Preface to the third edition |
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xi | |
How to use this book |
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xii | |
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PART I WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? |
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3 | (7) |
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3 | (1) |
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Two Basic Requirements On Knowledge: Truth And Belief |
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4 | (1) |
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Knowing Versus Merely `Getting It Right' |
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5 | (2) |
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7 | (3) |
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10 | (10) |
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Why Care About Knowledge? |
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10 | (1) |
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The Instrumental Value Of True Belief |
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10 | (2) |
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12 | (2) |
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14 | (1) |
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Is Some Knowledge Non-Instrumentally Valuable? |
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15 | (5) |
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20 | (11) |
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The Problem Of The Criterion |
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20 | (1) |
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Methodism And Particularism |
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21 | (2) |
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Knowledge As Justified True Belief |
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23 | (1) |
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23 | (3) |
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Responding To The Gettier Cases |
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26 | (2) |
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Back To The Problem Of The Criterion |
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28 | (3) |
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4 The structure of knowledge |
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31 | (11) |
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Knowledge And Justification |
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31 | (1) |
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The Enigmatic Nature Of Justification |
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31 | (2) |
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33 | (1) |
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34 | (1) |
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35 | (1) |
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36 | (6) |
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42 | (13) |
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Rationality, Justification, And Knowledge |
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42 | (1) |
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Epistemic Rationality And The Goal Of Truth |
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43 | (2) |
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The Goal(s) Of Epistemic Rationality |
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45 | (1) |
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The (Un)Importance Of Epistemic Rationality |
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46 | (1) |
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Rationality And Responsibility |
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47 | (2) |
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Epistemic Internalismiexternalism |
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49 | (6) |
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55 | (12) |
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55 | (1) |
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A `Gettier' Problem For Reliabilism |
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56 | (1) |
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57 | (3) |
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Virtue Epistemology And The Externalismiinternalism Distinction |
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60 | (7) |
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PART II WHERE DOES KNOWLEDGE COME FROM? |
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67 | (46) |
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69 | (11) |
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The Problem Of Perceptual Knowledge |
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69 | (2) |
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71 | (2) |
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73 | (1) |
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74 | (2) |
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76 | (4) |
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80 | (11) |
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The Problem Of Testimonial Knowledge |
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80 | (2) |
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82 | (2) |
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84 | (2) |
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The Problem Of Memorial Knowledge |
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86 | (5) |
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9 A priority and inference |
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91 | (10) |
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A Priori And Empirical Knowledge |
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91 | (1) |
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The Interdependence Of A Priori And Empirical Knowledge |
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92 | (1) |
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93 | (1) |
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94 | (1) |
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95 | (1) |
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96 | (5) |
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10 The problem of induction |
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101 | (12) |
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101 | (2) |
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Responding To The Problem Of Induction |
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103 | (1) |
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Living With The Problem Of Induction I: Falsification |
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103 | (4) |
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Living With The Problem Of Induction II: Pragmatism |
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107 | (6) |
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PART III WHAT KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE ARE THERE? |
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113 | (46) |
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115 | (14) |
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115 | (2) |
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Science Versus Pseudo-Science |
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117 | (6) |
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The Structure Of Scientific Revolutions |
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123 | (2) |
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125 | (4) |
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129 | (15) |
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Is There Any Religious Knowledge? |
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129 | (1) |
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The Evidentialist Challenge To Religious Knowledge |
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130 | (1) |
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131 | (4) |
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135 | (1) |
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136 | (8) |
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144 | (15) |
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The Problem Of Moral Knowledge |
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144 | (1) |
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Scepticism About Moral Facts |
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144 | (4) |
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Scepticism About Moral Knowledge |
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148 | (2) |
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The Nature Of Moral Knowledge I: Classical Foundationalism |
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150 | (2) |
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The Nature Of Moral Knowledge II: Alternative Conceptions |
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152 | (7) |
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PART IV DO WE KNOW ANYTHING AT ALL? |
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159 | (32) |
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14 Scepticism about other minds |
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161 | (8) |
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The Problem Of Other Minds |
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161 | (1) |
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The Argument From Analogy |
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162 | (1) |
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A Problem For The Argument From Analogy |
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163 | (1) |
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Two Versions Of The Problem Of Other Minds |
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164 | (2) |
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Perceiving Someone Else's Mind |
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166 | (3) |
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169 | (14) |
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The Radical Sceptical Paradox |
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169 | (3) |
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172 | (2) |
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174 | (3) |
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177 | (6) |
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183 | (8) |
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Objectivity, Anti-Realism, And Scepticism |
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183 | (1) |
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Truth As The Goal Of Inquiry |
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184 | (2) |
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Authenticity And The Value Of Truth |
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186 | (1) |
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187 | (4) |
General further reading |
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191 | (4) |
Glossary of terms |
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195 | (16) |
Glossary of key examples |
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211 | (3) |
Index |
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214 | |