy concepts, but also provides practical advice on how to organize and use this information via the introduction of stakeholder mapping tools and the development of an actionable political economy toolkit.In other words researchers, graduate students, and policy practitioners interested in understanding, the what, the why and the how of policy reform will find this book an essential tool.
Foreword xi
Acknowledgments xiii
Abbreviations xv
Introduction 1(16)
What Is This Handbook About?
2(1)
A Guide for Reformers, Journalists, and Civil Society Activists
3(2)
The Main Theoretical Narrative and the Guiding Principle of the Handbook
5(1)
Collective Action: The How To Change Solution
6(8)
The Rest of This Book
14(1)
Summary
15(2)
1 Political Economy: What It Is and What It Is Not
17(32)
Objectives of
Chapter 1
17(1)
Political Economy Analysis, Diagnostics, and Tools
18(4)
Reform Stories: Seeing the World through the Lens of Political Economy
22(6)
Deconstructing and Understanding Poverty Reduction Reform: An Empirical Puzzle
28(12)
The Limits, Perils, and Promises of Political-Economy Analysis
40(4)
Summary
44(5)
PART I
49(230)
2 Accountability and Corruption: The What Question
51(28)
Objectives of
Chapter 2
52(1)
What Is Accountability?
52(10)
Common Symptoms of Malfunctioning Institutions: Corruption and Its Relatives
62(11)
Summary
73(6)
3 The Collective Action Problem in Development: The Why Question
79(32)
Objectives of
Chapter 3
81(1)
Collective Action Problems: At the Heart of Development
81(1)
What Are Public Goods?
82(3)
What Factors Inhibit Collective Action?
85(3)
Social Dilemmas of Delivering Public Goods
88(3)
Identifying and Evaluating Collective Action Problems
91(4)
Game Theory and Collective Action: Modeling Social Dilemmas with Nash Equilibria
95(3)
Summary
98(13)
Exercise 3.1 The Unscrupulous Diner's Dilemma
99(12)
4 Theories and Mechanisms of Political Economy: Institutions and Equilibria
111(46)
Objectives of
Chapter 4
113(1)
Institutions, Incentives, and Collective Action
113(18)
Institutional Origins, Stability, and Change
131(9)
Symptoms of Institutional Failure: Lack of Enforcement
140(4)
Modeling the Role of Institutions with Game Theory
144(2)
Summary
146(11)
Exercise 4.1 The Prisoner's Dilemma Game
147(10)
5 Collective Choice and Agenda Setting
157(24)
Objectives of
Chapter 5
159(1)
What Is Agenda Setting?
159(4)
Types of Agenda Setting
163(8)
Agenda Setting as a Strategic Tool for Policy Making: A Note on Positivist and Normative Angles
171(2)
Summary
173(8)
Exercise 5.1 The Agenda-Setting Game
174(7)
6 Delegation Problems and the Principal-Agent Relationship
181(26)
Objectives of
Chapter 6
183(1)
Delegation
183(3)
The Principal, the Agent, and Their Incentives
186(1)
What Are the Main Technical Features of a Principal-Agent Model?
187(2)
Who or What Will Make Sure That the Agent Complies with the Mandate? Solving Delegation Problems
189(4)
Analyzing Principal-Agent Dilemmas Using Game Theory
193(2)
Summary
195(12)
Exercise 6.1 The Principal-Agent Game
196(11)
7 Causes and Effects of Information Asymmetries in the Policy-Making Process
207(26)
Objectives of
Chapter 7
209(1)
The Political Economy of Information
210(7)
Broader Implications of Information Asymmetries
217(7)
Understanding the Nonlinear Relationship between Information Asymmetries and Pro-Development Collective Action
224(5)
Summary
229(4)
8 Credible Commitment
233(14)
Objectives of
Chapter 8
234(1)
The Problem: Time Inconsistency
234(1)
What Is "Credible Commitment"?
235(6)
Credible Commitment, Collective Action, and Development
241(1)
The Importance of Collective Action-Induced Credible Commitment to Development: What the Data Say
242(1)
Modeling Credible Commitment as a Challenger Game
243(1)
Summary
244(3)
9 Solutions to Collective Action Problems
247(32)
Objectives of
Chapter 9
248(1)
When Do Mobilization and Production of Public Goods Occur?
249(5)
Tools for Solving Collective Action Problems
254(10)
Conceptualizing Leadership, Trust, and Repeated Interaction through Games
264(2)
Summary
266(13)
Exercise 9.1 The Prisoner's Dilemma with Different Time Horizons/Institutional Incentives Game
267(12)
PART II
279(38)
10 How to Conduct Political-Economy Analyses: First Steps
281(22)
Objectives of
Chapter 10
282(1)
Who Are the Stakeholders, and How Can Their Preferences Be Mapped?
283(3)
The Role of Institutions
286(1)
The Role of Constraints
287(1)
Methods and Instruments for Diagnostics and Analysis
288(3)
From Theory to Action
291(2)
Summary
293(10)
Exercise 10.1 The Leadership Game
294(9)
11 Recognizing Opportunity for Policy Change
303(14)
Objectives of
Chapter 11
304(1)
Time Frames for Reform: Timing, Sequencing, Pacing, and Maintaining Momentum
304(6)
Complementary versus Trade-offs of Different Reform Areas
310(5)
Summary
315(2)
Appendix A Fundamental Concepts in Game Theory 317(4)
Appendix B Technical Appendix 321(2)
Appendix C Political-Economy Concepts in Practice: Public Procurement Reform in the Philippines 323(10)
Appendix D Political-Economy Homework Exercises 333(12)
Index 345