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ix | |
| Introduction |
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xi | |
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Chapter 1 Convenience theory of white-collar crime |
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1 | (20) |
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Convenience benefits and costs |
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1 | (1) |
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Theorizing and theory development |
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2 | (4) |
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Social economic conflict in society |
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6 | (1) |
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7 | (1) |
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8 | (3) |
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Reasons for punishing their own |
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11 | (3) |
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14 | (1) |
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15 | (1) |
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16 | (5) |
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Chapter 2 Economical dimension in convenience theory |
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21 | (14) |
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Economical profit in crime |
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21 | (2) |
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Profit-driven crime and markets |
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23 | (3) |
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Rational choice by self-interest |
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26 | (3) |
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Transaction costs in criminal activities |
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29 | (3) |
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32 | (3) |
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Chapter 3 Organizational dimension in convenience theory |
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35 | (34) |
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Organizational opportunity in crime |
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35 | (5) |
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Opportunity-driven financial crime |
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40 | (4) |
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Agency relationships in crime |
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44 | (2) |
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Institutional moral collapse |
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46 | (23) |
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46 | (3) |
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Dysfunctional network theory |
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49 | (1) |
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50 | (1) |
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51 | (1) |
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52 | (1) |
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52 | (1) |
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53 | (4) |
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57 | (3) |
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Follower obedience in organizations |
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60 | (1) |
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Organizational systems failure |
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61 | (2) |
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63 | (6) |
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Chapter 4 Behavioral dimension in convenience theory |
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69 | (32) |
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Deviant behavior in crime |
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69 | (4) |
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Labeling self-identity of criminals |
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73 | (2) |
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75 | (2) |
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Self-control and desire for control |
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77 | (1) |
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Strain for success and status |
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78 | (1) |
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Criminal personality disorders |
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79 | (8) |
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82 | (2) |
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Categories of personality disorder |
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84 | (3) |
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Crime deterrence mechanisms |
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87 | (3) |
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Neutralization techniques |
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90 | (5) |
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Profiling risky individuals |
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95 | (2) |
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97 | (4) |
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Chapter 5 Integrated approach to convenience theory |
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101 | (34) |
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Integrating convenience dimensions |
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101 | (5) |
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Research hypotheses for convenience |
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106 | (6) |
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Theorizing white-collar crime and criminals |
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112 | (3) |
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Limits to a general white-collar crime theory |
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115 | (5) |
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Contributions from convenience theory |
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120 | (4) |
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Comparison to Sutherland's theory |
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124 | (5) |
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129 | (6) |
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Chapter 6 Empirical study of white-collar criminals |
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135 | (22) |
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Sample of criminals in Norway |
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135 | (2) |
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Economical dimension in crime |
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137 | (4) |
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Organizational dimension in crime |
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141 | (4) |
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Behavioral dimension in crime |
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145 | (4) |
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The case of Kerik neutralization |
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149 | (4) |
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153 | (4) |
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Chapter 7 Statements for testing convenience hypotheses |
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157 | (16) |
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Desire in the economical dimension |
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157 | (2) |
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Opportunity in the organizational dimension |
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159 | (1) |
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Willingness in the behavioral dimension |
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160 | (1) |
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Research model for convenience theory |
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160 | (1) |
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The case of fraudulent attorneys |
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161 | (2) |
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The case of two sides in corruption |
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163 | (4) |
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The case of Yara corruption in Libya |
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167 | (5) |
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172 | (1) |
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Chapter 8 Corporate social responsibility |
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173 | (24) |
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When employers become crime victims |
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173 | (2) |
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When others become crime victims |
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175 | (3) |
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Gjensidige Insurance and Hells Angels |
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178 | (9) |
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Gjensidige Insurance Company |
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179 | (2) |
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181 | (1) |
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182 | (1) |
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183 | (2) |
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185 | (2) |
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Corruption case at Siemens |
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187 | (1) |
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What is corporate responsibility? |
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188 | (1) |
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Failure in corporate responsibility |
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189 | (1) |
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Stages of growth in corporate responsibility |
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190 | (3) |
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Convenience and corporate responsibility |
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193 | (1) |
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194 | (3) |
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Chapter 9 Internal white-collar crime investigations |
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197 | (32) |
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Police versus internal investigations |
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198 | (2) |
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Reasons for private investigations |
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200 | (2) |
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Investigative knowledge needs |
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202 | (2) |
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Crime disclosure by whistleblowers |
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204 | (5) |
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Privatization of law enforcement |
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209 | (1) |
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Disclosure of investigation reports |
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210 | (1) |
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Competence of private investigators |
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211 | (1) |
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Limits by investigation mandate |
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212 | (1) |
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Empirical sample of investigation reports |
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213 | (13) |
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226 | (3) |
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Chapter 10 The case of the Betanien investigation |
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229 | (16) |
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BDO investigation at Betanien |
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230 | (1) |
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231 | (3) |
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CEO priest prosecution in court |
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234 | (2) |
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CEO priest conviction in court |
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236 | (2) |
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Religious white-collar criminals |
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238 | (3) |
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Comments from the chairman of the board |
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241 | (1) |
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242 | (3) |
| Conclusion |
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245 | (4) |
| Index |
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249 | |
