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El. knyga: Verifying Nuclear Disarmament

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  • Formatas: 240 pages
  • Serija: Modern Security Studies
  • Išleidimo metai: 09-Oct-2018
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781351592130
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Verifying Nuclear DisarmamentDidesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: 240 pages
  • Serija: Modern Security Studies
  • Išleidimo metai: 09-Oct-2018
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • Kalba: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781351592130
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Fifty years into the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) regime, the risks of nuclear war, terrorism, and the threat of further proliferation remain. A lack of significant progress towards disarmament will cast doubt upon the viability of the NPT. By recognizing that certain fissile materials are essential to every nuclear weapon and that controlling their usage provides the foundation for international efforts to limit their spread, this book presents a comprehensive framework for nuclear disarmament.

Based upon phased reductions, Shea provides a mechanism for the disposal of weapon-origin fissile material and controls on peaceful nuclear activities and non-explosive military uses. He explores the technological means for monitoring and verification, the legal arrangements required to provide an enduring foundation, and a financial structure which will enable progress.

This book will be invaluable to professional organizations, arms control NGOs, government officials, scientists, and politicians. It will also appeal to academics and postgraduate researchers working on security studies, disarmament diplomacy and the politics and science of verification.

Recenzijos

"His work is particularly valuable in light of the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which requires dismantling nuclear warheads but does not contain specific verification provisions. Shea's book offers a path forward for realizing the political goals of nuclear disarmament."

Kelsey Davenport, Arms Control Association.

List of figures ix
List of tables x
Foreword xi
Hans Blix
Preface xiii
List of abbreviations and acronyms xvi
Glossary xvii
Part I: An overview 1(18)
1 Introduction
3(16)
1.1 General considerations
3(2)
1.2 Two TPNW problems
5(2)
1.2.1 Time-bound disarmament
5(1)
1.2.2 Financing disarmament
6(1)
1.3 Theater-centric verification
7(2)
1.4 Institutional verification arrangements
9(3)
1.5 Coping with nuclear weapon secrecy
12(1)
1.6 The process of nuclear disarmament
12(2)
1.7 Elimination or conversion of a nuclear weapon complex
14(1)
1.8 Additional confidence building measures for the nuclear disarmament regime
14(5)
Part II: Eliminating existing nuclear weapons and weapon capabilities 19(44)
2 The international nuclear disarmament agency
21(13)
2.1 Introduction
21(2)
2.2 The nuclear disarmament council
23(4)
2.2.1 Responsibilities
23(1)
2.2.2 Nuclear disarmament councilors
24(1)
2.2.3 Standing committees
25(2)
2.3 INDA secretariat
27(1)
2.4 INDA Nuclear Disarmament Institute
28(2)
2.5 INDA Nuclear Disarmament Verification Research and Development Center
30(4)
3 The technical basis for nuclear disarmament verification
34(18)
3.1 Introduction
34(2)
3.2 Fission and fissile material
36(1)
3.3 Fissile material in nuclear weapons
37(2)
3.4 The Trilateral Initiative
39(2)
3.5 Decision factors affecting the verification of classified fissile material
41(5)
3.5.1 Information security
41(3)
3.5.2 Disarmament value
44(1)
3.5.3 Degree of assurance
44(2)
3.5.4 Susceptibility to cheating
46(1)
3.5.5 Practicality and affordability
46(1)
3.6 Candidate verification methods for classified forms of fissile material
46(2)
3.7 Chain of custody monitoring
48(1)
3.8 Development and production of INDA verification & monitoring equipment
49(3)
4 INDA inspections
52(11)
4.1 Introduction
52(4)
4.2 Fissile material-related inspection activities
56(1)
4.3 Elimination or conversion of weapon complex facilities
57(3)
4.4 Inspection logistics
60(1)
4.4.1 Verification equipment
60(1)
4.4.2 Conduct of inspections
60(1)
4.5 Inspection findings
61(2)
Part III: Sustainable disarmament 63(34)
5 Preventing rearmament
65(10)
5.1 Introduction
65(2)
5.2 Tasks assigned to the IAEA in the TPNW
67(3)
5.2.1 States that do not possess nuclear weapons
67(1)
5.2.2 States that disarm before signing the TPNW
68(1)
5.2.3 States that do not disarm before signing the TPNW
69(1)
5.3 IAEA capabilities and the TPNW
70(5)
6 IAEA disarmament missions
75(22)
6.1 Disposition of fissile material transferred from nuclear weapons use
75(1)
6.1.1 HEU disposition
75(2)
6.1.2 Plutonium
77(4)
6.1.3 Disposition inspection activities
81(1)
6.2 Conversion of mission-critical nuclear weapon facilities to peaceful use
82(2)
6.3 Diversion of declared stocks and undeclared production of weapon-usable nuclear material at declared facilities
84(6)
6.3.1 Plutonium
85(1)
6.3.2 HEU
86(2)
6.3.3 233U, 237Np and 241Am
88(1)
6.3.4 Diversion of indirect-use nuclear material
89(1)
6.4 Clandestine production of weapon-usable nuclear material
90(2)
6.5 Unconventional acquisition paths for weapon-usable nuclear material
92(1)
6.6 Historical production, imports/exports, and disposition of weapon-usable nuclear material
92(5)
Part IV: Building the nuclear disarmament regime 97(12)
7 Confidence-building measures for the nuclear disarmament regime
99(6)
7.1 Introduction
99(1)
7.2 Complementary bilateral arms reduction treaties
100(1)
7.3 TPNW engagement exercises
101(1)
7.4 Temporary monitoring of deployed or reserve warheads
101(1)
7.5 Controls on warhead refurbishment and re-manufacturing
102(1)
7.6 Export/import controls for nuclear-armed states
102(1)
7.7 Controls on fusion materials
102(1)
7.8 Standardizing dismantlement and conversion facility architecture
102(1)
7.9 Extra-territorial siting
103(1)
7.10 Antineutrinos
103(1)
7.11 Subsidizing disarmament
104(1)
8 Epilogue
105(4)
Legal Annexes 109(70)
Annex A.1 Text of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
111(11)
Annex A.2 (Suggested) Model Agreement Between A Nuclear-Armed State and the International Nuclear Disarmament Agency
122(33)
Annex A.3 (Suggested) Model Agreement Between A Nuclear-Armed State and the International Atomic Energy Agency
155(24)
Technical Annexes 179(37)
Annex B.1 International Center for Nuclear Disarmament Verification Research and Development
181(5)
Annex B.2 Candidate verification methods for classified forms of fissile material
186(15)
B.2.1 Introduction
186(1)
B.2.2 Attribute verification with information barriers
187(2)
B.2.3 Imaging plutonium in nuclear warheads with a thermal neutron camera
189(2)
B.2.4 A zero-knowledge proof protocol using active neutron interrogation
191(3)
B.2.5 Physical cryptographic verification using nuclear resonance fluorescence
194(2)
B.2.6 Cosmogenic muon verification with physical encryption
196(5)
Annex B.3 Inspection procedures for classified forms of fissile material
201(15)
B.3.1 Level 4 inspections
201(3)
B.3.2 Level 3 inspections
204(6)
B.3.3 Level 2 inspections
210(4)
B.3.4 Level 1 inspections
214(2)
Index 216
Thomas Shea is an adjunct, non-resident senior fellow at the Federation of American Scientists, and is widely recognized as an expert in nuclear disarmament verification, non-proliferation, and international safeguards. He specializes in pragmatic yet innovative approaches to verification, and has been honored for his work on Iran, the Trilateral Initiative, on a future FMCT, and on IAEA inspections in complex civil plants processing weapon-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and how those measures might be applied in the context of nuclear disarmament. Dr. Shea recently completed a FAS study supported by a MacArthur Foundation grant on the relevance of nuclear powered naval vessels to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, which may have relevance for Iran and for the 2020 NPT Review Conference.
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