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US Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: The Case For Restraint [Kietas viršelis]

Edited by , Edited by (CATO Institute, Washington,DC, USA)
  • Formatas: Hardback, 288 pages, aukštis x plotis: 234x156 mm, weight: 521 g, 11 Tables, black and white; 18 Line drawings, black and white
  • Serija: Routledge Global Security Studies
  • Išleidimo metai: 12-Feb-2018
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 1138084530
  • ISBN-13: 9781138084537
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
  • Formatas: Hardback, 288 pages, aukštis x plotis: 234x156 mm, weight: 521 g, 11 Tables, black and white; 18 Line drawings, black and white
  • Serija: Routledge Global Security Studies
  • Išleidimo metai: 12-Feb-2018
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 1138084530
  • ISBN-13: 9781138084537
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:

This book challenges the dominant strategic culture and makes the case for restraint in US grand strategy in the 21st century.

Grand strategy, meaning a state’s theory about how it can achieve national security for itself, is illusive. That’s particularly true in the United States, where the division of federal power and the lack of direct security threats limit consensus about how to manage danger. But a grand strategy consensus arrived in Washington in the past two decades around "primacy" or "liberal hegemony." Both Democratic and Republican leaders see US military power as indispensable to stability everywhere. US military alliances, they agree, secure the peace between foreign powers, and armed interventions are needed to occasionally halt civil conflict abroad. Partisanship masks this consensus. Republicans bitterly attack the Obama administration, but largely support doing more of the same – more energetic efforts to aid Syrian rebels, more troops in Afghanistan for longer, more Pentagon spending, and more vigorous efforts to demonstrate US fidelity to deter Putin through NATO. The consensus is unearned, according to the authors in this volume, who set out the case for restraint.

At its core, a grand strategy of restraint rests on three assumptions. First, the United States enjoys a robust state of national security thanks to its geographic, economic, and military advantages. Second, military interventions and long-term military alliances tend to cause more problems than they solve. Third, the United States would derive significant economic, political, and security benefits from a more restrained foreign policy, involving fewer military commitments and wars. Further, a grand strategy of restraint aligns with the fundamental values of the classical liberal tradition of the nation's founding. Accordingly, roughly the first half of the book focuses on challenging the assumptions of liberal hegemony or primacy. The second half explores the historical and political roots of US grand strategies and considers how to implement restraint in US foreign policy today.  

This book will be of much interest to students of US foreign policy, grand strategy, national security and International Relations in general.   

Recenzijos

'After a desultory post-Cold War insider debate, the US national security establishment settled on an ambitious grand strategy to integrate states great and small into a US led liberal international order. Despite the poor performance of this grand strategy for the last quarter century, particularly its propensity for war, advocates continue to rely on a handful of key arguments as to why it is both essential and doable. This book takes on these arguments one by one, and demonstrates their weakness. The key elements of a new, more cautious, and more cost-effective grand strategy-restraint are then systematically advanced and assembled into a coherent whole. Those uneasy with the present US course of action, and hungry for an alternative, will find allies in these pages.' -- Barry R. Posen, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA

'A. Trevor Thrall and Benjamin H. Friedman have assembled the intellectual A-Team of national security analysts in US Grand Strategy in the 21st Century. Covering the regional and functional waterfront, the authors of this timely and compelling volume demonstrate that the American pursuit of global hegemony over the past quarter century has been neither necessary nor realistic. The only puzzle remaining after reading this essential corrective to America's collective Liberal hegemonic delusion is why we fell for any alternative to restraint?' -- Michael Desch, University of Notre Dame, USA

'The essays in this volume shine a bright and skeptical light on Americas global military commitments, and make a compelling case for restraint in US strategy. The book includes fruitful discussions of the social science literature bearing on various strategic questions like nuclear proliferation, oil security, democracy promotion, and military intervention. It offers superb dissections of the role of distance, national character, public opinion, and built-up military institutions in shaping national strategy. The authors show, with keen argument and telling evidence, that restraint rather than primacy offers a superior route to ensuring Americas security, liberty, and prosperity.' -- David Hendrickson, Colorado College, USA

Americas recent unhappy experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya have caused many Americans to question the basic contours of US foreign policy, but they lack the confidence to challenge these ideas directly, and they are uncertain about realistic alternatives. This book helps fill in the details. It shows why warfare in the 21st century is unlikely to produce desirable results at reasonable costs. It challenges the notion that a forward-leaning US military posture is required to produce safety and prosperity. And it shows why a more restrained foreign policy would better align with classic American values of limited constitutional government, individual liberty, free markets, and peace. Taken together, the entries in this volume reassure readers that the United States can remain engaged in a complex world without having to manage it.--Christopher Preble, Vice President of Defense and Foreign Policy, the Cato Institute, Washington DC, USA

List of figures
ix
List of tables
x
Notes on contributors xi
1 National interests, grand strategy, and the case for restraint
1(16)
A. Trevor Thrall
Benjamin H. Friedman
PART I The myths of liberal hegemony
17(114)
2 It's a trap! Security commitments and the risks of entrapment
19(23)
David M. Edelstein
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson
3 Primacy and proliferation: why security commitments don't prevent the spread of nuclear weapons
42(16)
Brendan Rittenhouse Green
4 Restraint and oil security
58(22)
Eugene Gholz
5 Does spreading democracy by force have a place in US grand strategy? A skeptical view
80(28)
Alexander B. Downes
Jonathan Monten
6 The tyrannies of distance: maritime Asia and the barriers to conquest
108(23)
Patrick Porter
PART II The politics and policy of restraint
131(138)
7 Not so dangerous nation: US foreign policy from the founding to the Spanish---American War
133(24)
William Ruger
8 The search for monsters to destroy: Theodore Roosevelt, Republican virtu, and the challenges of liberal democracy in an industrial society
157(22)
Edward Rhodes
9 Better balancing the Middle East
179(19)
Emma M. Ashford
10 Embracing threatlessness: US military spending, Newt Gingrich, and the Costa Rica option
198(22)
John Mueller
11 Unrestrained: the politics of America's primacist foreign policy
220(23)
Benjamin H. Friedman
Harvey M. Sapolsky
12 Identifying the restraint constituency
243(26)
A. Trevor Thrall
Index 269
A. Trevor Thrall is a Senior Fellow in the Defense and Foreign Policy Department, Cato Institute, USA, and co-editor of Why Did the United States Invade Iraq? (Routledge, 2011) and American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear (Routledge, 2009).

Benjamin H. Friedman is a Foreign Policy Fellow and Defense Scholar at Defense Priorities and an Adjunct Lecturer at George Washington University, USA.