Atnaujinkite slapukų nuostatas

What is this thing called Knowledge? 2nd New edition [Kietas viršelis]

3.62/5 (461 ratings by Goodreads)
(University of Edinburgh, UK), (University of Edinburgh, UK)
  • Formatas: Hardback, 200 pages, aukštis x plotis: 246x174 mm, weight: 522 g
  • Išleidimo metai: 21-Sep-2009
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 0415552966
  • ISBN-13: 9780415552967
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
What is this thing called Knowledge? 2nd New editionDidesnis paveikslėlis
  • Formatas: Hardback, 200 pages, aukštis x plotis: 246x174 mm, weight: 522 g
  • Išleidimo metai: 21-Sep-2009
  • Leidėjas: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 0415552966
  • ISBN-13: 9780415552967
Kitos knygos pagal šią temą:
Pastovi nuoroda: https://www.kriso.lt/db/9780415552967.html
Raktažodžiai:

What is Knowledge? Where does it come from? Can we know anything at all? This lucid and engaging introduction grapples with these central questions in the theory of knowledge, offering a clear, non-partisan view of the main themes of epistemology including recent developments such as virtue epistemology and contextualism.

Duncan Pritchard discusses traditional issues and contemporary ideas in thirteen easily digestible sections, including:

  • the value of knowledge
  • the structure of knowledge
  • virtues and faculties
  • perception
  • testimony and memory
  • induction
  • scepticism.

What is this thing called Knowledge? contains many helpful student-friendly features including study questions, annotated further reading, a glossary and a guide to web resources. Clear and interesting examples are used throughout. This is an ideal first textbook in the theory of knowledge for undergraduates taking a first course in philosophy.

Recenzijos

'A valuable addition ... A book that sets things out in a clear and elementary way, while still covering the ground properly.' Finn Spicer, University of Bristol, UK



'Clearly laid out, well organized and written by a true expert.' Michael Lynch, University of Connecticut, USA

Preface to the second edition x
How to use this book xi
PART I: WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? 1
1 Some preliminaries
3
TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE
3
TWO BASIC REQUIREMENTS ON KNOWLEDGE: TRUTH AND BELIEF
4
KNOWING VERSUS MERELY 'GETTING IT RIGHT
5
A BRIEF REMARK ON TRUTH
7
2 The value of knowledge
10
WHY CARE ABOUT KNOWLEDGE?
10
THE INSTRUMENTAL VALUE OF TRUE BELIEF
10
THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE
12
THE STATUES OF DAEDALUS
14
IS SOME KNOWLEDGE INTRINSICALLY VALUABLE?
15
3 Defining knowledge
20
THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION
20
METHODISM AND PARTICULARISM
21
KNOWLEDGE AS JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF
23
GETTIER CASES
23
RESPONDING TO THE GETTIER CASES
26
BACK TO THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION
28
4 The structure of knowledge
31
KNOWLEDGE AND JUSTIFICATION
31
THE ENIGMATIC NATURE OF JUSTIFICATION
31
AGRIPPA'S TRILEMMA
33
INFINITISM
34
COHERENTISM
35
FOUNDATIONALISM
36
5 Rationality
42
RATIONALITY, JUSTIFICATION, AND KNOWLEDGE
42
EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY AND THE GOAL OF TRUTH
43
THE GOAL(S) OF EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY
45
THE (UN)IMPORTANCE OF EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY
46
RATIONALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY
47
EPISTEMIC INTERNALISM/EXTERNALISM
49
6 Virtues and faculties
55
RELIABILISM
55
A 'GETTIER' PROBLEM FOR RELIABILISM
56
VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY
57
VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE EXTERNALISM/INTERNALISM DISTINCTION
60
PART II: WHERE DOES KNOWLEDGE COME FROM? 67
7 Perception
69
THE PROBLEM OF PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE
69
INDIRECT REALISM
71
IDEALISM
73
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM
74
DIRECT REALISM
76
8 Testimony and memory
80
THE PROBLEM OF TESTIMONIAL KNOWLEDGE
80
REDUCTIONISM
82
CREDULISM
84
THE PROBLEM OF MEMORIAL KNOWLEDGE
86
9 A priority and inference
91
A PRIORI AND EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE
91
THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF A PRIORI AND EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE
92
INTROSPECTIVE KNOWLEDGE
93
DEDUCTION
94
INDUCTION
95
ABDUCTION
96
10 The problem of induction
101
THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION
101
RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION
103
LIVING WITH THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION FALSIFICATION
103
LIVING WITH THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION II: PRAGMATISM
107
11 A case study: moral knowledge
112
THE PROBLEM OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE
112
SCEPTICISM ABOUT MORAL FACTS
112
SCEPTICISM ABOUT MORAL KNOWLEDGE
116
THE NATURE OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE I: CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONALISM
118
THE NATURE OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE II: ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS
120
PART III: DO WE KNOW ANYTHING AT ALL? 127
12 Scepticism about other minds
129
THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS
129
THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY
130
A PROBLEM FOR THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY
131
TWO VERSIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS
132
PERCEIVING SOMEONE ELSE'S MIND
134
13 Radical scepticism
137
THE RADICAL SCEPTICAL PARADOX
137
SCEPTICISM AND CLOSURE
140
MOOREANISM
142
CONTEXTUALISM
145
14 Truth and objectivity
151
OBJECTIVITY, ANTI-REALISM, AND SCEPTICISM
151
TRUTH AS THE GOAL OF INQUIRY
152
AUTHENTICICTY AND THE VALUE OF TRUTH
154
RELATIVISM
155
General further reading 159
Glossary of terms 163
Glossary of key examples 179
Index 182
Duncan Pritchard is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling, UK.