Drawing on recently declassified documents and extensive interviews with Soviet and American policy-makers, among them several important figures speaking for public record for the first time, Ned Lebow and Janice Stein cast new light on the effect of nuclear threats in two of the tensest moments of the Cold War: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the confrontations arising out of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. They conclude that the strategy of deterrence prolonged rather than ended the conflict between the superpowers.
Recenzijos
One of Choice's Outstanding Academic Titles for 1994 "The orthodoxy ... is that deterrence worked and the arms race defeated the Soviet Union. Hitherto there has been little dissent from those positions, apart from those 'revisionist' historians who merely turned the whole orthodoxy on its head... Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein are not revisionists in that sense. They are far too sensible for emotional nonsense of that kind. Yet their work is quite as unorthodox, probably as shocking to the closed corporation of Cold War 'scholars' but much more surprising than that of the Chomskyans."--Godfrey Hodgson, The Independent (London) "They've got it just right. It is a dangerous conclusion that the West won the Cold War. The argument that one side won the Cold War is mistaken. We all lost the Cold War, particularly the USA and the USSR. We all won by ending it."--Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev
Daugiau informacijos
Runner-up for Choice Magazine Outstanding Reference/Academic Book Award 1994.They've got it just right. It is a dangerous conclusion that the West won the Cold War. The argument that one side won the Cold War is mistaken. We all lost the Cold War, particularly the USA and the USSR. We all won by ending it. That is the scientific conclusion. -- Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev
PrefaceAbbreviationsCh. 1Introduction3Pt. 1The Cuban Missile Crisis,
1962Ch. 2Missiles to Cuba: Foreign-Policy Motives19Ch. 3Missiles to Cuba:
Domestic Politics51Ch. 4Why Did Khrushchev Miscalculate?67Ch. 5Why Did the
Missiles Provoke a Crisis?94Ch. 6The Crisis and Its Resolution110Pt. 2The
Crisis in the Middle East, October 1973Ch. 7The Failure to Prevent War,
October 1973149Ch. 8The Failure to Limit the War: The Soviet and American
Airlifts182Ch. 9The Failure to Stop the Fighting198Ch. 10The Failure to Avoid
Confrontation226Ch. 11The Crisis and Its Resolution261Pt. 3Deterrence,
Compellence, and the Cold WarCh. 12How Crises Are Resolved291Ch. 13Deterrence
and Crisis Management324Ch. 14Nuclear Threats and Nuclear
Weapons348Postscript. Deterrence and the End of the Cold
War369Notes377Appendix523Name Index527General Index535
Richard Ned Lebow is Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. Janice Gross Stein is Harrison Professor of Conflict Management and Negotiation at the University of Toronto.
